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Abstract
The American administrative state of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is defined
by deference by federal courts to administrative agencies. The political science and (especially)
legal literatures have long discussed how federal courts defer to agencies, but little attention has
been dedicated to how to identify deference and why courts defer. This dissertation redefines
deference, a term that has been topic of extensive discussion in the last forty years but that was
missing a key feature: the intent of the deferrers. Using administrative courts as the proxy for
agencies at large, this dissertation suggests three reasons why judges may defer. First, an Article
III court might defer to an administrative court by the advice of Chevron v. National Resource
Defense Council (1984), a case that provided an explicit declaration in favor of deferring to
agencies on the subject matters of which they are an expert. Second, an Article III court might
defer to an administrative court when the courts are staffed by co-partisans (i.e. when the
partisanship of the Article III court panel and the administrative court panel match). Third, an
Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the Article III court would like to
communicate instructions on good judicial practice to administrative law judges.
To test these theories, this dissertation utilizes a new approach to identifying deference.
Using the universe of precedent decisions at the Board of Immigration Appeals, I identified each
decision where there was a companion case in the various courts of appeals. This created dyads
of cases (n = 116) that provide the opportunity to trace a dispute through two different judicial
institutions. I coded each dyad on several variables that provided analytical leverage on all three
theories.

Upon explicating the research design and case selection featured in this dissertation, I
introduce the four forms of deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence
in the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in
the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the
text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in
the text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “active non-deference.” In this deference scheme, even non-deference has theoretical
significance. When a court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is
the rationale rather than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in
court with active language either for or against the agency’s actions, we can confidently make
conclusions about judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible
when solely relying on win rates.
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Introduction

Mr. Wong surely regretted his trip to Mexico.
After living in California from the age of fifteen, he decided to take a day trip to see the
sights south of the border; he was away from the United States for only two hours before
returning home. His last entrance to the United States was by illegal means: he arrived from
China through falsely claiming his father was a United States citizen. After his trip abroad he
voluntarily surrendered himself to the local Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office,
conceding his illegal entry and asking for a stay of deportation. The special inquiry officer in
charge of adjudicating his claim denied his request on the grounds that he was not continuously
present in the United States for seven years because of his two-hour sightseeing jaunt to Mexico.
His one avenue of relief (a stint in the U.S. military that ended with an honorable discharge) was
insufficient since to be granted a stay of deportation the immigrant must have served in the
armed forces for at least twenty-four months; Mr. Wong was discharged after twenty-three
months and twenty-three days.
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Wong was denied relief. The
Board, considering Fleuti (which granted discretionary relief to an immigrant who, like Wong,
1

was continuously present until a brief trip to Mexico; Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 499 (1963)),
declared Wong ineligible for relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) since he
never entered the United States legally like Fleuti did (Rosenberg). Since he was not technically
present for at least seven years before his application for an adjustment of status (filed in 1961,
four years prior to this decision), he was not eligible for relief and his appeal was dismissed
(Matter of Wong, Dec. A-13128473 (BIA, 1965)).
Like many immigrants faced with this outcome from the BIA, Wong appealed to the
closest court of appeals (in this case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals). Fortunately for Mr.
Wong, the Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion regarding Fleuti. Where the Board
argued that the trip to Mexico constituted a meaningful disruption in his presence in the United
States, the 9th Circuit concluded that nothing in the record showed that Wong intended to break
up his residence in the United States by briefly traveling to Mexico. The court, in reference to
the BIA’s interpretation of Fleuti, stated: “’The Service seeks to distinguish Fleuti on the ground
that there the [C]ourt was dealing with an entry and that here we are faced with a concept of
continuous physical precedent. 1 We do not regard this distinction as at all significant’” (Git Foo
Wong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 358 F.2d 151 (1966), 153; citing Waldman v.
INS, 329 F.2d 812 (1964), 815-816). They provide explicit instructions for the Board to rectify
their mistake in this case: “In deciding whether to permit an application for suspension of
deportation when the issue is physical presence ‘in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application,’ the Board must

1

Throughout immigration case law, the INS (and its successor, the EOIR) is used
interchangeably with the BIA using the term “Service.”
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determine the significance of an absence from the United States during that time under the
[s]tandard set down in Fleuti” (Git Foo Wong supra.).
Though Mr. Wong’s two-hour trip to Mexico did not ultimately lead to his removal from
the United States, it did make four years of his life extraordinarily difficult.
<><><><><>
The Wong cases are one dyad of hundreds that provide insight into the relationship
between courts and the administrative immigration apparatus. Through tracing the movement of
disputes from administrative courts to federal courts, patterns of deference by courts to agencies
appear. This dissertation offers a new approach to defining deference and explains why
deference occurs. By the end of this dissertation, I will provide answers to two questions. First,
how can we better ascertain whether judicial deference to administrative agencies has occurred?
Second, why does deference (or non-deference) occur? To answer these questions, I appeal to
dyads like Wong’s, where a dispute over immigration status moves from the immigration court
system to the federal courts. As I explain in Chapter 1, using this set of data provides an exciting
opportunity to consider this relationship without interference from confounding variables.

Administrative Courts in the Administrative State
Scholars of the bureaucracy and administrative law generally divide the day-to-day
functions of agencies into two activities: rulemaking and adjudication. Rules, according to
Section 551(4) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “means the whole or a part of an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
3

requirements of an agency (Administrative Procedure Act of 1946); rulemaking, then, is the
process of “formulating, amending, or repealing” rules. In plain English, rules are interpretations
of and changes to statutes that occur in the process of interpreting and implementing statutory
law on the ground. The bureaucracy literature in political science has generally focused on
rulemaking as a political act that has implications for how those interacting with the bureaucracy
change their behavior, particularly as policy making activity for political actors who are
otherwise restricted from acting politically (Croley 2003; Mashaw 1994; O’Connell 2008, 2011;
Pierce 2011; Potter 2017).
Conversely, the political science literature has not often focused on the adjudicatory side
of bureaucratic activity, even though, as I will argue, it is as politically important as rulemaking. 2
Section 551(7) of the APA defines adjudication as the “agency process for the formulation of an
order,” where Section 551(6) defines an order as “the whole or a part of a final disposition,
whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form of an agency in a matter other
than rulemaking…(Administrative Procedure Act of 1946).” This is vague, and administrative
law scholars have not reached consensus on what this section of the APA means except by the
exclusion of rules; for the purposes of this study, orders are defined as the end result of
adjudication, which is the process undertaken by administrative courts (Pierce et al 2013).
Administrative adjudication occurs throughout the bureaucracy, typically through the use
of administrative courts, or agency offices that are staffed by judges who adjudicate disputes in

2

The literature on the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is a notable exception to this
rule, though a sizable portion of this literature focuses on the politics of NLRB decisions rather
than how the NLRB makes those decisions.
4

an adversarial way not unlike courts in the judiciary (Kagan 2001). 3 As of 2020, there were
sixty-three administrative courts scattered across the bureaucracy. 4 Like federal courts,
administrative courts operate under a combination of legal and institutional constraints: they are
required to determine how the facts of a case relate to relevant jurisprudence in light of appellate
possibilities, and they must consider how the case at hand fits into the institutional structure of
the agency much in the same way that a federal court must make decisions with an eye towards
both past and future precedent (Coate and Kleit 1998). The APA defines administrative courts
through describing the prerogatives of administrative law judges, the bureaucrats who staff
administrative courts and are responsible for adjudicating disputes and, in turn, produce written
opinions that explicate statutory interpretations that carry precedential force (Administrative
Procedure Act, § 554-556).

Administrative Law in Action
Administrative courts and federal courts have a reciprocal, cyclical relationship
consisting of several steps. 5 The process begins with a dispute brought to an administrative court
under delineated statutory boundaries (as expressed by Congress in the language of the statute

3

The other primary method of adjudication for dispute resolution in the bureaucracy is the use of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as arbitration and mediation. For example, the
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education, tasked with enforcing Title IX of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, addresses Title IX violations by using binding arbitration. Similar
mechanisms are present throughout agencies, though these offices are typically very small and
only resolve a handful of disputes each year.
4
A list of all administrative courts with their mission statements is provided in Appendix A.
5
This dissertation uses administrative courts as its focus due to the institutional structures that
administrative courts and federal courts share. Following the case study advice provided by
George and Bennett, this dissertation employs a most likely case schema (George and Bennett
2005, 121).
5

and the agency as it has interpreted the statute over time). The form disputes take in these cases
depends on the statute the administrative court is tasked with implementing. In some cases, a
claimant is competing against the agency itself; for example, in removal proceedings before the
BIA within the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), complainants bring a suit
against the Department of Justice. In other situations, the claimant brings a suit against another
non-state actor; for example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hears disputes
between employees alleging discriminatory labor practices against their employer, neither of
whom are agents of the federal government. The administrative court, at the end of the
adjudication process, will reach either a pro-claimant (perhaps pro-immigrant or pro-employee)
or anti-claimant (perhaps anti-immigrant or pro-employer) decision. The process can end here
with no further adjudicatory action. If, however, the losing party is dissatisfied with the outcome
for either factual or procedural reasons, they are entitled to appeal to the federal court indicated
by the governing statute. Since these appeals are typically directed toward a non-Supreme Court
federal court, the court is compelled to hear the appeal and make a determination. 6 The federal
court, then, will decide either in favor of the original claimant, in favor of the original defendant,
or a mixture of the two. If the disputants are satisfied, then the process ends. If one or both
disputants are not satisfied, then the case can be appealed to the next highest court in the federal
judicial hierarchy until there are no courts left to appeal to. At each stage (assuming an opinion is
published), 7 the court will provide a written opinion on the merits of each dispute (Hume 2009).

6

That said, not all determinations need be published. This is especially the case when the statute
requires initial appeal to the geographically appropriate district court rather than the
geographically appropriate court of appeals. The Social Security Administration’s disability
adjudicatory apparatus uses this approach: decisions are not transcribed until a case is appealed
to an Article III court.
7
I discuss this methodological challenge in Chapter 1.
6

In the context of the administrative court-federal court relationship, previous decisions
made by federal courts in reference to an administrative court case affect future outcomes in
administrative adjudication. This is not unique, since stare decisis dictates that courts are
restrained, at least formally, by the strictures of precedent. But in the administrative court-federal
court relationship, these strictures are imposed upon one institution by another rather than
imposed by an earlier iteration of the same institution. An anti-administrative court opinion by a
federal court has the potential to change the behavior of the administrative adjudicators, and
these changes in behavior as a result of federal court actions are compounded over time to help
define how bureaucratic institutions function.
The conjunction of two legal orders, one judicial and one bureaucratic, fosters plenty of
opportunities for interactions between the two actors. In cases that arrive at the federal courts that
begin in administrative agencies, the agency is the prevailing party more often than not. Figures
vary depending on the types of cases examined and the research design employed, but agencies
win anywhere between 55% and 80% of cases where they are a party (Barnett and Walker 2017,
Kerr 1998, Miles and Sunstein 2006, Raso and Eskridge 2010, Richards et al 2006, Schuck and
Elliott 1990, Watry 2000). Since agency-originating cases make up one of the largest proportions
of appeals to the federal judiciary, it behooves us to understand why agencies are so successful in
court. 8
The extant literature defines this phenomenon, where a court rules in favor of an agency
with greater frequency than other types of litigants, as deference. Political scientists and

8

In 2017, appeals from administrative agencies comprised 20.4% of all appeals pending with the
courts of appeals at the end of the year. Only appeals from the district courts comprised larger
proportions (United States Courts 2017 Data Tables, Table B-1).
7

(especially) legal scholars have explored deference for years, generally concluding that deference
occurs but stopping short of providing answers as to why. Deference, introduced by Farina
(1989) and expanded upon in this dissertation, is “a style of review in which the Court adopts the
agency’s judgment at the expense of its own (Farina 1989, 454)” through the abdication of
political power pursuant to the adoption of another branch’s judgment; this occurs by allowing
another political actor to exercise a power that the initial actor would typically enjoy. Deference,
then, can be diagrammed in a two-by-two table, with an agency win or loss in the columns and
active or passive deference in the rows. The rows identify evidence of actual deference in the
text of judicial opinions: if the opinion includes language that lauds or criticizes the judicial
actions of the administrative court, then the deference or non-deference is considered active; if
the opinion does not include language that lauds or criticizes the judicial actions of the
administrative court, then the deference or non-deference is considered passive.
This dissertation is divided into two parts, both of which serve to enrich the existing
literature on deference. First, this dissertation redefines deference, focusing on the intent of the
deferential judge rather than relying exclusively on the outcome of the case vis-á-vis the agency.
It is impossible to ascertain deference by courts when we rely solely on the outcome; instead, we
must appeal to judge’s intent as communicated in the text of decisions. Upon explicating this and
providing new evidence of deference rates, the dissertation turns to why courts defer. It offers
three possibilities: copartisanship across institutions, adherence to deference doctrine, and a
commitment to instruct other institutions as an expert in judicial procedure.
The first two theories (copartisanship and doctrine) have been explicated in the extant
literature, and they will be considered in depth in Chapter 1. But the third theory, an institutional
motivation, is a new addition to the literature. It suggests that courts defer as a result of the
8

position they occupy in the greater administrative state: courts model what they consider to be
good judicial behavior and often actively point out inadequate judicial behavior. When courts
defer, they are making decisions on the basis of their relative expertise in dispute resolution and
statutory interpretation; by asserting this expertise through praising good administrative behavior
and correcting bad administrative behavior, the courts signal their intent as to how the
administrative state should exist and develop. Deference, then, is incidental to a larger goal of a
well-functioning administrative state. This explanation ties together the two pre-existing theories,
but it goes beyond simple legal or political explanations: it asserts a politico-legal landscape
where courts and agencies are in conversation and where the administrative state develops as a
result of these interactions, rather than through the individual actions of siloed institutions.
What follows, then, is an exploration of deference that plays out in five chapters. Chapter
1 provides the theoretical approaches (both old and new) to understanding deferential behavior
by courts to administrative courts. My arguments are two-fold: first, that to truly understand
deference we must redefine deference through no longer relying solely on agency win rates; and
second, that deference exists at the intersection of copartisanship, adherence to doctrine, and a
cooperative commitment to interbranch politics. To introduce the theories, I consider case
selection in detail. 9 Chapter 2 explains the new approach to studying deference: through
examining dyads of federal and administrative court opinions. There I explain the new method
for defining deference. An extensive explication of the coding instrument used to identify
deferential intent is included in Appendices C and D. Chapter 3 tests two explanations for
deference that are drawn from the existing literature on deference: copartisanship across

9

As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, there are potential generalizability concerns based
on case selection.
9

institutions and doctrinal commitments that compel judicial deference to an administrative
court’s statutory interpretation. These two theories garner fascinating results wherein Chevron
deference appears to provide an opportunity for judges to mask their political motives for
decision making. Chapter 4 appeals to the text of the dyadic opinions to suggest that deference
serves to foster interbranch cooperation. I use content analysis to argue that courts use their
opinions to model good judicial behavior and to provide instructions in the case of inadequate
governance by administrative courts. Chapter 5 briefly concludes and discusses future avenues
for research.

10

Chapter 1:
A Theory of Deference

Fifty years before this dissertation was written, Martin Shapiro confidently asserted that
“courts typically let the agency do what it pleases” (Shapiro 1968). Twenty years later, Peter
Schuck and E. Donald Elliott, in the first extended examination of judicial review of agencyoriginating decisions and the new deference doctrine explicated by Chevron, did not disagree
with Shapiro’s prescription, though their reasons for doing so reflected new insights into the
relationship between the two institutions when an agency finds themselves in court: “...two
trends that move in opposite directions are at work simultaneously. The total body of
administrative law is increasing rapidly, but administrative law appeals constitute a very small
and ever-shrinking portion of the workload of individual circuit judges. The combination of these
two factors raises serious questions about the opportunity for appellate judges to develop
substantial experience in handling administrative law cases” (Schuck and Elliott 1990, 998).
At the time Schuck and Elliott published their essay, this statement was accurate: in 1987
(the last year they present data), there were 2,723 appeals from administrative agencies in the
circuit courts out of 35,176 total appeals to the circuit courts; only 8% of cases heard by the
courts of appeals in 1987 were administrative appeals (Administrative Conference of the United
11

States, 1987 Annual Report). This is stark when, as Schuck and Elliott note, 16% of circuit court
cases were administrative appeals in 1965 (Schuck and Elliott 1990, 998). There has been
remarkable variability over time as to the number of appealed cases to the federal courts with its
peak in the early 2000s.
That said, in any given year since the mid-twentieth century administrative appeals
comprise at least 5% of the courts of appeals’ dockets. If Shapiro is correct and courts generally
give agencies carte blanche when sued, that means that at least 5% of the cases the courts of
appeals hear are, in essence, already decided without knowing anything else about the case.
Is Shapiro right? Do agencies win in court most of the time? If so, do the wins constitute
deference? A literature exists that answers the first question, but the second question has
remained elusive. This dissertation gives an extensive treatment to both questions. It argues that
the literature on identifying deference does not adequately measure what it purports to analyze,
and that once deference is identified the second question can be answered.
In this chapter I describe a new theoretical approach to understanding deference in the
twentieth and twenty-first century administrative state. I begin with defining administrative law
and deference. I give special treatment to administrative law courts, the sui generis characteristic
of administrative law. After defining deference, I explain the existing approaches to measuring
deference and note that those strategies are deficient. I provide a new approach to identifying
deference wherein the intent of the judges is ascertained from the text of opinions. But it is
inadequate to simply identify whether an agency has won or lost; I must also provide an
explanation as to whether the win or loss exemplifies (non-)deference. I offer two theories from
the extant literature (doctrinal restrictions on courts and copartisanship across institutions) and
one of my own (commitment to the development of the administrative state at large through
12

promoting good interpretive and dispute resolution practice across institutions). Later in the
dissertation it will become clear that all theories have limited explanatory power. However, I will
argue that the new approach is a promising avenue methodologically and theoretically. It is here
that I argue for the strength of using dyadic data.

Administrative Law Introduced
Administrative law has existed in one form or another since the inception of the
American state (Stewart 1975) but its modern form traces back to the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and, arguably, Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense
Council (1984) 10. There have been many attempts to define administrative law with each
definition homing in on its constituent parts. Breyer and his co-authors, in their textbook on
administrative law and regulatory policy, defines it as “those legal principles that define the
authority and structure of administrative agencies, specify the procedural formalities that
agencies use, determine the validity of administrative decisions, and outline the role of reviewing
courts and other organs of government in their relation to administrative agencies (Breyer et al
2017, 2-3).’” Simeone suggests that administrative law is a law for modern problems: the
development of substantive rights and procedural remedies already well-established.
Administrative legal processes, then, are means of redress in the face of an inaccessible judiciary
concurrent with heightened pressures on the Article III judiciary (Simeone 1992).
At its most essential level, administrative law refers to the policies and procedures that
govern how bureaucratic agencies function in the day-to-day in context with external political
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A discussion of Chevron and its impact begins on page 22.
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forces. Stewart finds that administrative law is schizophrenic in the tension between procedural
formality and political control (Stewart 1975). And Moe argues that “bureaucracy [arises] out of
politics, and its design reflect[s] the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise
political power” (Moe 1989, 267).
Administrative procedures, according to McCubbins et al, serve two main purposes:
addressing informational asymmetries (Eskridge and Frickey 1994, Ferejohn and Shipan 1990,
de Figueroida et al 1999, Huber and Shipan 2002, Lupia and McCubbins 1994) and tilting
agency decision making toward the preferences of important constituents (Balla 1998, de
Figueroida et al 1999, McCubbins et al 1987, Spence 1999). Strauss differentiates between three
methods of separating prerogatives across the administrative state. The first, separation of
powers, “supposes that what government does can be characterized in terms of the kind of act
performed...and that for the safety of the citizenry from tyrannous government [the functions of
the three branches of government] must be kept in distinct places” (Strauss 1984, 577).
Separation of functions, in comparison, “admits that for agencies...the same body often does
exercise all three of the characteristic governmental powers, albeit in a web of other controls-judicial review and legislative and executive oversight….The powers are not kept separate, at
least in general, but certain procedural protections...may be afforded” (ibid, 577). Checks and
balances bridges the two separations through “focus[ing] on relationships and interconnections,
on maintaining the conditions in which the intended struggle at the apex may continue. From this
perspective...it is not important how powers below the apex are treated; the important question is
whether the relationship of each of the three named actors of the Constitution to the exercise of
those powers is such as to promise a continuation of their effective independence and
interdependence” (ibid, pg#). Strauss argues that to focus on separation of powers as the
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governing principle of the administrative state is misguided; separation of functions and checks
and balances more fully embrace the reality that governance does not fit into the tripartite
structure defined by the first three articles of the Constitution.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) embraces this. §706 explicates the
separation of functions inherent in the relationship between the reviewing courts and the
reviewed agency: “To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court
shall – (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be: (a) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (d) without observance of procedure required
by law; (e) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to §556 and §557 of this title or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (f) unwarranted by
the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making
the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by
a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error” (Administrative Procedure
Act §706: Scope of Review).
This introduces tension in how the rule of law is exercised. Agencies implement
administrative systems that leverage experience and expertise to provide consistent and informed
decisions that accomplish statutory objectives; at the same time, the rule of law justifies
intervention by courts to decide whether the administrative system comports with the core values
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of the legal system. The challenge the administrative state faces is to balance these two ideals
(Aagaard 2018).

Deference Defined

The primary goal of this dissertation is to provide a new and more thorough approach to
understanding the concept of deference, for deference (or a lack thereof) defines the activities of
courts in the twentieth and twenty-first century administrative state. Farina, in her essay on
deference and the balance of power across branches in administrative law, defines deference as
“a style of review in which the Court adopts the agency’s judgment at the expense of its own”
(Farina 1989, 454). I accept her definition and further strengthen it by adding an action to the
interpretation: deference refers to the abdication of political power pursuant to the adoption of
another branch’s judgment through allowing another political actor to exercise a power that the
initial actor would typically enjoy. To simplify this phenomenon, we can say that deference
occurs when Actor A, who usually enjoys Power X, allows Actor B to exercise Power X in
certain circumstances. For the purposes of deference, it is not enough for Actor B to exercise
Power X; key to deference is Actor A’s motivations. When Actor A defers to Actor B, there is an
assumption made, either implicitly or explicitly, that Actor A has faith that Actor B can perform
Power X to a comparable or better end than Actor A can perform Power X. Deference, in
American politics, can take several forms: from Congress delegating powers to bureaucratic
agencies (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) and the President to the President enlisting the help of
the bureaucracy to determine the best path to policy success (Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___, 3-5
(2018)).
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Of particular interest here is the deference provided by courts to agencies generally and
administrative courts specifically. The differences between courts and the bureaucracy are not as
distinct as they may appear at first glance. Aagaard implores us to consider how the rule of law is
exemplified across both institutions. The commitment to the rule of law that judges employ is a
foregone conclusion in the vast legal literature. But if we break down the features of the rule of
law that agencies exemplify, we can point to some of the same features that Weber argued
typified bureaucracies: the rule of law promotes predictability, consistency, and efficiency. In
fact, agencies are often better arbiters of these principles than courts: agencies are composed of
experts who are adept at reaching consistent decisions through creating processes that, through
specialization and routinization, make decisions with greater speed and at lower cost than courts
do (Aagaard 2018, Andreski (ed) 1983).
Deference by courts to administrative courts states that courts are likely to abdicate some
of their interpretive and dispute resolution power to administrative courts through making
decisions that provide those powers to the Article II courts. When an agency is party to a federal
lawsuit, the court will often make decisions that defer to the expertise of bureaucrats and their
interpretations of the agency’s governing statutes. In practice, this means that agencies prevail in
federal court more often than average (if by “average” we mean 50% of the time). Scholars have,
since the advent of the modern administrative state, explicated the nature of judicial deference to
administrative statutory interpretation, generally extolling the various deference doctrines that
control courts (Eskridge and Baer 2008, Raso and Eskridge 2010). A spectrum of deference
doctrines exists, ranging from exclusive deference by courts to agencies to deference in name
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only (in order of strength of deference, Curtiss-Wright, 11 Seminole Rock, 12 Auer, 13 Beth Israel, 14
Skidmore; 15 Raso and Eskridge 2010).
But there is no doctrine that is more widely cited and applied than Chevron. 16 This
doctrine calls for near exclusive deference by courts to agencies when questions arise as to the
interpretation of the agency’s governing statutes in circumstances where Congress was
ambiguous as to how a statute should be interpreted. In practice, this deference is neither
absolute nor well-defined and measured by the existing literature. Before I can test explanations
of deferential behavior I must first define deference (both Chevron and otherwise) in such a way
as to ensure that deference is identified and measured without accidentally including false
positives.
The existing literature on deference uses a simple binary approach to code for deference
by a court to an administrative court: if a court rules in favor of an administrative court’s
interpretation of their governing statute, then the decision is coded “1” for deference; if a court
rules against an administrative court’s interpretation of their governing statute, then the decision
is coded “0” for no deference. Using agency win rates is a fine place to start to understand
deferential behavior by courts (for deferring necessarily requires ruling in an agency’s favor) 17,
but it is inadequate in the long term. By distilling deference down to whether an agency wins or
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United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
13
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1996).
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Beth Israel Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board, 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
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Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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A case could be made that deference can occur without a court ruling in favor of an agency. I
will discuss this in chapter 5 as a potential future study.
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loses, the context within which the decision is made and the rationale for why a decision is made
is scrubbed away. As such, the evidence for deference is left unexamined.
Relying on win rates alone can obscure the true reason for ruling in an agency’s favor;
there are many circumstances where an agency could be successful in court that are unrelated to
deference. As an example, consider the use of procedural rationales for judicial decisions. Bickel
famously argued that courts can use procedural means to avoid making a decision in
controversial cases, such as declaring a dispute moot or asserting a lack of jurisdiction (Bickel
1962, Sunstein 1999). In courts that do not enjoy a discretionary docket, these powers can be
useful tools. To be sure, a court may rule on procedural grounds instead of actively deferring to
an agency; however, there is no way to know if this might be the case without looking deeper.
Further, there is a more likely explanation for the use of these procedural decisions in courts that
have no control over their docket’s composition or size: declaring an outstanding dispute moot
clears up space for a dispute that remains active and would benefit from the dispute resolution
expertise of the judges on the bench. In the last thirty years where docket sizes have expanded in
conjunction with increasing litigation rates, this explanation becomes all the more likely.
In short, if we are to simply state that in a case where an agency is successful in court
there is deferential intent by a judge or a court, then we are very likely to inadvertently lump
together actual cases of deference with a significant number of false positives. This, in turn,
inflates the deference rate. The solution to this problem is to appeal to the text of opinions. In
order to truly identify deference, we must look to the text of the opinion to find evidence of
deference or non-deference. Only then can we be sure that deference has or has not occurred. I
explain the ways that deference is discerned for this project later in the text.
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Deference in Action: Why Do Courts Defer?
The central challenge in administrative law is how decision-making authority is delegated
across the administrative state. The APA as passed in 1946 delegated decision-making authority
to administrative law judges but that authority was approximate and rough-hewn. By the
Chevron era the interpretive authority was passed to agencies more conclusively (Gersen 2006).
Even given the extensive literature on Chevron and its contemporaries, no clear answer
has been provided. Two primary explanations, alluded to by the literature but rarely explicitly
tested, can be described as “doctrinal” and “partisan.” Doctrinally, courts have been (at least
nominally) restrained by deference doctrines since the nineteenth century, though the modern
deference framework is defined by Chevron (Bamzai 2017). This doctrinal explanation states
that variable deference rates can be discerned through (1) identifying the governing deference
regime at the time a judicial decision is made, and (2) determining whether the court applies that
deference schema. Since most of the literature on deference comes from law scholars rather than
political scientists, most of the existing scholarship falls under this umbrella and as such is
typically interpretive and rarely empirical.
A “partisan” explanation, in contrast, asserts that courts will defer when they are faced
with an agency that they consider to be a copartisan. This explanation is consistent with the
attitudinal and strategic strands of the judicial decision making literature which, generally, state
that judges will more often than not vote in line with their policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth
1998), and that judges are strategic actors who realize that the ability to achieve their goals
depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the
institutional context that they occupy (Epstein and Knight 1998). Both strands suggest that
judges are political actors who have, and act upon, individual preferences that may or may not be
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contrary to the preferences of the institution they occupy. The canonical works in judicial
decision making seek to explain the behavior of Supreme Court justices and their decision
making; though undoubtedly illustrative in this case, the more recent literature on courts of
appeals judges and their decision making calculus is more relevant since the forces that motivate
Supreme Court judges are tempered in lower courts due to the unique institutional characteristics
of non-Supreme Court federal courts (Kaheny and Haire 2008, Kastellec 2007, Songer and Haire
1992, Songer et al 2000). Even given this caveat, we can expect that if partisan pressures explain
deferential behavior there will be a relationship between copartisanship across institutions and
the existence of deference.
In examining the data I collected and analyzed for this dissertation (to be explained in
Chapter 2), I have reason to suspect that these two existing explanations do not explain all of the
observed variation. Chapter 3 tests the two extant theories, while Chapter 4 introduces a new
explanation: that courts, in an effort to foster interbranch cooperation and good governance
across the political apparatus, defer to administrative courts in an attempt to signal adequate or
inadequate interpretive behavior. We can expect, then, that if this theory has explanatory power
that courts are purposefully communicating their preferences regarding how other judicial actors
should perform their duties. Below I explicate the three theories and the observable implications
for each.

Deference Doctrine
The first possible reason for judicial deference to administrative agencies is a
commitment to extant and evolving doctrine that requires deference. Under this theory, doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court and regularly reiterated by the federal courts conditions judicial
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decision making through limiting judicial discretion in cases involving an administrative court’s
statutory interpretations. This is the predominant explanation in the extensive legal literature on
deference.
In Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, the Supreme Court clarified the
relationship between the bureaucracy and the courts, entrenching deferential behavior that had
already existed for decades (as I will argue in Chapters 3 and 4). The opinion heralded nearexclusive judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes. The opinion provided a two-step
test for judges to apply when faced with a statutory interpretation case. First, the court must ask
whether Congress has explicitly spoken to the issue in question in the statute. If it has, then there
is no issue to be resolved. If, however, Congress has been ambiguous or silent, then the court
must determine whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable given the text of
the statute provided by Congress. This standard gives great latitude for agencies in their statutory
interpretation processes since their interpretation need only be reasonable to pass the Chevron
test.
The Court’s rationale in Chevron, provided by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion,
states that Congress, in writing an ambiguous statute, “provided an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” (Chevron v.
Natural Resource Defense Council, 884-5). Further, the Court recognized that bureaucrats are
specialists and judges are not. 18 Therefore, judges, recognizing this reality, should defer to the
way agencies engage in their business as usual with the assumption that they (the bureaucrats)
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This feature of the opinion offers an interesting dichotomy. In Chevron, the distinction is made
between generalist courts and specialist agencies. However, in the case of administrative courts
and federal courts, the courts are the experts on acting judicially and thus the courts are the
specialized entity. This turns the Weberian principles of bureaucracies on its head.
22

know the best way to fulfill their statutory duties; when the courts try to instruct the bureaucrat to
act in a certain way, they are more likely to misunderstand agency functions than the bureaucrats
who are actively working within the agency. The Chevron decision has been referred to as “the
anti-Marbury”: where Marbury v. Madison self-empowered the Court to act as a check on the
other branches of government through the exercise of judicial review, Chevron voluntarily gave
some of its interpretive power to another branch (Marbury v. Madison (1803), Sunstein 1990,
Sunstein 2006a).
According to Pierce and Weiss, there are three grounds upon which judicial deference to
agency interpretations of agency rules can rely. The first is that deference might be supported by
the belief that the agency is more likely than a court to know what it intended when it issued the
rule. But at the same time, it is very unlikely that the people who made the rule are the ones who
are doing the interpreting or that the priorities of the agency at the time the rule is evaluated are
the same as when the rule was initially implemented. This is a helpful reminder that agencies are
the sum of many parts, not a monolith promoting one set of policies exclusively. The second
ground states that deference is justified because the agency understands better than a court which
interpretation will allow the agency to further its statutorily-defined mission. This provides a
solution to the conundrum introduced when considering agencies as conglomerations of different
ideas rather than one monolith of policy: even though the personnel and policies change in
bureaucracies over time, the day-to-day activities of agencies rarely change significantly over
time per Weber’s ideal of a bureaucracy through the institution of a hierarchical structure, career
employees hired apolitically, and a commitment to formal rules of procedure. Third, the
jurisdictional reach of agency interpretations and judicial interpretations vary: since an agency’s
jurisdiction is national and a circuit court’s jurisdiction is regional, a high degree of judicial
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deference to agency interpretation of agency rules furthers the goal of maximizing national
uniformity in implementing national statutes (Pierce and Weiss 2011).
Given this, we can consider Chevron as a doctrine of hard cases. Dworkin defined hard
cases as cases where “the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent;” simply put, hard
cases are those where the law runs out. Dworkin’s process of deciding hard cases has two
dimensions. The first step is fit, or the extent to which the novel legal theory crafted in the
process of deciding the hard case is consistent with the existing legal landscape. If there is more
than one novel legal theory that fits, then the second step, or justification, must occur: the judge
must implement the theory that provides the best justification for the law at large (Dworkin
1975). Liu argues that the Chevron two-step tracks with Dworkin’s theory of hard cases. Step
one is prior to the hard case determination; this is the law-applying stage in statutory
interpretation cases. But when the Chevron analysis moves to step two, then the theory of hard
cases applies, for step two is the law-making stage. If Congress has not explicitly spoken on the
issue, then there is no law that applies to the present dispute and the law, thus, has run out. The
court, in that situation, is responsible for considering Dworkin’s fit and justification to come to a
decision that applies deference or non-deference (Liu 2014).
But this application of Dworkin’s theory excludes the preferences and expertise of
agencies in the process, and it is in this exclusion that a theory of deference emerges. As Liu
notes, “the presence of an agency construction, however, means that the court itself need not
make law to fill that gap; instead, it may defer to the law-making of the agency--which, unlike
the court, is accountable to the political branches. Viewed this way, deference emerges as an act
of judicial self-restraint, grounded in the recognition that the law carries greater legitimacy when
made by politically accountable agencies than my unelected judges” (Liu 2014, 285).
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This positivist account of Chevron breaks judicial reliance on interpretation of
Congressional intent (Hart 2012, Raz 1979). Farina summarizes it well: “Chevron offers no
evidence to support its conclusion that silence or unclarity in a regulatory statute typically
represents Congress’ deliberate delegation of meaning-elaboration power to the agency” (Farina
1989, 470). In fact, as Liu argues, there is little to suggest that Congress ever consciously left
ambiguities such that the courts would be required to use Chevron to fill in the gaps (Liu 2014).
Chevron, as Merrill notes, was a strange candidate to become a landmark decision in
administrative law: only six justices took part in the decision, and the decision to provide greater
latitude to agencies took place as the early Reagan administration was engaging in a larger goal
of deregulation and ceding power away from the bureaucracy (Merrill 1992, 975). But even so
its tenets took hold and the legal profession, both in court and in the academy, took notice. In the
years that followed the Chevron decision, scholarship on the new doctrine proliferated with
extraordinary speed. A Nexis keyword search for Chevron in the text of law review articles from
the top twenty-five law journals since 1986 yielded nearly 3500 articles comprising
approximately 8% of all articles published in that time frame. 19
Shapiro and Levy, speaking on the burgeoning Chevron literature ten years after the
opinion was handed down, argued that “administrative law scholars, whether they agreed or
disagreed with the Court’s standards, assumed that Chevron…[was a landmark decision] that
signaled a turning point in the substantive review of agency decisions” (Shapiro and Levy 1995,
1051). Their prescription, that Chevron was perceived as important regardless of whether
scholars thought it was good law, was shared by numerous legal scholars and it led to an

19

Information broken down by individual journal is available in Appendix F.
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extensive and varied literature on the subject. Some scholars have argued that judicial deference
to agencies did not occur as swiftly and unilaterally as the popular accounts suggest (Lawson and
Kam 2013, Liu 2014). Other accounts add Congress into the fray: since Congress passes the
legislation that creates appropriates funds for agencies, their preferences are not irrelevant
(Garrett 2003, Liu 2014, Mantel 2009). Some question the extent to which the Court offered
direct instructions for other federal courts in adjudicating agency deference cases, imploring the
Court to clarify its position and pushing the legal community to investigate Chevron further
(Bressman 2009, Chabot 2015, Foote 2007, Foy 2010, Merrill 1992, Stephenson and Vermeule
2009, Sunstein 2006b). Yet other scholars expand the scope beyond just the actions of the Court
regarding Chevron by examining agency deference at all levels of the federal court system
(Hubbard 2013, Note 2007).
The defense of deference to agencies by courts is not universal. For example, Manning
argues that widespread deference may lead agencies to exploit the ambiguities in the rules that
the agency itself is creating in order to maximize their power. An agency could issue a broadly
worded rule that can be interpreted in multiple ways unilaterally instead of creating a more
narrowly applicable rule through the time- and effort-intensive notice and comment process
(Manning 1996). But the overwhelming rate with which the courts bless agency interpretations
of their statutes (Pierce and Weiss cite a 90+% deference rate by the Supreme Court of agency
interpretation of agency rules) suggests that the courts do not share this same concern (Pierce and
Weiss 2011, citing Eskridge and Baer 2008).
But even though the Chevron literature is rich with interpretive guidance and
jurisprudential insight, there is comparatively little empirical work on the effect of Chevron on
both judicial and agency decision making. In my review of the literature, I found a few
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exceptions in both the legal and political science literatures. 20 The foundational study of Chevron
that appears in bibliographies in nearly every Chevron essay is a 1990 Duke Law Journal essay
by Schuck and Elliott. They sought to understand the effect of Chevron on agency decision
making, noting the dearth of large-n studies of the phenomenon. Their analyses indicate a steady
rise in administrative filings in federal courts, beginning in 1965 and peaking just after Chevron
(Schuck and Elliott 1990).
Shortly after the Schuck and Elliott essay was published, Kerr offered an empirical test of
the traditional explanations of judicial deference to agencies. This is the first essay that suggests
that partisanship might explain judicial decision making in these cases better than, or at least
comparable to, Chevron (Kerr 1998). Miles and Sunstein took up the mantle of politicallymotivated decision making in full, testing judicial decision making in cases involving the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the NLRB. They found that Republican-appointed
justices were more likely to rule against Democrat-appointed agencies than Democrats were
(Miles and Sunstein 2006, further examined in Miles and Sunstein 2008). Most recently, Barnett
and Walker tested the strength of Chevron deference in 1571 courts of appeals cases between
2003 and 2013. They found, generally, that the circuit courts upheld agency rulings 71% of the
time and applied Chevron deference 75% of the time. This provides further by limited evidence
that the courts defer to agencies more often than not (Barnett and Walker 2017). 21
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Pierce (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of ten articles that identify agency win rates.
However, one of the articles (Zaring 2010) is a meta-analysis itself. The four studies discussed
here are the foundational studies as well as one recent study that has proved itself to be a
significant contribution to the literature (cited by 139 others in the three years since publication).
21
A fifth study (Eskridge and Baer 2008) places all Supreme Court agency interpretation cases
between Chevron and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2004) (n=1014) on a deference continuum. The
table summarizing the findings is reproduced on page 57-8.
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I also identified three political science treatments of Chevron. The first was a dissertation
drafted by Ruth Watry pursuant to her doctoral studies at the University of Delaware. She
examines what she calls “contested agency interpretations of statutes” cases at the Supreme
Court twelve years before and after the Chevron decision. In particular, she is testing the power
of Chevron as an independent variable against conventional attitudinal accounts of judicial
decision making via their ideological leanings (Segal and Cover 1989, Segal and Spaeth 2002).
She finds that “attitude is an extremely strong predictor of liberal/conservative outcome in
[contested agency interpretation of statutes] cases,” though it is slightly less explanatory after
Chevron (Watry 2000, 43).
Later, Richards et al studied the impact of Chevron on judicial decision making. They use
jurisprudential regime theory as a foil, arguing that “while the attitudes of the justices do matter,
Chevron may have nonetheless changed the structure of influences on justices’ decisions in
administrative law cases (Richards et al 2006, 444).” Using a sample of Supreme Court cases
between 1969 and 2000, they find that Chevron led to an increase in deference and that justices
are more likely to defer in a case involving administrative rulemaking than in cases that do not
involve rulemaking (Richards et al 2006; see also Richards and Kritzer 2002). Most recently and
echoing insights from both the interpretive and empirical work preceding it, Raso and Eskridge
find that deference doctrine (and other methodological doctrines) do not hold exclusively as
stare decisis would suggest (Raso and Eskridge 2010).
Though these studies begin to investigate the role of Chevron in interbranch politics, the
extant literature has several weaknesses. First, only three studies examine pre- and post-Chevron
judicial deference, and their conclusions are dated (Schuck and Elliott 1990, Richards et al 2006,
Watry 2000). Most studies examine only post-Chevron deference and only over the course of a
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short time frame (typically between two and ten years). This is useful for understanding
contemporary deference practices, but it sheds little light on how judicial deference to agency
decisions has evolved (or if it has evolved) over time. Second, only two of the political science
studies take seriously the partisan counterfactual (i.e. that judicial deference to agencies is
disguising co-partisanship across institutions) (Richards et al 2006, Watry 2000). However, I
would argue that Richard et al use the wrong measure of partisanship. (I discuss this in chapter
2.) And more fundamentally, the two studies provide contradictory results: one finds that
partisanship matters greatly but independently of Chevron (Watry 2000) while the other finds
that partisanship is highly moderated as a result of Chevron after its passage (Richards et al
2006). Only one legal piece offers partisanship as a possibility and only in passing (Kerr 1998).
The most important shortcoming of the existing literature is the main focus of this
dissertation: almost all studies of deference doctrine, especially those that find that Chevron does
not fully explain deferential behavior, note that a large majority of agency appeals are decided in
favor of the agency. In their 2010 article, Raso and Eskridge evaluate deference rates across
different doctrines at the Supreme Court level between 1984 and 2006 (i.e. after Chevron). Their
cross tabulations, provided in Table 1a, show that judicial deference to agency statutory
interpretation is high regardless of the doctrine (if any) is applied (Raso and Eskridge 2010).
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Table 1a: Deference Regime and the Decision to Uphold 22

No regime, antideference

Consultative
deference,
Skidmore

Chevron, Beth
Israel

Seminole Rock,
CurtissWright

Uphold agency

60.76%

78.21%

72.13%

88.41%

Overturn agency

39.24%

21.79%

27.87%

11.59%

To complement this finding and to extrapolate on the finding that Chevron led to deference rates
that were only slightly higher than when no deference doctrine was applied at all, I collected all
cases that involved an agency as a party to a lawsuit in the courts of appeals in 1983 and 1985. I
then identified a random sample of one hundred cases (fifty from 1983 and fifty from 1985) and
coded for the agency involved, the outcome of the case, and the partisanship of both the judges
on the panel and the author of the opinion. Every circuit court (including the D.C. and Federal
Circuit Courts) and twenty-three agencies were represented in the sample. Table 1b provides the
number of cases won and lost by an agency in the years immediately before and after the
Chevron decision.
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Pearson’s chi2 = 249.0136; Pr = 0.000. From Eskridge and Raso (2010), pg. 1767. Emphasis
my own.
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Table 1b: Agency Win Rates Immediately Before and After Chevron 23
1983

Proportion of
Sample

1985

Proportion of
Sample

Agency win

28

56%

26

52%

Agency loss

8

16%

11

22%

Mixed outcome

5

10%

3

6%

9

18%

10

20%

Unknown
outcome

These limited data suggest the possibility that Chevron did not have an appreciable effect on
agency win rates at the courts of appeals, at least not to the extent that the existing literature
suggests. 24

Partisanship
An explanation more at home in the political science canon suggests that courts will be
more likely to defer to agencies when they perceive copartisanship across the two institutions.
There are a number of approaches to understanding judicial decision making as a political act,
but regardless of the theory one truism overarches them all: judges are not neutral arbiters of law
(Epstein et al 2007).
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N = 50 for both years. Random sample was selected via random number generator.
These findings do not assert causality since they simply count cases before and after Chevron,
but Chapter 3 provides a causal claim with regression analyses that come to a similar conclusion.
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There are two strands of judicial decision-making theory emphasizing judicial preference
that overlap in parts and diverge in others: attitudinalism and strategic theory. Of the two,
attitudinalism has the most to offer for this dissertation project. The attitudinal model of judicial
behavior suggests that judges, in essence, vote their political preferences. The history of this
strand of judicial decision making theorizing begins with Pritchett who argued that judges are
motivated by their preferences as evidenced by the observed increase in the number of dissenting
opinions (where dissenting opinions are declarations of policy position in opposition to the
majority opinion) (Pritchett 1941). Shortly thereafter, Dahl’s seminal 1957 essay on judicial
review practices at the Supreme Court in the first century and a half of the Court’s history found
that when the Court votes to declare a law unconstitutional (which is relatively rarely) they do so
in line with the political regime that appointed them (Dahl 1957). Presidents, according to
Peretti, can count on their judicial appointees on the Supreme Court to rule in line with the
regime’s policy preferences approximately 75% of the time (Peretti 1999). Judicial review, then,
is primarily used by the “political” branches to shunt potentially controversial “cross-cutting”
political issues to an unelected judiciary to solve (Graber 1993).
At its core, attitudinalism relies on identifying judicial preferences. Individual
preferences, according to Rohde and Spaeth, are the primary determinants of judicial behavior.
They break preferences into five characteristics: they are (1) relatively enduring, (2) an
organization of interrelated beliefs that describe, evaluate, and advocate action regarding an
object or situation, (3) composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components, (4)
predispositions that result in a preferential response for the attitude, object, or situation, or
toward maintenance or preservation of the attitude itself, and (5) social behavior that, at
minimum, activates at least two intersecting attitudes: one regarding the attitude object and one
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regarding the attitude situation (Rohde and Spaeth 1976, as cited in George 1998). Keck
distinguishes between two varieties of preferences: political preferences (in the Dahlian strain)
and policy preferences (Keck 2007). The promotion of policy preferences, initially explicated by
Segal and Cover and Segal and Spaeth, accepts Dahl’s premises (i.e. that judges will generally
rule in favor of the regime of which they are a part) but pushes judicial preference one step
further: in situations where the personal preferences of a judge conflict with the goals of the
larger regime, then the judge will rule in favor of their own preferences and against the
preferences of the regime (Dahl 1957, Segal and Cover 1989, Segal and Spaeth 2002; see also
Keck 2007). Segal and Spaeth, in their spirited defense of attitudinalism, found that when
justices are coded for partisanship and placed on a spectrum of both partisanship and the extent
of partisanship, outcomes in politically charged decisions can be predicted with extraordinary
accuracy (Segal and Spaeth 2002; see also Martin et al 2005).
There are two ways that we can measure partisan constraints on deference activity
borrowing from the two strands of attitudinal theory. The first, borrowing from Dahl, is to
determine the appointing party for each judge and each administrative law judge and look for
matches in deference cases and no matches in non-deference cases (Dahl 1957). The other
option, from Segal and Spaeth, is to determine the “pro-agency” stance versus the “anti-agency”
stance and, using the partisanship identified in the first instance, ascertain whether the policy
stance is the primary reason for ruling for or against an agency. Since the focus of this portion of
the dissertation is on partisanship rather than ideology, I rely heavily on the Dahlian approach; I
discuss this further in Chapter 2.
But the challenge inherent in drawing upon these theories of judicial decision making is
the fact that they are primarily theories of Supreme Court decision making; applying these
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theories to non-Supreme Court courts and their partisanship is not cut-and-dried for several
reasons. For one, non-Supreme Court courts generally operate within a panel system wherein a
rotating set of judges try cases. Further, non-Supreme Court courts do not have discretionary
dockets; they are responsible for hearing all cases that come before them.
There are ways to circumvent these challenges. One approach is to only study en banc
cases, or cases where all of the judges in the circuit hear the case together and where the judges
vote as a single bloc. These are more likely to be important cases, and they give the opportunity
to examine judicial coalition building to achieve their preferred results since judges, in en banc
cases, cannot vote individually (George 1998). However, this is not to say that we cannot
examine non-aggregate circuit court decision making. Fischman’s study of circuit court judges
found that the interaction between judges serving on appellate panels produces collegial pressure
toward consensus (Fischman 2011). Goldman argues that presidents use lower court
appointments to reward their party’s faithful and to shore up party cleavages, not to support their
policy agenda (Goldman 1975).
Further, non-Supreme Court judges may experience reversal aversion since having a
higher judge overturn their decision court be potentially damaging to career prospects and
internal conceptions of their success as an arbiter (Higgins and Rubin 1980). Schanzbach and
Tiller, in their empirical study of contemporary sentencing statutes, argue that district court
judges decide cases strategically to avoid reversal through using recommended sentences at the
lower end of the recommended sentencing guidelines or through utilizing Bickel’s non-decision
decisions (Schanzbach and Tiller 2008; see also Bickel 1962). Epstein and her co-authors found
that although Republican and Democratic judges do not decide cases differently, the partisan
preferences of the appellate court that would oversee the cases decided at the lower court
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influences their judgments (Epstein et al 2013). Landes and Posner, in their essay on rational
judicial behavior, found that there is a conformity effect in the courts of appeals: the number of
judges appointed by Republicans increases relative to the number appointed by Democratic
presidents; as this occurs, all of the judges in the circuit tend to vote more liberally (with the
same dynamic present in the opposite scenario). When the proportion of Republican judges to
Democratic judges is skewed, the judges belonging to the minority party tend to vote in a more
partisan way (“the fewer the judges appointed by Democratic presidents, the more liberally they
vote”) (Landes and Posner 2009, 775).
Drawing from all of the aforementioned strands of the judicial decision making literature,
I assign partisan codes to each judge in each case in this dissertation’s dataset. I will describe this
in detail in chapter 2.

Commitment to Interbranch Cooperation
The final explanation eschews explicitly doctrinal and political rationales for deference; it
instead considers the possibility that courts defer to agencies in an attempt to foster crossinstitutional dialogue and good judicial practice across the political apparatus. It ties together, in
part, the two existing theories and considers the possibility that courts act with an eye towards
how their decisions may help guide other institutions in their business-as-usual.
This theory is primarily drawn from the burgeoning literature on interbranch
institutionalism. The motivating principle of interbranch institutionalism states that institutions
may make decisions that are immediately contrary to their interests but ultimately may be better
for the political apparatus at large (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). To quote Barnes, interbranch
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institutionalists assume that the “intricate dispersal of power [across institutions] creates a
complex and shifting web of relations among various centers of power, which varies across issue
areas and over time” (Barnes 2007, 27). Further, “the dynamic tension built into this fragmented
system is likely to produce a multiplicity of interinstitutional interactions” that can be traced
across institutions and over time only if the relationship between the two institutions is taken
seriously rather than taken for granted (Barnes 2007, 27-8; see also Graber 1993). Only when
courts are considered as one actor of many can inferences about judicial behavior be made.
There are a number of ways that courts can be examined vis-a-vis other political actors,
including through separation-of-power game theory (Epstein et al 2007; Epstein and Walker
1996; Eskridge 1991; Gely and Spiller 1992; McCubbins et al 1987, 1989) and the regime theory
explicated above (Dahl 1957, Richards and Kritzer 2002). But my approach to understanding
deference borrows from the judiciary-focused American political development literature for it
provides the greatest opportunity to trace how deference activity has changed over time. Barnes
refers to these approaches as “microinstitutional analyses” wherein “courts operate in a wide
range of institutional contexts at any given time and thus play different roles in the policymaking process” (Barnes 2007, 33). Scholars operating within the confines of this subdiscipline
acknowledge and celebrate the various roles that courts play in a way that other judicial scholars
often overlook: by focusing on courts in interbranch context on one or a few policy issues,
patterns can be unearthed as to the dynamics underlying judicial behavior (Barnes 2004, Feeley
and Rubin 1998, Melnick 1994). Even though this dissertation is not a traditional American
political development dissertation, the principles remain at the fore.
In the case of judicial deference to administrative agencies, courts may rule in such a way
as to abdicate some of their dispute resolution and interpretive powers to another branch. If we
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are to consider institutions as individual rational actors, then this action does not make sense:
political actors acting rationally will always seek to enhance their own power. But what we find
when we examine the case law, and particularly the text of the case law, is that courts will
delegate court-adjacent activities (like dispute resolution and statutory interpretation) to
administrative actors. A natural assumption is that this delegation is due to the aforementioned
partisan and doctrinal theories. But when we control for those two possibilities, deference still
occurs.
So why does this deference occur? Courts defer to ensure good judicial practice in a state
that decentralizes much of its dispute resolution to non-judicial entities (like administrative
courts). This might be self-serving – perhaps courts would prefer not to have their dockets filled
with cases that could be potentially resolved elsewhere (after all, the non-Supreme Court federal
courts do not have discretionary dockets). But in reality courts do not defer at each opportunity.
Courts selectively defer and provide instructions to administrative courts so that they can reward
good governance with deference (which an autonomous bureaucracy would likely cherish)
(Carpenter 2001, 2010) and discourage insufficient dispute resolution with explicit instructions
for future action. It is as if courts will only abdicate responsibilities when they believe that the
institution taking on these responsibilities is up to the challenge. It is selective deference in
pursuit of good governance in an interbranch system, or at least selective deference so that the
benefits of abdicating responsibility outweigh the potential that the abdicated power is used
incorrectly.
In short, I argue that courts defer to agencies outside of partisan and doctrinal bounds in
order to promote an ideal form of judicial behavior across institutions. In the same way that
courts are compelled to defer to agencies because, according to Chevron, agencies are experts in
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their policy areas, courts can assert expertise about those actions that are inherently judicial in
nature. By explicitly communicating their expertise in the text of opinions where an agency is a
party, courts express their preferences as to how government should function across institutions.
Deference to agencies, then, serves as an indication that agencies are acting correctly as defined
by the court; active non-deference to agencies, then, indicates both that agencies are not acting
correctly as defined by the courts and that the court can provide guidance for correct action in the
future.
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Chapter 2:
Methods and Case Selection

In order to test the theories explicated in Chapter 1, I employ a most-likely case study
approach by examining the deferential relationship between federal courts and administrative
courts (George and Bennett 2005). But before I reflect on case selection, we must fully
understand the history and characteristics of administrative courts that make them an ideal
avenue of study for this dissertation.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) aims for improved efficiency and fairness in
agencies through the separation of the adjudicative (quasi-judicial), rule-making (quasilegislative) and enforcement (quasi-executive) operations. The adjudicative aims, according to
Graham, are “for the agency, through its quasi-judicial function, to decide a dispute as ‘rightly’
as possible with agency policy as the basic test” (Graham 1985, 260-1). To achieve these
adjudicatory goals, many agencies turn to administrative courts. Administrative courts are a
bureaucratic construction that interpret relevant statutory law and adjudicate disputes that arise
under those statutes and interpretations. They are staffed by administrative law judges who
publish decisions that provide resolution to disputes that rely on precedent and statutory
interpretation.
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Administrative law judges are selected in a merit-based process that starts at the Office of
Personnel Management (for initial review of applications and administering a competitive
examination used to rank applicants) and ends with the agency that houses the administrative
court making the final hiring decision. Administrative law judges must be a licensed attorney
with at least seven years of legal experience. They are hired as career appointees who are not
subject to periodic performance reviews. Administrative law judges almost always leave their
post voluntarily through retirement or death; a very small minority of administrative law judges
are removed for misdeeds. The power to sanction administrative law judges lies in 5 U.S.C.
Section 7521(a): “An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under
section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only
for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record
after opportunity for hearing before the Board (5 U.S.C. Section 7521(a)).” The “good cause”
standard, according to Rosenblum, falls between the “efficiency of the service” standard used to
remove other civil service employees and the “good behavior” standard that Article III judges are
held to. To quote Rosenblum: “Failure to follow agency directives in decision making provides
justification for typical removals pursuant to the ‘efficiency of the service’ standard but is
prohibited from use as ‘good cause’ for removal of administrative law judges” (Rosenblum 1984,
642; see also Office of Personnel Management 2020).
This all speaks to the tension inherent in administrative law judges specifically, and
administrative courts generally, as to their position as both bureaucrat and adjudicator. Lens
breaks down two complementary models of administrative law judge identity. The administrative
law judge-as-bureaucrat model recognizes overlap between the agency and the administrative
law judge such that the judge might sanction agency activity simply because it is agency activity.
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The administrative law judge-as-adjudicator model, in comparison, embraces the designated
adjudicator role to safeguard against inappropriate state action even within the agency the
administrative law judge occupies (Lens 2012). The dominant role of the administrative law
judge as either bureaucrat or adjudicator derives from the type of agency within which the
administrative law court is housed.
To attempt to mitigate these dual identities, the APA provides for separation between
administrative courts and the agency where they reside. To quote the APA as codified in the U.S.
Code, an administrative law judge may not “be responsible to or subject to the supervision or
direction of an employee or agency engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency” (5 U.S.C. § 554(d); see also Burrows 2008). The Office of Personnel
Management has reiterated that the agency that houses the administrative court is responsible for
maintaining the independence of the administrative court and its judges (5 C.F.R. Section
930.201(f)(3); see also Burrows 2008).
Administrative courts generally, and administrative law judges specifically, are
potentially very powerful. Marquardt and Wheat argue that administrative law judges are a
“corps of hidden allocators, unknown to the general public, untouched by formal agency or
[Office of Personnel Management] scrutiny, yet armed with immense discretionary and policy
power. (Marquardt and Wheat 1981, 302). Administrative law judges exist in a complex state:
they are employees of an agency, but they are simultaneously divorced from the day-to-day
operations in the agency due to their quasi-judicial role (Simeone 1992). The development of
administrative courts in the post-Administrative Procedure Act era has melded the adjudicatory
strength of administrative law judges with minimal external accountability measures. Marquardt
and Wheat continue on to say “all this results in a situation where administrative law judges, in
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an increasingly narrow judicialized setting which is essentially immune from democratic control
and accountability, become central public policy makers in the regulatory arena…. So the
judicial procedure of the administrative law judge either means everything in the agency decision
making process or it may mean nothing. In those few important cases which the agency chooses
to review, the agency heads have the power to overturn the administrative law judge’s decision
and substitute their own decision” (Marquardt and Wheat 1981, 303-4).
The goal, under the APA, is to promote “assurances of neutrality” for administrative
courts to preserve the administrative process (Simeone 1992, 163). The relatively anonymous
nature of administrative law judges is in almost every way a benefit for how administrative
courts function, and attempts at quantifying administrative law judge performance or success is
anathema to the institution as it was envisioned by the APA, which further isolates
administrative courts from bureaucratic oversight and further promotes administrative court
independence (O’Keeffe 1986). There have intermittently been attempts to cull the power of
administrative courts, though most of these attempts have been unsuccessful in the long term.
For example, the 95th and 96th Congresses (from 1977 to 1981), for whom regulatory reform
was a major priority, introduced one hundred and fifty-seven bills that attempted to clarify
regulatory policy in some way. Some of these bills directly referenced administrative law judges,
including advocating for term limits (S. 755), instituting periodic reviews by the Administrative
Conference of the United States (S. 262, H.R. 6768), and introducing information dispute
resolution processes that would occur outside of the administrative court apparatus (Marquardt
and Wheat 1981).
All the while, there is evidence that administrative courts and administrative law judges
have favored making their offices even more independent from the agencies in which they reside
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(United States Civil Service Commission, Report of the Commission on the Study of the
Utilization of Administrative Law Judges 1974, as discussed in Lubbers 1981). One of the most
common proposed reforms is the formation of a unified corps of administrative law judges
instead of discrete administrative courts and administrative law judges in agencies across the
administrative state. Simeone’s arguments in defense effectively sum up the arguments in favor
of a unified corps. First, Simeone argues that an administrative law judge corps would remove
the system of judges that are directly associated with the agency that they occasionally are tasked
with evaluating for missteps. Second, a unified corps of administrative law judges would be
more efficient for both the management of judges and the management of administrative court
caseloads. Third and relatedly, a unified corps could shift routine civil cases from the Article III
judiciary to an administrative court to free up Article III dockets for the cases, often criminal or
constitutional, that only the federal judiciary can adjudicate. Fourth, a unified corps would
expand administrative law judges’ breadth of knowledge. Fifth, creating a unified corps would
recognize that the functions of administrative law judges and Article III judges perform many of
the same functions to begin with. Finally, a unified corps would naturally lend itself to a uniform
training scheme for new administrative judges. In short: expanding administrative law judges’
breadth of knowledge and experience (acts that would surely judicialize the administrative
adjudicators) would benefit the administrative state writ large through resolving many of the
issues inherent in the structure as explicated by the APA (Simeone 1992).

Case Selection
It follows from the features and development of administrative courts that we can expect
the most explicit descriptions of (non-)deferential behavior from courts to agencies when courts
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explain to other courts about how to best act like courts. To probe this relationship, I use one
case study examined in depth. The nature of methodology for American political developmentinspired projects preferences in-depth analysis of one or a few cases in order to thoroughly
examine the case over time (George and Bennett 2005, Gerring 2004, Orren and Skowronek
2004).
In identifying a case for this dissertation, I sought to select an administrative court
apparatus that best exemplifies, in aggregate, the average features of administrative courts while
also preferencing features that make the study feasible. I prioritized the following considerations:
•

Size – most administrative courts adjudicate only a handful of cases each year. Of the
sixty-three potential cases identified and provided in Appendix A, there are three
administrative court systems that are outliers in the size of the court system, the number
of cases heard and decided, and the consequent political impact the court has on other
actors (the BIA, the NLRB, and the Social Security Disability apparatus (SSD)). The case
study should pay attention to one of these extraordinary cases for the reasons explicated
in the following bullet points.

•

Longevity – in order to provide a thorough account of twentieth-century administrative
law, I require cases that have existed in some form for the majority of the century. More
specifically, the ideal case study has to have been in existence and politically salient in
three major eras in order to fully examine the effects of extra-bureaucratic shifts on
administrative court behavior: post-New Deal/pre-Administrative Procedure Act, postAdministrative Procedure Act/pre-Chevron, and post-Chevron.

•

Intermittent and/or ongoing internal crisis – the ideal case study has undergone or
continues to undergo major internal crises. Given the twentieth century increases in
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litigation across all levels of the judiciary, this criterion generally refers to impossibly
large docket sizes and the attempts to resolve the problems that result from those dockets.
•

Political salience of issue area – in order to ensure that the chosen administrative court is
amply relevant in the political system at large, I require a case that involves an issue area
that is frequently considered and debated by all branches of government.

•

Availability of data – relatedly, the case study chosen must have reasonably accessible
data to analyze. By reasonably accessible, I mean that most relevant administrative court
opinions are available online.
Each of the sixty-three administrative courts identified in Appendix A were evaluated

based on the five criteria explicated above. After evaluating each potential case, I selected the
BIA as the focus of this dissertation. There are many reasons why this case is ideal as a focal
point for the dissertation.

1. The immigration court system is large both in terms of number of constituent parts and the
number of cases heard.
The immigration court system consists of geographically-dispersed immigration courts,
administered by immigration judges that are hired in the same apolitical merit-based way that
other bureaucrats are hired, and the BIA, the final administrative appellate body appointed by the
Attorney General (and serving directly under and at the pleasure of the Attorney General). As the
need for immigration adjudication increased over the last 75 years, the number of immigration
courts and immigration judges rose in turn. As of this writing, there are fifty-eight immigration
courts nationwide, employing nearly 350 immigration judges (Executive Office of Immigration
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Review 2019) who completed, in FY 2016, 273,390 cases (Executive Office of Immigration
Review 2017). By extension, the BIA, as the review body of the immigration court system with
no discretionary docket, hears thousands of cases annually.

2. The Department of Justice’s immigration apparatus is just one part of a larger administrative
immigration regime, especially today.
In the early years of the modern immigration apparatus (i.e. since 1940 when the INS
moved from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice (DOJ)), the INS was
responsible for both border security and regulating immigration in their administrative courts.
(Naturalization, or the process of obtaining citizenship and the benefits pursuant to it, is a
judicial prerogative that the administrative immigration apparatus simply assists with.) Prior to
1983 when the Department of Justice reorganized the agency to combine all immigration
adjudication under one roof at the EOIR, the immigration courts were under the purview of the
INS while the BIA was directly accountable to the attorney general; with different overseers, the
two judicial actors could very well have had different goals when deciding cases. The 1983
reorganization alleviated these concerns by, according to the EOIR itself, “ma[king] the
immigration courts independent of the INS, the agency charged with enforcement of federal
immigration laws” (Executive Office of Immigration Review n.d.).
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, the border
patrol and immigration enforcement duties were moved from the EOIR to new offices at DHS,
including the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services (the closest analog to the original
INS). Only the immigration courts and the BIA remain under the umbrella of the DOJ. This
means that almost all cases that the immigration courts and the BIA hear begin with actions by
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the DHS at the border. This new administrative set up means that sophisticated cross-agency
cooperation is required for successful day-to-day operations even prior to judicial intervention.

3. The history of immigration courts is well-documented from a number of different vantage
points.
Judicial records from both administrative courts and federal courts are easily available
online. As long as a federal court has issued a written opinion, the opinion will be available on
LexisNexis, WestLaw, and on the individual court’s website; even unpublished opinions are
accessible on the aforementioned databases or in tabular form in hard copies of the Federal
Supplement (for district court cases), the Federal Reporter (for courts of appeals cases), and the
United States Reporter (for Supreme Court cases) which are easily accessible at law libraries.
Administrative court cases, in comparison, are more variable in the ease with which they can be
found. Many administrative courts have at least a sample of their decisions available at the
aforementioned databases. Some also maintain databases on their own websites. Others still do
not have their cases published until a party appeals to a federal court. This is the case for the
administrative court system regulating the Social Security disability apparatus. The courts of the
Social Security Administration produce by far the most cases per year of any administrative
court with over 630,000 cases closed by approximately 2000 administrative law judges with a
year-end backlog of over a million cases in FY 2015 and an average processing time of nearly
550 days (Social Security Administration n.d.). However, their cases are not published, or even
transcribed, until required to do so by the geographically appropriate district court in the event of
an appeal. Even then the originating administrative court opinion is not available online. Though
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the Social Security court system would have been a fascinating case study for this dissertation, it
falls victim to its own size.

4. The immigration court system is in crisis.
The past twenty-five years have seen a tremendous increase in the docket size of
immigration courts. To some extent, this tracks with increased docket size in the federal courts:
though there is likely not an increase in the inherent litigiousness of Americans like Manning
suggested, there has undoubtedly been a rise in the number of cases that have been brought to
courts of all kinds in the latter part of the twentieth century into the twenty-first century (Burke
2002, Galanter 1983, Haltom and McCann 2004, Lieberman 1981, Manning 1977, Olson 1991).
The same is true for the immigration courts. In 1980 the immigration courts disposed of
3100 exclusion hearings and 45,034 deportation hearings (INS 1980). By 1996 that number
ballooned to 33,824 exclusion hearings and 197,678 deportation hearings (EOIR 2001). Pursuant
to these increases, cases were delayed often for years: in 2002 there was a backlog of more than
57,000 cases, 38,000 of which were over a year old (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009). These docket
pressures not only strained the immigration courts’ ability to make decisions effectively, but it
also affected the relationship between judicial and administrative adjudicators since an increase
in administrative caseloads led to a subsequent increase in the number of cases that were
appealed to the federal courts.
These caseload pressures elicited first a (mostly successful albeit short-lived) series of
docket-clearing reforms under Attorney General Reno in 1999 (Dorsey and Whitney LLP 2003)
and an additional series of BIA reforms under Attorney General Ashcroft in 2002. The 2002
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Ashcroft reforms were comprised of four major parts: replacing three-member review with
single-member review for the majority of cases, moving from de novo review to a clearly
erroneous standard of review (i.e. a far less strict standard), implementing a time limit of ninety
days for single-member adjudications and 180 days for three-member adjudication, and reducing
the size of the BIA from twenty-three members to eleven members (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009).
These reforms were largely unsuccessful since they did not decrease docket sizes in either the
short- or the long-term. Additionally, they introduced a host of due process concerns. For
example, the Ashcroft reforms led to the use of succinct boilerplate language affirming
immigration judge decisions without explicated reasoning, making judicial review far more
challenging; this is a particularly damning shortcoming since the rise of immigration court
decisions led to a subsequent increase in the number of BIA cases appealed to the federal courts,
effectively transplanting docket size pressures from one judiciary to another.
Further, fewer BIA members in conjunction with an excessive number of cases and the
end of de novo review meant that cases at the BIA were given a cursory examination at best;
when an appellate body is built into a legal system, it suggests that the possibility of an
additional level of review promises some sort of reexamination of the case at hand to ensure that
the correct decision has been reached (Benesch 2007). For a system that affects the lives and
livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of persons a year to have intrinsic flaws that have not been
resolved behooves researchers to give significant time to understanding why the system
developed the way it did.
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5. The Executive Office of Immigration Review publishes their precedent decisions online.
Compared to the other administrative courts (read: most other immigration courts besides
the NLRB), the EOIR is remarkably open with their precedent decisions both on their personal
website and on external databases. I discuss this below.

Selecting the Board of Immigration Appeals as the primary case study introduces
potential generalizability concerns. Since the vast majority of administrative courts are small and
adjudicate only a handful of cases per year, choosing one of the large administrative courts
(Board of Immigration Appeals, National Labor Relations Board, or the Social Security
disability apparatus) may produce results that are not generalizable to administrative courts at
large. Further, immigration as a policy issue crosscuts the political spectrum in a way that could
potentially dampen any partisan effects that could explain deferential behavior by Article III
courts to Article II courts. I accept these critiques as valid but argue that the similarities in
structure between the immigration judiciary (with its various immigration courts and the Board
of Immigration Appeals as an appellate body at the top of the hierarchy) and the Article III
judiciary make the selection of the BIA the best analog to the federal courts of all administrative
courts examined. I stand by the methodological choice but acknowledge that the results of this
study cannot be easily generalized to administrative courts at large. Future deference studies
should build off this study of the Board to include other administrative courts to promote
generalizability.
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Research Design
The insights of this dissertation are as much methodological as they are theoretical. In
order to provide a novel approach to understanding and identifying deference, I created a new
coding system through extensive examination of the case study literature in interpretive legal
scholarship (Hall and Wright 2010). I explain this coding scheme in detail in Appendices C and
D, but it is important at this point to underscore the new means through which deference can be
studied for this dissertation and for any studies of deference that follow.
Studying interbranch institutionalism presents unique methodological challenges. For
one, identifying communication between branches is rarely clear-cut. Scholars must rely on
various forms of data that present evidence of communication even if the data individually are
not smoking gun instances of inter-institutional communication. Interbranch institutional
scholars rectify this by layering multiple data sources upon each other in order to create a
narrative that highlights the contributions of each institution in order to make inferences about
how events occur vis-á-vis institutional interaction.
Consequently, this dissertation utilizes several different sources of judicial data. The
judicial data collected and analyzed for this dissertation represent an important advance in the
study of interbranch institutionalism, especially as it relates to the relationship between courts
and other political actors. As aforementioned, the administrative court-federal court relationship
is a cyclical one that oftentimes produces opinion dyads where both courts are compelled to
adjudicate the same dispute. This dyadic data source has several advantages. By the nature of the
data many potentially confounding variables are eliminated: since the dispute to be resolved is
the same across both courts, the only variation is in the court that is doing the resolving. This
helps to illuminate the differences in dispute resolution styles and it has the potential to highlight
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differing institutional constraints on dispute resolution. Further, the direct line of communication
between administrative courts and agencies through written opinions provides an exciting
opportunity to understand the decision making processes at work by both judiciaries as a direct
result of their interactions.
In order to create these dyads I appealed to several databases, both public and private,
that archive judicial opinions. LexisNexis and WestLaw, for example, provide a variety of
administrative court opinions in addition to their extensive collection of federal court opinions.
However, the number of cases decided by the BIA introduces a problem when attempting to
collect the universe of cases. The EOIR divides BIA opinions into three categories: precedent
opinions, non-precedent opinions, and unpublished opinions. Precedent opinions, as determined
by EOIR leadership, represent the governing interpretation of immigration laws for the DOJ at
any given point in time. There are approximately five thousand precedent decisions, all of which
are available directly from the DOJ via legal databases and on the EOIR website. Non-precedent
decisions do not hold precedential value but the EOIR has determined that they may be useful for
those in the immigration court system to consider as indications of contemporary administrative
practice. There are several thousand cases that fit this category annually. They are variably
available on online databases which makes identifying the universe of cases very difficult. Most
cases are routine and thus unpublished and unavailable for analysis.
Using the fully accessible universe of precedent decisions, 25 I used the LexisNexis
Shepardize feature to identify pairs of BIA decisions and the corresponding appeal(s) in the

25

There are generalizability concerns inherent in using only those cases that are deemed
important enough to declare precedential. However, since the relationship between the courts and
the bureaucracy is the phenomenon under analysis and not the factual contents of the opinion per
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federal courts. Most of these dyads consist of one BIA case and one case in the geographically
appropriate court of appeals; a small portion of dyads are comprised of one BIA case and one
case in the geographically appropriate district court (for habeas requests), 26 and a slightly larger
but still small portion of cases contain more than one federal court case. 27 Some dyads were
inaccurately coded by LexisNexis and were thus excluded from analysis. Appendix E provides
the cases identified for analysis in this dissertation.
The empirical thrust of the dissertation attempts to identify and measure deference. The
existing scholarship tends to assert deference through observing high agency win rates in court.
But consider the weaknesses inherent in making inferences on deference based solely on whether
an agency wins or loses in court or even why agency appeals end up in federal courts. There are
any number of reasons why an agency might prevail in court independent of deference doctrine.
The data provided in Table 1a on page 31 regarding agency win rates across doctrinal eras
provide a brief illustration as to why the question of judicial deference to agency action and
understanding the development of the administrative state is important, but it does not provide
any indication as to why or how this development occurred. The existing literature does a poor
job of providing an account of this, in part because it relies heavily on agency win rates without
contextualizing them in order to understand the greater political environment that those win rates
inhabit. By using dyadic data, agency win rates are given a natural foil in the form of the
originating administrative court opinion. In addition, analyzing the text of the opinions
themselves beyond just the win-lose outcome provides evidence of the calculus employed by

se, the likelihood that the content of the BIA decision is not representative of all of the BIA’
decisions is not a disqualifying limitation.
26
These are excluded since they do not involve a court of appeals.
27
In these cases (of which there are two instances), I code for two separate dyads: the BIA case
and the first court of appeals case, and the BIA case and the second court of appeals case.
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administrative and federal judges; this is instrumental in understanding the relationship between
the two judiciaries.
To ascertain deference rates, I employ a new two-step approach in identifying whether
deference has occurred. First, I determine whether an agency was the winning party in the case
under analysis. This is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that deference has occurred. To
finally conclude that deference has occurred, I determine whether the federal court has explicitly
stated that it is deferring to the administrative court.
One of the most promising avenues that this approach to measuring deference can
provide is the further disaggregation across the deference/non-deference divide to assert
theoretical significance to both deference and non-deference situations; this is a possibility that
the existing literature on deference does not explore. There are four, not two, possible outcomes
when identifying deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence in the text
of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as
“active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in the text of
the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as
“passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the text of the
opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as
“passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in the text of the
opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this instance as
“active non-deference.” In this schema, even non-deference has theoretical significance. When a
court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is the rationale rather
than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in court with active
language either for or against the agency’s actions, we can confidently make conclusions about
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judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible when solely relying
on win rates.
A key feature of the dissertation’s empirics relies on the content of the courts’ opinions.
In order to analyze these judicial data, I created a content analysis schema (explained in
extensive detail in Appendices C and D). I appealed, in particular, to the legal literature on
content analysis of judicial opinions; though the majority of legal literature is dedicated to
interpretive studies of various doctrines and statutes, there is a burgeoning tradition of using
explicit coding schemes to identify patterns in case law by legal scholars. I found in my review
of both the legal and political science literatures that legal scholars were more explicit about their
coding schemes than political scientists. I undertook a meta-analysis of studies cited in Hall and
Wright’s review of content analysis of judicial opinions in order to create a coding schema that
accounts for variables of potential interest (Hall and Wright 2010). 28
I first coded for the doctrinal era the case was decided within. This consists of two parts:
identifying the deference doctrine(s) that the court could apply and determining whether that
doctrine(s) was actually applied. Eskridge and Baer differentiate between several forms of
deference, noting that each doctrine can be placed on a continuum on the extent of deference by
courts to agency interpretations of statutes (Eskridge and Baer 2008). The literature, as
aforementioned, places a great deal of emphasis on Chevron as an important codification of
deference procedure. By coding for the controlling deference doctrine, I am able to extend the
theoretical and empirical contributions of the existing literature by both expanding the time
frame under analysis and extending the analysis to consider other non-Chevron forms of

28

See Appendix B for meta-analysis.
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deference. Borrowing from Eskridge and Baer, I code for the deference doctrines provided in
Table 2a.

Table 2a: Deference Regime and Agency Win Rates in Eskridge and Baer Sample

Deference Regime

Anti-deference

No deference

Skidmore deference

Beth Israel deference

Chevron deference

Form of Deference
The Court invokes a
presumption against the
agency interpretation in
criminal cases (the rule of
lenity) and in some cases in
which the agency
interpretation raises serious
constitutional concerns (the
canon of constitutional
avoidance)
Ad hoc judicial reasoning
Agency interpretation is
entitled to “respect
proportional to its power to
persuade,” with such power
determined by the
interpretation’s
“thoroughness, logic, and
expertness,” its “fit with prior
interpretation,” etc.
Pre-Chevron test permitting
reasonable interpretations that
are consistent with the statute
Reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous
statutes accepted. If the
statute is clear, no deference
to agency.
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Agency Win Rate in Eskridge
and Baer sample of Supreme
Court cases

36.2%

66.0%

73.5%

73.5%

76.2%

The Court, without invoking
a named deference regime,
relies on some input from the
agency (e.g. amicus briefs,
Consultative deference
80.6%
interpretive rules or guidance,
or manuals) and uses that
input to guide its reasoning
and decision making process
Strong deference afforded to
Seminole Rock deference
an agency’s interpretations of
90.9%
its own regulations
Super-strong deference to
executive interpretations
Curtiss-Wright deference
100.0%
involving foreign affairs and
national security.
Source: Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1099. Chart is verbatim from source material except for
excluding one column from the original table (proportion of deference in their sample).

I then coded for several different markers of partisanship. There are several ways to code
for the ideological and partisan preferences of a judge. The primary means that the judicial
decision making literature has defined a judge’s preference is through transplanting the party of
the appointing president as the party of the judge. Per Dahl, this draws on the insight that judges
and their appointing president are more often than not similar (Dahl 1957). This method has
high intercoder reliability which is undoubtedly why this method is used frequently. But there
are several critiques of this method throughout the literature. First, this method assumes that all
appointing Republican presidents are equally republican and that all appointing Democratic
presidents are equally democratic (Giles et al 2001, Songer and Haire 1992). Pinello, in a metaanalysis of studies on the extent of the link between judicial ideology and judicial decision
making, found that though the correlation between political party and judicial ideology across all
courts and subject matters is moderate, Democratic judges are more liberal than Republican
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judges and Republican judges are more conservative than Democratic judges (Pinello 2007; see
also Cross and Tiller 1998, Flemming et al 1998, Gerber and Park 1997). Second, this method
assumes that all judges are motivated by ideology equally (read: that judges decide exclusively
as a result of their partisanship) (Epstein et al 2013). Third, this method assumes that a judges’
ideology is stable over time (Epstein et al 2007, Martin and Quinn 2007). Finally, the method
assumes that the president is in complete control of the nominations process. It neglects to
consider senatorial courtesy and the influence of special interests outside of the government
(Giles et al 2001).
There have been two primary alternatives to this measure that Epstein et al classify as
exogenous and endogenous measures (Epstein et al 2013). The most famous exogenous measure
comes from Segal and Cover’s seminal work on defining judicial political preference (Segal and
Cover 1989). They performed a content analysis of newspaper clippings on nominations of
Supreme Court justices and developed a formula to assign a partisan alignment: the fraction of
paragraphs coded conservative subtracted from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal. The
most widely cited endogenous variable comes from Martin and Quinn assessed voting patterns of
justices each term and placed each justice in each year on a scale from most republican to most
democratic (Martin and Quinn 2007). This measure has the benefit of recognizing the fluid
nature of ideology, but it has a serious endogeneity concern: the measure uses votes on cases to
determine votes on other cases.
In order to assign a partisan identity to the leadership of federal agencies, I use the party
of the appointing president in the same way that I do in assigning a partisan identity to federal
judges. It should follow that in the same way that the president would prefer partisan friendlies
on the courts the president would also want to ensure that his or her agency leadership is
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sympathetic to his or her policy positions. Marisam, in his essay on the president’s agency
selection powers, concluded that “presidents continually select which agencies act by exercising
a set of statutory and constitutional powers” (Marisam 2013, 821). This theory recognizes the
traditional understanding that Congress chooses which agencies should act on which sets of
policies since the president does not have the power to transfer congressionally granted powers
between agencies, but also acknowledges that the president has powers over the bureaucracy’s
landscape independent of those congressional powers (Barron and Kagan 2001, Grundstein
1944, Miller 1993). Marisam identifies three powers that give the president the ability to shift the
landscape of the bureaucracy to fit his or her needs. First, the president has the power to
subdelegate authority to the agency they choose when Congress has expressly delegated that
authority to the president. Second, the president has the power to delegate constitutional powers
to an agency and thereby force Congress’ choice of agency on particular regulatory matters.
Third, the president has the power to reconcile agencies’ overlapping jurisdiction by deciding
which of the agencies in the shared regulatory space should act (Marisam 2013).
Though this approach is useful, it requires several caveats. For one, assigning
partisanship based on the partisanship of the appointer presents a unique difficulty for Board
members who are appointed by someone other than the president. Where it is relatively easy to
ascribe partisanship to a presidential appointee to the NLRB, whose members are appointed by
the president, through the president’s party affiliation, it is less simple to ascribe partisanship to a
BIA member appointed by the Attorney General. Though it logically follows that an Attorney
General appointed by a president would have many of the same partisan priorities as the
appointing president, it is hard to know whether those partisan priorities would translate into
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appointing copartisans to positions within the agency. I assume that the partisan priorities are
transferred to bureaucratic appointees, but I do so with caution.
A further difficulty lies in five interrelated assumptions: (1) that presidents will always
appoint copartisans, (2) that presidential partisanship is static over time, (3) that presidents of the
same party are similarly partisan (i.e. that Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter are similarly
democratic while Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush are similarly Republican), (4) that
appointees share the same ideological priorities of the president, and (5) that those appointees
will consistently hold the same ideological priorities of the president that appointed her over
time. Some of these assumptions are easy to overcome: for example, by disaggregating the data
by president rather than just by party, we can avoid false equivalency concerns; and if we accept
Dahl’s conclusions about justices adhering to the regime that appointed them is true, then we can
circumvent the fifth assumption. However, the first and fourth assumptions are important barriers
that must be addressed before making conclusions as to the power of a partisan explanation.
To overcome those assumptions, I take a step back to observe partisanship in the
aggregate by coding for the policy position of the decision and the overall partisan makeup of the
circuits at the time of the decision. All told, I have a good sense of how partisanship might affect
judicial decision making at both the administrative court and the federal court level after
considering all of these codes in concert.
Beyond these codes (and the codes discussed in Appendices C and D), I identified
pertinent deferential language in the text of the opinions. By this, I am referring to passages
within the opinions where the federal court explicitly mentions the administrative courts and the
activities that the administrative court undertook while adjudicating the dispute. This is because
the means through which judges communicate their preferences about how law should be
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interpreted and applied across the administrative state can be ascertained from the verbiage of
judges rather than through static codes exclusively. Since non-discretionary dockets severely
restrict judges’ ability to pick cases that best advance their policy preferences, judges can use
their decisions to advance their policy agendas rather than electing to not hear cases they would
rather avoid (Bickel 1962, Cohen 1991, Macey 1994, Sunstein 1990). By extricating the
portions of opinions where the author provides a rationale for her decision and considering those
rationales alongside the political and doctrinal motivations previously identified, I am able to
make conclusions as to why courts defer.
By means of example, consider the two following passages from cases in my dataset. In
Yaldo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether INS properly applied evidentiary standards regarding an immigrant accused of pursuing
a “sham” marriage to avoid deportation. In a per curiam opinion in favor of INS, the court stated,
“Review of the entire record discloses that both the Special Inquiry
Officer and the BIA employed the proper standard of ‘clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence’ in making their findings
below. Review of the record further discloses that the testimony of
petitioner’s ex-wife, if believed, would, along with the other
evidence, support the findings below. As stated above, we are not
permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the Board or the
Special Inquiry Officer 29 with respect to the credibility of this
testimony or the ultimate findings of fact based thereon. It is

29

This was the title given to immigration judges in the early post-APA years.
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therefore determined that the findings below are supported by
‘reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence,’ and the decisions
of the BIA are affirmed” (Yaldo v. INS, 424 F.2d 501 (1970), 503).
In this text, particularly in the underlined passages, we observe two pro-agency forces working in
tandem. First, the court acknowledged that the Special Inquiry Officer and the BIA acted
correctly in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard for the facts presented in this
case. This is an important statement: the court is arguing that the judicial actors in the
bureaucracy acted correctly in their activities as adjudicators. Second, the court continues on to
remind its audience that it is not able to substitute its own interpretations of the evidence for that
of the two INS actors. 30 By not providing their own conclusions after asserting that the
conclusions drawn by the bureaucratic actors were appropriately found, the court in Yaldo acted
with a high level of deference.
By means of comparison, consider Yanez-Jacquez v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Yanez-Jacquez, a permanent resident, was assaulted on a brief trip to Mexico. He sought
to get revenge on the assailants and perched by the river where he was previously attacked
wielding an ice pick. He was found by Border Patrol and charged with possessing a weapon, a
deportable offense. After the Board ordered his deportation, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The crux of the court’s argument hinged upon the meaning of “entry” in the
Immigration and Nationality Act; the Act requires that a permanent resident not commit a crime
within five years of the most recent entry, and his initial entry to the United States was eight
years prior to the Mexico trip. The court found that his trip to Mexico did not constitute an entry

30

In a pre-Chevron case.
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under the INA as defined by Fleuti. Judge Simpson, in the opinion for the court, explicitly
disapproved of the interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided by the Board:
“This case is necessarily limited to its facts. A different set of facts
applied to the criteria to be weighted might dictate a different
result…. Under the facts of this case, we simply conclude that the
agency determination that the incident of May 6, 1963, was an
“entry” does not have support in the record (Yanez-Jacquez v. INS,
440 F.2d 701” (1971), 704).
In the same way that the court in Yaldo was laudatory for the Service’s actions, the court in
Yanez-Jacquez is opposed to the Service’s interpretations. The court is not only skeptical of the
decision made by the Board; Simpson explicitly states that there is no factual support for the
Board’s decision. This is a strong statement against the Board’s interpretive faculties, and it
constitutes a textbook case of active non-deference.

The Four Deferences
Where the extant literature sees deference as binary (deference or no deference), I place
deference in quadrants.
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Table 2b: Deference Quadrants
Agency Win

Agency Loss

Explicit Deference Claims

Active Deference

Active Non-Deference

Absence of Deference Claims

Passive Deference

Passive Non-Deference

This serves to provide further theoretical leverage in order to better understand how the
courts and the bureaucracy interact – by interrogating the judicial opinions for deferential intent
and practice, we can provide a compelling account as to why courts do or do not defer. The
columns differentiate between a win and a loss; this is the primary means through which the
existing literature identifies deference (Barnett and Walker 2017, Eskridge and Baer 2008, Hume
2009, Watry 2000). If the agency wins, I code the case as deference. If the agency loses, I code
the case as non-deference. But the binary requirement (a win or a loss) is not as clear cut as it
might appear at first glance. For one, a case may not have a single winner or a single loser;
instead, a case might have a mixed outcome where both parties win in part and lose in part. To
identify a win or a loss, then, we must triangulate using several approaches. The first step in
coding for type of deference is to read the text of the BIA opinion. This is critical for
understanding the corresponding court of appeals case for a close reading unearths the inherent
strengths or weaknesses of the decision before the case arrives in the federal judiciary. It also
often provides an alternative account of the facts of the case that can offer insight on the
approach both courts take to adjudicate identical disputes. The second step is to read the opinion
and come to a conclusion as to the successful party at the end of the opinion. This is a good
approach when the coder has legal expertise, but to ensure accuracy I refer to LexisNexis and
WestLaw case summaries to confirm conclusions made after a full reading of the opinion.
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Additionally, for cases that are not clear cut as to a winner and a loser, I carefully weigh the
components of each case that constitute winning aspects for each party, concluding from that
which party was successful at more than 50%. 31
The rows, my addition to the literature, codes for whether there is evidence that the court
is actually deferring. This is what is missing in the previous attempts at defining deference: there
are any number of reasons why a party is unsuccessful in court that can be independent of
deferential behavior, including the comparative strength of the arguments, the governing
ideology of the judiciary at the time of the decision, the pressures of a full docket, and other
ineffable phenomena. But when the text of the opinion is scoured for language directly speaking
to the actions of the BIA in their initial decision, then we can confidently conclude that deference
has or has not occurred. Of interest for this dissertation, then, are the quadrants in the upper right
and lower left corners: those cases where (1) an agency won and (2) the deference was active;
and where (1) an agency lost and (2) the non-deference was active. 32
One hundred and sixteen dyads of BIA and courts of appeals cases, representing one
hundred and thirteen immigrants (plus one immigration attorney in the United States) from fortyfour countries, were coded for deference and the other myriad codes explicated in Appendices C
and D. Figure 2a provides a temperature map of the cases in the dataset where larger dots
represent countries with more immigrants represented in the sample.

31

Fortunately only one case was so ambiguous as to require this weighing procedure.
This is not to say that the other two quadrants (passive (non-)deference) are not worth
investigating. After all, deference may occur even if there are not explicit discussions of
deference in the text of the opinions. This is why I still identify agency wins and losses where
there are no explicit discussions of deference or non-deference as deference, for we cannot
evaluate whether or not a win or loss constititutes deference or non-deference when the opinion
lacks the explicit discussions. Because of this, they are excluded from the current analysis.
32
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Figure 2a: Countries of Origin in BIA/Courts of Appeals Sample of Dyads

The plurality of cases feature an immigrant from Mexico (twenty-five appellees). Eight
come from China (with an additional four from Hong Kong and one from Taiwan), six each
come from the Philippines and El Salvador, five each from Italy and Canada, and four come
from the Dominican Republic.
Table 2c provides the deferences present in the sample.
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Table 2c: Deferences in BIA/Courts of Appeals Sample of Dyads
Deference Type

Count of Cases

Active Deference

42

Active Non-Deference

39

Passive Deference

29

Passive Non-Deference

6

Total

116

Of note is (1) the near equal distribution of active deference and active non-deference
cases, and (2) the comparative dearth of cases where an agency loses but the court does not
explain why vis-a-vis the agency’s decision making. It appears, then, that in instances where an
agency’s decision is reversed by the court it rarely allows this to occur without explanation as to
why.
Table 2d breaks down deference type by pre- and post-Chevron eras.

Table 2d: Deferences in BIA/Courts of Appeals Sample of Dyads by Chevron Era
Active

Active Non-

Passive

Passive Non-

Deference

Deference

Deference

Deference

Pre-Chevron

20

14

18

5

57

Post-Chevron

22

25

11

1

59

Total

42

39

29

6

116

Period

67

Total

We observe a marked decrease in the number of moderate deference cases and a similar
increase in active non-deference cases following Chevron. As I will discuss in Chapter 3, the
high proportion of active to moderate cases post-Chevron is notable since only a portion of these
cases actively cite and apply Chevron; there appears to be a paradigm shift that is independent of
active application of the doctrine. Further, the assumption that Chevron led to an increase in
deferential activity is not supported by these data. In fact, there is an increase in cases of active
non-deference by 20% (from 24% to 44% of the pre-Chevron sample) compared to a 5%
increase in the number of active deference cases (from 34% to 39% of the post-Chevron sample).
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Chapter 3:
Partisanship and Chevron as Explanations for Deferential Behavior

In Chapters 1 and 2, I provided a theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship
between courts and the bureaucracy as it applies to interactions over administrative court
proceedings and judicial deference to administrative agencies both because of and independent
of Chevron. I introduced a new paradigm for defining deference that adds judicial intent into the
process of identifying deferential activity by courts and agencies. With deference accurately
identified, Chapters 3 and 4 answer why deference occurs. Chapter 4 appeals to the text of the
opinions to consider deference as explicated by the courts themselves, but before this novel
approach can be considered, we must examine extant explanations for deferential behavior. In
this chapter I give thorough treatment to attitudinal and doctrinal rationales as explanations for
deference by courts to agencies.
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Partisanship
This section tests one main hypothesis: I assess the claim that where there is a partisan
match between the administrative panel and the judicial panel there is more likely to be
deference. This explanation is expected from the attitudinal strand of empirical political science,
but the literature has come to contradictory conclusions (see Chapters 1 and 2 for details). In this
section I will provide the results of a series of regressions testing the impact of partisanship on
the likelihood that a court rules for or against an agency controlling for the contextual facts of the
case.
But before I provide regression evidence that a partisan explanation is not altogether
explanatory, I will describe the data as they relate to partisanship. Given the patchwork nature of
deducing partisanship for administrative law judges and circuit court judges, I delineate multiple
descriptive measures of partisanship in order to lay the groundwork prior to hypothesis testing.
Table 3a provides the partisan breakdown for the universe of courts of appeals cases. I
define a Republican panel as one that includes at least one more Republican-appointed judge
than Democratic-appointed judges; the opposite is true for Democratic panels. The distribution is
roughly equal. This is a fortuitous coincidence: we need not control for the number of cases that
are decided by each party since the case law naturally did so.
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Table 3a: Number of Cases by Panel Partisanship
Panel Partisanship

Number of Cases

Republican

56

Democratic

57

Unknown

2

Even

1

Total

116

Tables 3b and 3c discuss unanimity. Unanimity has the potential to concentrate likeminded sentiment in such a way as to illuminate nascent pro- or anti-agency opinions. A sizable
portion of the cases (approximately one-third) are decided by unanimous panels (Table 3b). Of
those unanimous cases, a slight majority are exclusively Republican panels. Table 3c provides a
breakdown of cases whose panel is exclusively staffed by one party.

Table 3b: Number of Cases by Unanimity Type
Unanimity Type

Number of Cases

Not Unanimous

69

Unanimous

35

Unknown Panel

26

Total

116
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Table 3c: Number of Cases by Unanimity Type and Panel Partisanship
Unanimity Type

Number of Cases

Non-Unanimous

69

Republican

31

Democratic

37

Unknown partisanship

1

Unanimous

35

Republican

19

Democratic

16

Unknown Panel

26

Total

116

The key distinction is not the partisanship per se; instead, we must investigate the impact
of the partisan match between the Board and the courts. Regressions later in this chapter will
assert causality, but first I will provide tabular data on partisan match. There are two ways to
measure partisan match: through matching the deciding panels and through matching the
partisanship of the courts as a whole at the time the case was decided. Table 3d distinguishes
between the partisanship of the two panels at the time of the decision. This is calculated using the
appointing president of the judge as described in Chapter 2. This is a more fine-tuned approach
to determining whether there is a partisan match, but there is one primary weakness that
necessitates another more general approach to complement. We cannot determine partisanship
for the BIA prior to 1978 since the BIA did not indicate the deciding panel in their decisions.
Though we could assume that the panel is exclusively made up of the judges on the Board at the
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time, I am uncomfortable making that assumption where there is another means for determining
a partisan match that, though imperfect, is an adequate supplement. Even after 1978, per curiam
opinions by the BIA do not indicate the members of the panel deciding that per curiam decision
in the same way as federal courts do. Thus, there are more null values in this table than in the
table below. Table 3d, then, shows the partisan match of the two panels post-1978 when the BIA
began to regularly indicate the composition of the panels.

Table 3d: Partisan Match of the Panels, 1978-2016
Board Partisanship

Court of Appeals Partisanship

Number of Cases

Republican

Republican

15

Republican

Democratic

14

Democratic

Republican

10

Democratic

Democratic

10

N/A (partisanship equal)

Republican

10

N/A (partisanship equal)

Democratic

4

All matched

25

All unmatched

24

Table 3e distinguishes between the partisanship of the courts at large. Though this measure is
less exact, it has the benefit of capturing the entire span of time given the prevalence of per
curiam opinions by the Board before 1978.
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Table 3e: Partisan Match of the Courts, 1940-2016
Board Partisanship

Court of Appeals Partisanship

Number of Cases

Republican

Republican

21

Republican

Democratic

13

Democratic

Republican

38

Democratic

Democratic

38

N/A (partisanship equal)

Republican

1

N/A (partisanship equal)

Democratic

5

Unknown

Unknown

6

All matched

59

All unmatched

57

Table 3f begins to answer the second question (is the (non-)deference active or passive?). It
disaggregates the four kinds of deference by panel partisanship. We observe little difference
between the instances of any of the forms of deference between the two parties. The insight will
be substantiated causally shortly.
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Table 3f: Deference Type and Panel Partisanship
Panel

Active

Active Non-

Passive

Passive Non-

Partisanship

Deference

Deference

Deference

Deference

Republican

21

21

12

2

56

Democrat

20

18

15

4

57

Unknown

0

0

0

0

2

Even

1

0

0

0

1

Total

42

39

29

6

116

Grand Total

These tables are necessary to provide a grounding for the regression analyses that follow.
The regression analyses fall into two main categories that correspond with the two steps of
deference analysis explicated in Chapter 2: first, was the agency successful in court; and second,
was the deference active or passive?
<><><><><>
For each test I utilized multiple logistic regression. 33 The regressions should be read with
the knowledge that a Republican Board/panel/court is coded as 0 and a Democratic
Board/panel/court is coded as 1. Thus, a unit change in the positive direction suggests a more
democratic outcome, while a unit change in the negative direction suggests a more republican
outcome. An agency win is coded as 1 and an agency loss is coded as 0. A case indicating
deference is coded as 1 and a case indicating non-deference is coded as 0. A case indicating

33

I also ran x2 tests to evaluate correlations. Results are presented in Appendix G.
75

active (non-)deference is coded as 1 and a case indicating moderate (non-)deference is coded as
0.
I ran twelve distinct regressions investigating six independent variables on two dependent
variables: whether an agency wins or loses, and the existence of passive or active (non)deference. The six variables are as such:
1. Panel match – this indicates whether or not the partisanship of the deciding panels at the
Board and the Court of Appeals match. A match is coded as 1; a non-match is coded as 0.
2. Court match – this indicates whether or not the partisanship of the deciding Board and
Court of Appeals match at large. A match is coded as 1; a non-match is coded as 0.
3. Board partisanship – this indicates the partisanship of the BIA panel as defined by the
appointing Attorney General (and, in turn, the Attorney General’s appointing president).
A majority Democratic Board is coded as 1; a majority Republican Board is coded as 0.
4. Court of Appeals panel partisanship – this indicates the partisanship of the Court of
Appeals panel as defined by the appointing president. A Democratic panel is coded as 1;
a Republican panel is coded as 0.
5. Per curiam: Board of Immigration Appeals – this indicates whether the case was decided
per curiam at the BIA. As aforementioned, this was the norm before 1978. A per curiam
opinion is coded as 1; a non-per curiam opinion is coded as 0.
6. Per curiam: Court of Appeals – this indicates whether or not the Court of Appeals case
was decided per curiam. A per curiam opinion is coded as 1; a non-per curiam opinion is
coded as 0.
Each independent variable is regressed against two dependent variables with various
controls (indicated in the footnotes). The first refers to the two steps of the deference
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identification process: whether or not the agency was successful in court (“agency win or loss”)
The second refers to the decision was active or passive (“deference type”).
Tables 3i and 3j provide the regression data on all one hundred and sixteen dyads.

Table 3i: Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Logistic Regressions

Independent Variable

Panel Match

34

Court Match

35

β-Coefficient

(Standard Error)
0.671
(0.445)

Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 36

0.332
(0.425)
0.001
(0.001)

Court of Appeals

-0.024

Panel Partisanship 37

(0.556)

34

Significance

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.132

0.03

0.436

0.009

0.547

0.012

0.996

0.047

Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
35
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
36
Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
37
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
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Board of Immigration

0.919

0.032

(0.429)

**

Court of Appeals Per

2.165

0.001

Curiam 39

(0.657)

***

Appeals Per
Curiam 38

0.063

0.180

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1

Table 3j: Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Logistic Regressions

Independent Variable

Panel Match

40

Court Match 41
Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 42

β-Coefficient

(Standard Error)
0.027
(0.479)
0.156
(0.451)
0.000
(0.001)

38

Significance

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.955

0.02

0.728

0.013

0.678

0.004

Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
40
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
41
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
42
Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
39
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Court of Appeals

0.498

Panel Partisanship 43

(0.631)

Board of Immigration

0.430

-1.384

0.012

(0.550)

***

Court of Appeals Per

-0.972

0.029

Curiam 45

(0.496)

**

Appeals Per
Curiam 44

0.146

0.095

0.067

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1
The majority of regressions do not reach statistical significance as defined by a p-value of
0.1 and below. There is no statistically significant correlation regarding partisanship. This tracks
with the literature on Court of Appeals judges and the effect that partisanship has on their
decision making. That said, it is surprising that we observe no effect of partisanship on deference
rates; even though the literature on judicial decision making in the courts of appeals, as discussed
in Chapter 1, suggests that partisan calculations are moderated as compared to Supreme Court
decision making, the partisan motivation is not completely absent in the courts of appeals.
Further, we observe that whether a case is decided per curiam by the Board and the Court
of Appeals is correlative with deference existence and type to a statistically significant degree.
Per curiam decisions provide judicial panels the opportunity to obscure their identity for any
number of reasons. In the courts of appeals, according to Hume (2009), per curiam opinions are
most commonly utilized for “unimportant” cases, those that are considered particularly weak

43

Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
45
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
44
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opinions or cases that may be politically contentious. Nygaard, a circuit court judge, extolled the
virtues of the per curiam opinion for the day-to-day operation of the court: “According to a
survey by the American Judicature Society, judges ranked opinion-writing as a significant case
of delay in the intermediate appellate courts....Without the allure of ‘NYGAARD, Circuit Judge’
at the beginning of an opinion, it might well be shorter and more to the point, and have fewer
bursts of rhetoric. Judge PER CURIAM is statistically less windy than its named colleagues”
(Nygaard 2005, 47). It is a combination of these factors that I believe is the phenomenon at play
here. The per curiam question becomes more prescient in the Chevron regressions, so the
discussion continues there.
The data in aggregate do not support the partisan match theory. The panel match
regressions (the most important regression required to support the theory) garners no significant
results. This suggests that co-partisanship across decision making bodies does not affect case
outcomes. This result is not indicated by the extant judicial decision making theories; that said,
there is no apparent literature on the effect of partisanship on BIA judges. I return to discuss this
in Chapter 5.

Adding Chevron
In order to test the effect of Chevron on dyad outcomes, I divided the dyadic data into
two buckets: cases that occurred in or before 1984 and cases that occurred after 1985. Since the
Chevron decision is a natural cut-point, this provides substantial leverage on the question of
whether the Chevron decision made a difference in deferential activity. Like the partisanshiponly regressions, I use logistic regression.
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Tables 3k and 3l provides regression results for the fifty-seven pre-Chevron dyads.
Immediately following, in Table 3m and 3n, are regression results for the fifty-nine postChevron dyads. The independent and dependent variables are the same as those utilized in the
partisanship regressions.

Table 3k: Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Pre-Chevron
Independent Variable

β-Coefficient

Significance

(Standard Error)

n/a 46

Panel Match
Court Match

47

Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 48

Nagelkerke’s R2

1.224

0.115

(0.777)
2.234

0.106

(1.380)

*

Court of Appeals

0.662

Panel Partisanship 49

(1.054)

0.530

46

0.244

0.094

0.154

There are too few observations to garner a reliable result from the logistic regression. Because
BIA panels were not reliably published for each case until the mid-1970s, only 6 of 57 dyads
have a panel match value.
47
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
48
Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
49
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals
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Board of Immigration

n/a 50

Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per

2.165

0.001

Curiam 51

(0.657)

***

0.180

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1

Table 3l: Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Pre-Chevron
Independent Variable

β-Coefficient

Significance

(Standard Error)

n/a 52

Panel Match
Court Match 53
Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 54

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.294
(0.657)
1.050
(1.320)

50

0.655

0.005

0.426

0.026

There are too few observations to garner a reliable result from the logistic regression. Because
BIA panels were not reliably published for each case until the mid-1970s, only 6 of 57 dyads
have a panel match value.
51
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
52
There are too few observations to garner a reliable result from the logistic regression. Because
BIA panels were not reliably published for each case until the mid-1970s, only 6 of 57 dyads
have a panel match value.
53
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
54
Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
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Court of Appeals

2.234

0.087

Panel Partisanship 55

(1.306)

*

Board of Immigration

0.256

n/a 56

Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per

-0.865

Curiam 57

(0.632)

0.171

0.044

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1

Table 3m: Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Post-Chevron
Independent Variable

Panel Match 58

Court Match

59

β-Coefficient

(Standard Error)
0.102
(0.606)
0.221
(0.601)

55

Significance

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.866

0.055

0.713

0.035

Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals
There are too few observations to garner a reliable result from the logistic regression. Because
BIA panels were not reliably published for each case until the mid-1970s, only 6 of 57 dyads
have a panel match value.
57
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
58
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
59
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
56
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Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 60

0.001
(0.001)

Court of Appeals

-0.561

Panel Partisanship 61

(0.622)

Board of Immigration
Appeals Per
Curiam 62
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

63

0.394

0.037

0.367

0.041

1.117

0.075

(0.628)

*

3.274

0.003

(1.101)

***

0.107

0.361

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1

Table 3n: Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Post-Chevron
Independent

β-Coefficient

Variable

(Standard Error)

Panel Match 64

-0.365
(0.772)

60

Significance

Nagelkerke’s R2

0.637

0.081

Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals
62
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
63
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
64
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the partisanship
of the Court of Appeals panel, and the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
61
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Court Match

65

Board of Immigration
Appeals
Partisanship 66

0.378
(0.763)
0.000
(0.001)

Court of Appeals

-0.421

Panel Partisanship 67

(0.798)

Board of Immigration
Appeals Per
Curiam 68
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

69

-1.064
(0.695)

0.621

0.059

0.923

0.001

0.597

0.205

0.126

0.066

-1.521

0.035

(0.723)

**

0.168

*** ≤ 0.01 | ** ≤ 0.05 | * ≤ 0.1
Before Chevron we observe, unlike in the regressions discussed previously, several
moderate indications that partisanship had an influence on judicial decision making, particularly
on federal judges. All significance indicated in the pre-Chevron regressions drop away after the
Chevron decision. In its place, whether a court of appeals case is decided per curiam attains high
levels of significance across the board. We observe opposite effects of per curiam on court of
appeals decision making: as the deference/non-deference dummy increases by one (read:
65

Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
66
Controlling for the partisanship of the Attorney General.
67
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Court of Appeals
68
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
69
Controlling for the overall partisanship of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the overall
partisanship of the Court of Appeals.
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indicates deference), the case is more likely to be per curiam; and when the deference type
dummy increases by one (read: indicates active), the case is less likely to be per curiam. Thus, a
deferential case and a non-active case are likely to be published per curiam. Operationally, this
suggests courts anonymize (or decide a case as an institutional unit rather than as individuals) in
situations where the court is ruling in favor of an agency but not providing positive
reinforcement for good judicial and administrative behavior by the BIA. But when the court feels
compelled to comment on the Board’s activity, the court will infrequently decide as one body
and instead indicate an author.
Why this shift occurs after the Chevron decision should be investigated. Drawing on the
extensive literature on Chevron cited in Chapters 1 and 2 in concert with the regressions,
Chevron was likely a monumental case for judicial procedure independent of the two-step
process introduced by the decision. Chevron gave judges, I suspect though cannot prove (though
future scholarship might, see Chapter 5), the means to obscure personal partisan preferences
under the guise of Chevron procedure and per curiam decisions. That the Chevron-independent
regressions did not indicate partisan motivations but the pre-Chevron regressions did (albeit
moderately) suggests that the effects in the post-Chevron era were stronger than those before
Chevron. (After all, there is no real difference in the number of cases before and after Chevron in
the dataset, so differences in effect cannot be attributed to sample size. Similarly, the distribution
of partisanship (defined by presidents and judge partisanship) is roughly equal across samples.)
It is important to note that the effect of Chevron is not due to Chevron itself; if the
Chevron doctrine directly impacted deferential behavior as the extant literature suggests, we
would observe a large change in the number of cases defined as deferential following the
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Chevron decision. But in fact there is no large shift. Table 3o summarizes the deference types
before and after Chevron.
Table 3o: Deference Rates Before and After Chevron
Deference

Non-Deference

Before Chevron

38

19

After Chevron

33

26

In fact, there were more deferential cases before Chevron, not fewer. The effect of Chevron,
then, is not the doctrine in itself, but instead the unintended consequences of the doctrine that
shifted deferential behavior after the Chevron decision.
In short, from these data we observe Chevron did have an impact on judicial deference,
but not in the way that the literature expects. Before Chevron we observe a moderate partisan
impact on judicial decision making among court of appeals judges, and after Chevron we
observe a strong per curiam effect. Before Chevron the partisanship of both the Board correlates
with deference existence and the partisanship of the courts of appeals correlates with deference
type to a statistically significant degree. After Chevron the correlations drop away completely.
This suggests that Chevron, like per curiam opinions, serves as a method to obscure partisan
motivations behind doctrinal strictures. I investigate deference before and after Chevron in
Chapter 4 and suggest avenues for future research on the phenomenon in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4:
Active (Non-)Deference in Action: Opinion Language as Data

In Chapter 3 I considered two explanations for deferential behavior as described by the
extant literature. First, I determined to what extent a match in partisanship between the BIA and
the courts of appeals can predict the presence of deference. The regression analysis of all dyads
showed little connection between partisan match and deference existence or type. Instead, there
was a statistically significant relationship between deference and the presence of per curiam
decision making. However, when cases are disaggregated into pre- and post-Chevron there are
partisan variables that are statistically significant prior to Chevron and all but one per curiam
variables are statistically significant after Chevron, some to a very high degree of significance.
This suggests that Chevron provided circuit courts the ability to obscure their partisan
motivations behind the strictures of precedent.
Given the insights provided by the regression data in Chapter 3, we can fill in the gaps
with qualitative data on circuit court discussions of BIA behavior. This chapter seeks to answer
the following question: how do courts of appeals, knowing now that they use the tools at their
disposal to depoliticize their decision making in regards to immigration regulation, provide
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guidance to the BIA on how best to act like courts to promote their deference goals? I argue that,
in so doing, courts (either implicitly or explicitly) exhibit preferences for how other judiciaryadjacent institutions should function. I provide evidence that the text of opinions can provide
insight into the ways the circuit courts provide guidance to the BIA on how to best act as a court.
I suggest that in order to understand deferential behavior, we must reach beyond partisan and
doctrinal lenses to determine what courts believe to be ideal judicial behavior by non-judicial
bodies.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, I mined dyads of BIA/courts of appeals cases for
circuit court language that instructs the BIA how to best act as a court. In order to examine this,
we must consider what courts do and how they function. Table 4a provides a sampling of court
functions.
Table 4a: A Sample of Features and Functions of Courts
Features and Functions of Courts
Adjudicating disputes
Assigning legal right and wrong
Creating precedent
Fact-finding
Interpreting evidence
Interpreting statutes for application in disputes
Judicial review (at the appellate level)
Maintaining the rule of law
Protecting civil rights
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To organize this inquiry, I selected three of these functions to investigate: interpreting
evidence, interpreting statutes, and creating precedent. Using the text of circuit court opinions, I
determined the extent to which (as interpreted and discussed by the circuit courts) the Board of
Immigration Appeals acted as a court.
I organize this chapter into two sections. The first portion investigates the features that
define courts and how circuit courts provide guidance to Board members. This includes
discussions of evidentiary procedure, statutory interpretation, commitment to stare decisis, and
the fact-finding process. The second section returns to Chevron and deference. There I discuss
Chevron deference in practice with special focus put on congressional intent. In that section I pay
special attention to the cases decided in the year before and the year after the Chevron decision
to discern any differences between the pre- and post-Chevron eras.
But before we consider the qualitative data, by means of introduction and to introduce the
observable implications I expect to see in cases where the circuit court is speaking explicitly
about the Board’s court-like prowess, let us consider the case of Kulle v. Immigration and
Naturalization. Kulle is the prototypical example of the sort of language that I coded for in this
chapter: the opinion’s author explicitly reflects upon judicial prerogatives as exercised by the
BIA, coming to the conclusion that the Board was correct in its judicial activities. As I will
discuss shortly, the rules of evidentiary procedure for administrative courts is less extensive than
the Federal Rules of Evidence that governs Article III courts. This direct consideration of the
judicial role of immigration court members as evidentiary interpreters, then, is particularly
important as it lays the groundwork for the court’s interpretation of the few passages on evidence
present in the APA. The government, as proxied by the INS, actively eschews the strictures that
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are on judges as to evidentiary procedure in deportation hearings, arguing that since Board
members are not judges in the constitutional sense they are not subject to those same evidentiary
requirements. The court does not disagree that the Board is not an Article III court; even so, the
court finds that the Board “established deportability by ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence.’” Though the Board is not restricted by the extensive Federal Rules of Evidence, they
nonetheless surpassed one of the stricter standards of proof.
The Board continues on to consider the role of judicial procedure in immigration court
proceedings:
“…we believe the hearing was conducted in accordance with the
provisions of [U.S. Code]. According to the rules governing
deportation proceedings, the respondent has ‘a reasonable
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him, and
to present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine
witnesses presented by the Government” (Kulle, 1194).
Though the evidentiary standards vary between the deportation proceedings before the
BIA and adjudication before the circuit courts, all parties arguing in the Board have rights to
examine and object to evidence used against them to examine and cross-examine witnesses. That
the government was emphatic as to the evidentiary non-requirements and then the court went on
to explicate the requirements speaks volumes as to the relationship between the court and the
Board and the ways in which the court communicates its preferences.
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In these passages, 70 the court has carefully asserted that the Board is court-like. The rest
of the chapter will proceed in a similar manner.

The BIA as a Court
In providing guidance to the Board in identical disputes, we can consider how the two
bodies come to their conclusions through excluding potential confounders implicit in examining
case law. In nearly half of the cases in the dataset, the conclusions garnered by the courts and the
Board are the same; these are deferential cases. But the other half come to opposite conclusions;
these are non-deferential cases. One of the more common means for either agreeing or
disagreeing with the Board is through considering how well the Board acts as a court. This flips
the Chevron deference principle on its head – where federal courts, at times, defer to agencies
because of their subject matter expertise, courts can assert their own subject matter expertise on
acting judicially upon administrative courts. The deference, then, goes in both directions: from
courts to agencies and from agencies to courts.
As explained throughout this dissertation, there are any number of reasons why a court
would rule for or against an agency, and those reasons are likely less difficult (or at least timeconsuming) than instructing another court-like body how to act judicially. The decision to
provide instructions is a concerted one, and through examining those instructions we can
understand the reasons through which courts decide to provide those instructions.

70

Of note: the passages quoted in this chapter are a subset of the evidence identified in the
opinion dyads. They are representative of the features discussed in this chapter, but they are by
no means the only occurrences of each phenomenon. 29 of 81 (36%) “active” cases are quoted in
this chapter and in the methods portion of Chapter 2.
92

Evidence, Evidentiary Procedure, and Fact-Finding
As stated above, federal courts and administrative courts are not beholden to the same
rules of evidence and evidentiary procedure. Federal courts are subject to the guidance set out in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules, along with ample Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the subject, amount to an intense and extensive evidentiary procedure canon.
Stephenson suggests that the size and strength of evidentiary procedure requirements and
guidance serve many functions, including minimizing decision, error, and information gathering
costs; extracting information from the more prepared party; and influencing potential incentives
that the parties might face (Stephenson 2008; see also Hay and Spier 1997, Milgrom and Roberts
1986, Posner 1973a, Rubinfeld and Sappington 1987, Sanchirico 2001).
A trend towards loosening evidentiary standards on administrative courts (as compared to
the evidentiary strictures on Article III courts) began with Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird (1904) and hit its apex with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
Kidane interprets the few provisions of the APA that refer to evidentiary procedure as a
compromise between those who advocated for evidentiary rules that were analogous to those
imposed on Article III courts and those who preferred a more lenient approach (Kidane 2008).
The more lenient approach, according to Davis, allows the administrative process to continue the
expediency and efficiency that characterizes it (Davis 1964).
The BIA exemplifies this move towards a less strict set of evidentiary procedures. The
guidebook for the EOIR on evidence provides additional guidance beyond the brief passages in
the Administrative Procedure Act. “Relevant and fundamental fairness,” notes the guidebook’s
authors, “are the only bars to admissibility of evidence in deportation cases” (Executive Office of
Immigration Review n.d., 2). Only common-sense restrictions define the use of evidence in
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deportation proceedings: “as long as the evidence is shown to be probative of relevant matters
and its use is fundamentally fair so as not to deprive the alien of due process of law” (ibid., 3).
Even hearsay, one of the prototypical features of evidentiary procedure for Article III courts, is
allowed in deportation proceedings if the speech is “probative and not fundamentally unfair”
(ibid., 3). The burden of proof required to establish admissibility in the United States lies with
the immigrant; this burden never shifts to the government (Immigration and Nationality Act,
Section 212; Matter of Walsh and Pollard, 20 I&N Dec. 60, 63 (1989)).
That there are both similarities and differences in how administrative courts and Article
III courts interpret and apply their respective evidentiary procedures suggests that the
conversations the courts of appeals have with the BIA in case law will be illustrative in
understanding how circuit courts view the evidentiary realities of administrative courts. Being
able to assess and interpret evidence is a particularly important prerogative of courts harkening
back to Shapiro’s claim that courts consist of disinterested arbiters of disputes; by extension,
courts must weigh the comparative value of evidence as it relates to the disputes being arbitrated
(Shapiro 1981). It follows, then, that courts are well-situated to evaluate evidence as it arises.
The circuit courts, in these data, frequently speak on the demonstrated ability of the
Board to be able to assess evidence and apply evidentiary standards. At the most basic level, the
courts use language such as:
“We think that on the record before us there is a lack of substantial
evidence to support the Board’s conclusion” (Sawkow, 37-38).
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This suggests that the Board made a decision that was anathema to the evidence at hand; thus, it
asserts a lack of ability of the Board to act court-like regarding the use of evidence in this case.
More specifically, consider the court’s argument in Scythes v. Webb regarding hearsay:
“We think that the characterization of the Socialist Workers Party
as an organization advocating violent overthrow of the
Government on the basis of such passages would be a
characterization based on what was not said rather than what was
said” (Scythes, 908).
The Board, in Scythes, mistakenly interpreted the evidence in such a way as to try to rely
on the non-existence of a phenomenon.
Beyond interpreting the use of evidence in Board arguments, the courts also reflect on
Board usage of the various evidentiary standards of review. This is a frequent topic in court
opinions, and it is particularly well-tailored to understanding how courts discuss the judicial
features of administrative courts. In Ah Chiu Pang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the court states:
“We agree with the BIA that the testimony of the Investigator as to
the making, signing, and verifying of the statement by the
petitioner, together with evidence by the interpreter of his regular
routine in all cases gave ample authentication to the statement not
only under the flexible rules regarding the admission of evidence
before administrative tribunals in deportation proceedings, but
would likely meet the stricter requirements of admissibility in
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court. The Government thus having shown that he was an alien, the
burden shifted to the petitioner to justify his presence in the United
States. This he failed to do” (Ah Chiu Pang, 639).
The court here explicitly discusses differences in the application of evidentiary standards
in the Article III courts and the administrative courts. The Administrative Procedure Act does not
speak to evidentiary standards. In Director v. Greenwich Collieries (512 U.S. 267 (1994)), the
Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act does not define a uniform burden of
proof to all administrative hearings; instead, due to the APA’s goal of “greater uniformity of
procedure and standardization of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose
customs had departed widely from each other’ (Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41
(1950))”, each agency’s governing statute is tasked with defining the evidentiary standards that
are imposed upon the administrative court in that agency (Director, 280). The Immigration and
Nationality Act states that the burden of proof resides with the government to establish
deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence (Immigration and Nationality Act,
Section 240). 71 Given this, the circuit court here is careful to explicate the evidentiary duties of
both the Board and the immigrant and concludes that the Board correctly interpreted and applied
their evidentiary standards correctly.
More specifically, the circuit courts frequently consider how well the Board fulfills its
requirement to meet the “clear and convincing evidence” standard. The “clear and convincing”
standard is a moderately strict hurdle that parties must surpass to successfully prove their case

71

Note that deportability is different from inadmissibility: admissibility questions occur when a
prospective immigrant is trying to enter the United States; deportability questions occur when an
immigrant, already present, is facing removal from the United States.
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with evidence. 72 In Laipenieks v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, we observe a typical
discussion of the Board’s “clear and convincing” requirements:
“Laipenieks argues that the INS failed to prove deportability on the
basis of Section 1251(a)(10) by clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence” (Laipenieks, 1428). 73
The Laipenieks opinion continues with a reflection on how immigration courts and the
BIA have variable applications of the “clear and convincing” standard.
“This court has observed that in a situation where the hearing
examiner and the Agency have reached opposite results, the
appellate court’s reviewing eye may be more searching”
(Laipenieks, 1430).
Thus, when there is a discord between the levels of administrative court, the federal
courts may be more likely to give a more thorough review even if the standard of review does
not change per se. The same process occurs in the various levels of the Article III judiciary: if a
district court and a circuit court reach different conclusions even when (and perhaps especially

72

If we consider the three standards of proof in terms of the percent of certainty the evidence
must provide, “preponderance of the evidence” requires 50.1% certainty, “clear and convincing
evidence” requires approximately 66.6% certainty, and “beyond a reasonable doubt” requires
99.9% certainty. Thank you to John Ryan, Esq. for guidance on standards of proof.

73

The addition of “unequivocal” to the “clear and convincing” standard is unique to immigration
law. It has also been widely debated in case law to confusing results. Walsh argues that the
addition of “unequivocal” makes the “clear and convincing” standard more stringent, more akin
to “beyond a reasonable doubt” though not as absolute. But the case law she cites, she admits, is
contradictory and unclear (Walsh 2018). For the purposes of this dissertation it is not
immediately important what the actual standard of proof is in practice; instead, we are primarily
focused on the consistency of asserting that standard and explicating whether the Board
successfully meets its requirements.
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when) the courts ostensibly use the same evidentiary standards, the Supreme Court must then
parse which court more successfully interpreted and applied that standard.
Before moving on, let us consider the review standards upon which the BIA assesses
immigration court cases as well as the review standards upon which the federal courts assess
BIA cases. Before the Ashcroft reforms of 2002 (discussed in Chapter 2), the BIA was granted
the ability to review both the facts of a case and the legal interpretation in that case de novo, or
with no reference to how the facts or law were initially interpreted (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009).
Since 2002 the Board is still entitled to de novo review of law but can no longer interpret a case’s
facts de novo (DOJ Practice Manual). 74
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To quote Ashcroft and Kobach’s argument against de novo review of facts on appeal: “Most
immigration cases involve a sparse paper record and very few corroborating witnesses or none at
all. Often the only live testimony is provided by the alien himself….The most salient evidence of
a ‘well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion,’ which is the central requirement for the granting of
asylum, is usually the testimony of the alien himself. Thus, if the system is to render a correct
judgment, an accurate evaluation of the alien’s credibility is essential. Only the immigration
judge has the opportunity to look the alien in the eye to assess his or her credibility….By
engaging in de novo review of factual findings on appeal, the BIA was giving aliens two bites at
the apple--two opportunities to present their facts (Ashcroft and Kobach 2009, 1993).” The
Board, and especially the courts of appeals, have regularly supported asylum claims on limited
physical evidence because, as a result of the conditions that led the immigrant to seek asylum in
the first place, it is common to not have access to the required documentation to support a claim
of asylum. Ashcroft and Kobach recognize this but do not give immigration judges the benefit of
the doubt in communicating an immigrant’s testimony on their asylum eligibility. And there is
something to be said of their assertion that giving an immigrant “two bites at the apple” will
compromise the integrity of the immigration apparatus. Their argument is specious, relying on
procedural formalities to argue against the rights of potential immigrants (especially those
seeking asylum). Case in point: in a set of reforms ostensibly crafted to respond to a glut of cases
before immigration judges and the BIA, they propose decreasing the number of immigration
judges and BIA members. If their focus was truly on easing the burdens of the system, they
would surely increase the number of personnel on hand.
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But the federal courts have retained de novo review rights over the BIA throughout recent
history. This is evident in Diallo, where the court rules against the Board on all fronts except for
its fact-finding:
“We see no reason to question the BIA’s factual determinations
here. Upon de novo review of the BIA’s application of its
corroboration standard in this case, however, we conclude that its
decision cannot be sustained because the BIA failed to (1) rule
explicitly on the credibility of Diallo’s testimony; (2) explain why
it was reasonable in this case to expect additional corroboration; or
(3) assess the sufficiency of Diallo’s explanations for the absence
of corroborating evidence” (Diallo, 287).
The court distinguishes between two related but nonetheless distinct court functions: factfinding and fact-application. The Board in Diallo was fully successful in the finding phase, but
not in the application phase.
We observe the court-as-fact-finder/court-as-fact-applier question even when (and
perhaps most explicitly when) the case is somewhat ambiguous. In Pickering, the circuit court
eventually rules against the Board on the grounds that:
“the record used by the BIA to determine that the Canadian court
acted solely for immigration purposes appear[ed] to be
incomplete” (Pickering, 267).
However, the opening lines of the opinion appears to offer positive reinforcement for the
Board’s ability to act court-like on their ability to interpret the law.
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“Pickering first argues that the BIA’s decision fails as a matter of
law. However, a review of that decision and the applicable case
law reveals that the BIA correctly interpreted the law by holding
that, when a court vacates an alien’s conviction for reasons solely
related to rehabilitation or to avoid adverse immigration hardships,
rather than on the basis of procedural or substantive defect in the
underlying criminal proceedings, the conviction is not eliminated
for immigration purposes” (Pickering, 266).

Interpretation of Statutes and Jurisprudence
Beyond engaging in evidentiary procedure, courts are well-suited to interpret statutory
law for application to conflicts. Both agencies and courts are experts in statutory interpretation
but for different reasons. Agencies, per their Weberian characteristics, are highly specialized in
one or a few policy areas; this specialization comes from a close reading and application of the
statute that governs the agency. For the immigration apparatus, 75 there are two primary
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This includes the various offices in the Department of Homeland Security that were at home in
the Department of Justice prior to the origins of Homeland Security in 2002: Customs and
Border Protection (mission statement: to “protect the American people, safeguard our borders,
and enhance the nation’s economic prosperity” (Customs and Board Protection n.d.).);
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (mission statement: “ICE stands at the forefront of our
nation's efforts to strengthen border security and prevent the illegal movement of people, goods,
and funds into, within, and out of the United States. The agency's broad investigative authorities
are directly related to our country's ongoing efforts to combat terrorism at home and abroad.”
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement n.d.).); and Citizenship and Immigration Services
(mission statement: “[to administer] the nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its
integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values” (Citizenship and
Immigration Services n.d.).) in addition to the EOIR, the only remaining immigration office in
the Department of Justice.
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governing statutes: the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended most significantly
by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and the Immigration Act of 1990) and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996. The various arms of the
bureaucratic immigration apparatus have interpreted and operationalized the features of these
statutes. Additionally, the immigration apparatus and all its contemporaries in the bureaucracy
are tasked with interpreting and applying the APA for the day-to-day functioning of their offices.
The courts, most famously in Chevron, have protected this statutory interpretation and
application power for the agencies of the bureaucracy.
But courts have statutory interpretation powers that are both similarly deep but much
broader. There is an immeasurably large literature on statutory interpretation by courts reaching
back nearly a century 76 and as such I will not attempt to summarize it here. Suffice it to say,
courts, especially at the federal level but also at the state and local levels, enjoy the ability to
parse statutory language, apply that interpretation to the appropriate dispute, and prescribe
remedies as a result of those interpretations.
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Diver places the first extended scholarly debate on legislative intent and statutory
interpretation with the debate between Landis and Radin in the Harvard Law Review in 1930
(Diver 1985, Landis 1930, Radin 1930). Radin provided the following truism on the nature of
statutes: “A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. Its effect is therefore neither
an expression laden with innumerable emotional overtones nor a permanent creation of infallible
wisdom. It is a statement of a situation, or rather of a group of possible events within a situation,
and as such is essentially ambiguous. This word is a pejorative expression in the mouths of most
persons and seems to suggest that an ambiguous sentence can have two contradictory meanings;
that, for example, it can permit what it seems to forbid. But of course that is not what the word
‘ambiguous’ ought to suggest. A statement is ambiguous if there are two possible meanings - any
two - and it can make no difference whether or not they partially contradict each other” (868).
Landis suggested that the emphasis must lie “upon the honest effort of courts to give effect to the
legislature's aims, even though their perception be perforce through a glass darkly” (893). This
debate, over what Diver defines as epistemological and institutional accounts, would continue on
in the literature for decades to come.
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In weighing these two complementary but divergent institutional prerogatives, Farina
distinguishes between two early judicial attempts to weigh the bureaucratic and judicial statutory
interpretation duties. One, with an emphasis on judicial statutory interpretation draws from
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (322 U.S. 111 (1944)). To quote
Farina, this “‘independent judgment model’ [finds] the agency’s function...analogized to that of
an expert witness: its view of the proper meaning becomes a factor in the court’s analysis, to be
given whatever persuasive effect it appears to merit in the circumstances” (453-4). This view is
contingent on the court’s interpretation of the agency’s grasp on legislative intent and statutory
purpose, and the court’s perspective on the credibility of the agency as an expert (fn 8). The
second model, the “deferential model,” drawing from Packard Motor Car Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board (330 U.S. 485 (1947)), places the interpretive onus on the agency: “the agency’s
function is to give meaning to the statute: the court determines only whether the interpretation
the agency has chosen is a ‘rational’ reading, not whether it is the ‘right’ reading” (454). This
second approach eventually became the governing attitude through the Chevron decision and its
ubiquity in case law and legal literature.
Though the Chevron decision put some of these debates to rest (or at least on ice), the
question of contrasting statutory interpretation prerogatives is a common topic of discussion in
the courts of appeals jurisprudence examined here. 77 The courts take it upon themselves to
reflect on the ability of the Board to interpret the governing statutes identified above even
though, as aforementioned, debates over their right to do so are extant and ongoing. Some of
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A more thorough discussion of Chevron specifically follows later in this chapter.
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these discussions are very narrow, such as this passage regarding the interpretation of the word
“entry” in Caudillo-Villalobos:
“Aside from procedural complaints which we find to be without
merit, the only question of substance here is the correctness of the
determination by the BIA that appellant made an ‘entry’ into the
United States after his conviction of a crime abroad involving
moral turpitude. We think it clear that such an entry was made
when the facts are considered in light of the language in [the
statute]” (Caudillo-Villalobos, 1).
The court here asserts that the Board should have interpreted “entry,” in light of the facts
of the case, in the positive (i.e. that an entry was made). The decision, then, should hinge on the
Board’s interpretation of the term. 78
Further, the Board, in order to act best as a court, must have an advanced ability to
interpret and apply “legal standards” such as statutory and doctrinal language.
“Having corrected the BIA’s legal errors, we could now remand
for application of the identified legal standards” (Canas-Segovia,
727).
One of the best examples of this concern is in Diallo. Diallo, a Mauritanian national,
applied for asylum and a withholding of deportation due to legitimate human rights concerns (the
systemic shunting of Black Mauritanians by the white-dominated government to internment
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Of note: this is the entirety of the per curiam decision. The Board’s decision was upheld due to
their correct interpretation.
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camps in neighboring Senegal frequently after torture and destruction of property and citizenship
paperwork). Due to Diallo’s refugee status and the unique hardships he faced in Mauritania, he
was unable to produce the several pieces of evidence that the Board asked for to determine his
asylum and deportation claims. Because of the unique human rights questions, the Board was
required to consider international statutory language (the Handbook of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees) in addition to relevant domestic law. The Board found in favor of
Diallo and against the Board as a result of many fatal errors in the Board’s reasoning. I will not
explicate all of the rationales here, but it is worth examining the following passage on the
Board’s inability to innovate as a result of governing domestic and international law as well as
due to the intricacies of the case at hand:
“The BIA only casually acknowledged the UNCHR’s general
explanation and, more importantly, wholly failed to acknowledge
Diallo’s own particular explanations for his inability to provide
further corroboration. The BIA’s failure to address Diallo’s
explanations violates both the letter and the spirit of its own
standard, which specifically provides that, even under
circumstances where corroboration may reasonably be expected,
petitioners may meet their burden of proof by offering a believable
and sufficient explanation as to why such corroborating evidence
was not presented” (Diallo, 289-290).
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By (intentionally or unintentionally) eschewing the considerations required of cases
involving mitigating human rights concerns, the Board did Diallo a disservice. 79 The above
statement is a particularly damning one, for it not only argues that the Board acted incorrectly as
a court, but it also acted contrary to its own principles.
Another important and frequently occurring issue in statutory interpretation appears in
the Caudillo-Villalobos decision: determining whether a crime of moral turpitude has been
committed. Crimes of moral turpitude is a category of legal offenses that is primarily related to
immigration, specifically as it relates to defining a rationale for denying entry or deportation. The
definition of “crimes involving moral turpitude” is not entrenched in statute; instead, it has been
explicated through federal case law. 80 Citizenship and Immigration Services, in their policy
manual, points to Medina v. United States (259 F.3d 220 (2001)) as the source of their
operational definition: “moral turpitude ‘is a nebulous concept, which refers generally to conduct
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules
of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in
general’” (Medina, 227; Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.). The agency, using this
definition, suggests four primary categories: crimes against a person (“criminal intent or

79

This is not to say that the courts of appeals, when assessing appeals from the Board,
universally give human rights claims wide latitude. In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder (633 F.3d 64),
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that forceable insertion of an intrauterine device (IUD)
does not constitute involuntary sterilization and thus is not a legitimate grounds for granting
asylum.
80
This is by design: Cabral v. INS (15 F.3d 193 (1994)) cites a passage in the hearings before the
House Committee on Immigration before the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917 where a
congressman notes, “[y]ou know that a crime involving moral turpitude has not been defined. No
one can really say what is meant by saying a crime involving moral turpitude…” and Justice
Jackson’s commentary in Jordan v. De George (341 U.S. 223 (1951), 233-4) on the statement:
“despite this notice, Congress did not see fit to state what meaning it attributes to the phrase
‘crime involving moral turpitude.’”
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recklessness, or is defined as morally reprehensible by state (may include statutory rape)”),
crimes against property (“involving fraud against the government or an individual (may include
theft, forgery, robbery)”), sexual and family crimes (“It is difficult to discern a distinguishing set
of principles that the courts apply to determine whether a particular offense involving sexual and
family crimes is a CIMT….Offenses such as spousal or child abuse may rise to the level of
CIMT, while an offense involving a domestic simple assault generally does not….In general, if
the person knew or should have known that the victim was a minor, any intentional sexual
contact with a child involves moral turpitude.”), and crimes against authority of the government
(“presence of fraud is the main determining factor (may include offering a bribe,
counterfeiting)”; Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.).
Since moral turpitude is a foundational concept in immigration case law, it follows that
extended discussions of whether crimes rise to the level of moral turpitude and, more
importantly, whether the BIA correctly makes that judgment are common in the case law.
Consider Goldeshtein, a case involving a German national convicted of intent to defraud:
“Even if intent to defraud is not explicit in the statutory definition,
a crime nevertheless may involve moral turpitude if such intent is
‘implicit in the nature of the crime’…Matter of Flores, 17 I & N
Dec. 225, 228 (BIA 1980) (“where fraud is inherent in an offense,
it is not necessary that the statute prohibiting it include the usual
phraseology concerning fraud in order for it to involve moral
turpitude”). The INA asserts that, despite the absence of intent to
defraud in the statutory definition of Goldeshtein’s offense, such
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intent is part of its ‘essential nature.’ We disagree” (Goldeshtein,
648).
The Board’s misstep here was relying on incorrect analogies to define the crime at issue.
The court argued that Goldeshtein’s crime was not defined by the sort of fraudulent behavior
required to be a crime of moral turpitude and thus is not a deportable offense. This exhibits, to
the court, inadequate statutory action.
“True, the government is deprived of information, but that is only a
consequence of conduct that is not of a fraudulent character. We
conclude that fraud is not inherent in the nature of this offense”
(Goldeshtein, 649).
Thus, the Board’s decision incorrectly interpreted the crime as one of moral turpitude.
A later application of the issue, in Tejwani v. Attorney General of the United States,
explains how the Board interpreted the crime as one containing moral turpitude and how the
Board’s interpretation was incorrect:
“Tejwani argues that the BIA erred in concluding that money
laundering, evaluated under the categorical approach, met the
definition of moral turpitude used by the BIA….These elements do
not meet the criteria the BIA relied on in holding that Tejwani’s
offense met its definition of moral turpitude. The BIA focused on
the fact that a money launderer takes ‘affirmative steps to conceal
or disguise the proceeds of criminal conduct[,] acts in an inherently
deceptive manner and impairs governmental function, specifically
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the ability to detect and combat criminal activity.’ The BIA further
stated that ‘such interference in governmental function is
inherently dishonest and contrary to accepted moral standards.’
Here, however, we have a problem: deception and knowingly or
recklessly concealing criminal conduct from the government are
neither elements of money laundering nor inherent characteristics
of the offense” (Tejwani, 723).
This decision goes beyond the question of defining moral turpitude; in the final sentence
of the passage the court alleges that the Board incorrectly interpreted the essential features of the
crime itself.

Adherence to Precedent
Further, courts are called upon to remain faithful to (and, when necessary, to actively
eschew) the precedent set by past and present courts. 81 This unique feature of courts that the
other branches of the federal government are not beholden to (at least officially) is an important
one; in fact, Justice Cardozo argued that “adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather
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The most widely cited modern defense of stare decisis comes from O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey: “[t]he rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable
command’....Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily
informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency
of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs
of reaffirming and overruling a prior case” (Planned Parenthood, 854).
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than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice”
(1921, in Segal and Spaeth 2002). The question of precedent is inextricably entwined with the
entrenched debates over what influences justices in their decision making. Those scholars who
argue that the Supreme Court is beholden exclusively to law when deciding cases (fewer and
further between in this era) are the strongest proponents of a theory that would find that justices
are restricted by the strictures of precedent (Gillman 2001). I introduced the judicial decision
making question earlier in this dissertation while discussing coding for a judge’s political and
partisan stature and thus will not reintroduce it here.
But we must reflect on how the question of precedent is dramatically different depending
on which court we discuss. There are inherent differences in how the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts interact with precedent, let alone differences in how the Article III judiciary
interacts with precedent as compared to the impact of precedent on administrative court decision
making. Without entering feet-first into a literature that has been entrenched in debate for many
decades, let us consider the legal forces which the Supreme Court is beholden to. As the highest
court in the land, the Supreme Court’s decisions are not immediately subject to review by any
other judicial authority. Their decisions can be overturned over time through new interpretations
of statutes by future iterations of the Court or through what Caminker defines as “a [lower court]
judge simply [refusing] to follow a Supreme Court precedent that she considers lawless, aware
that her decision will face reversal on appeal but nevertheless [committing] to exercising her
small universe of judicial power in accord with her best legal skills and conscience” (1994, 8189). Any non-Supreme Court federal court, in contrast, is accountable to at least one other higher
court who can review and overturn their decision. Being able to decide a case without immediate
accountability perhaps gives the Supreme Court more latitude in the rationales that undergird
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their decision making behavior. According to Cross in his study of decision making in the courts
of appeals, legal variables are far more explanatory than partisan ones (Cross 2007); this echoes
the literature cited in chapters 1 and 2 on circuit court decision making. For the purposes of
understanding precedential adherence in the courts of appeals, we can conclude (cautiously) that
the judges on the courts of appeals hold a stronger fidelity to precedent due to their institutional
stature in the Article III hierarchy.
The administrative judiciary’s relationship with precedent is, as far as I can discern,
unexamined in the literature and since I do not have data to support an argument I will not claim
to have a measured conclusion. But the Board, if it is a court, should be able to follow the rules
defining how precedent is followed or transcended.
In cases like Dillingham where the Board does not employ these principles of precedent,
the circuit court is quick to note this and provide instructions moving forward.
“The BIA erred when it found that ‘the expungement of
[Dillingham]’s conviction is akin to a foreign pardon and is
therefore ineffective for immigration purposes. Ignoring our prior
equal protection decisions in Garberding, Paredes-Urrestarazu,
and Lujan-Armendariz, the Board ruled that Dillingham failed to
satisfy the fourth criterion of Manrique, because he was
rehabilitated under a foreign (as opposed to a state) statute, and
because as a general policy matter the Board has never recognized
foreign pardons of crimes as moral turpitude. By likening foreign
expungements of simple drug possession offenses to foreign
pardons of crimes of moral turpitude—a category of crimes for
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which Congress has not enacted a domestic rehabilitation statute
analogous to the FFOA—the Board improperly skirted the
constitutional issue of differential treatment in this case.
Unfortunately, as a result of the Board’s false comparison, we can
glean little use from its opinion” (Dillingham, 1007).
We observe the court, who expected the Board to adhere to the precedent set out in the
four cited opinions, excoriating the Board for not adhering to those doctrines. We observe a
similar scenario in Robles-Urrea, though the court takes its precedent prescription one step
further:
“The BIA’s holding would result in a peculiar rule: even where a
principal offender has not committed a crime involving moral
turpitude, a person who conceals that crime—and who thereby
commits misprision of a felony—might be considered to have done
so” (Robles-Urrea, 710).
Here the court does not consider the Board’s adherence to precedent; instead, the court
discusses how the Board could create precedent. The precedent that would have been created by
the Robles-Urrea had the decision been upheld by the court would have been very strange; as
such, the court was quick to overturn the decision. The court continued on to say:
“We have severe doubts as to the merits of each of the
government’s arguments as to why the agency could conclude that,
even if misprision of a felony is not categorically a crime involving
moral turpitude, Robles-Urrea’s conviction was for a morally
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turpitudinous crime. Nonetheless, we recognize that the BIA is
entitled to conduct the analysis in the first instance. See Ventura,
537 U.S. at 16 (“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should
remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes
place primarily in agency hands.”) We therefore remand so that it
may do so….On remand, the BIA may also consider whether
Robles-Urrea is removable under [U.S. Code] as an alien who ‘has
been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance,’ and whether
he may be entitled to any form of relief from removal” (RoblesUrrea, 712).
The court, here, provides explicit instructions as to what the Board must reconsider so
that their decision falls in line with the court’s interpretation. When the two passages from
Robles-Urrea are taken in concert, the court provides the Board both a prescription of the issue
and a suggestion for future action to avoid further shortcomings.
To conclude, let us return to the Gertsenshteyn opinion. While reflecting on
Gertsenshteyn’s alleged crime, the Board (according to the court) departed from both court and
Board precedent without providing a sound reason for doing so.
“In the precedential opinion that the BIA issued in this case, it has
taken a new approach. But it has done so not by reinterpreting
[U.S. Code], the provision whose wording let it—and us—to adopt
the categorical approach in the first place. Rather, it has focused
entirely on a subpart of Section 1101(a)(43), the provision of the
INA that defines ‘aggravated felony.’ The BIA has authority to
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interpret that provision, and its interpretation—specifically, its
sensible reading of the phrase ‘commercial advantage’—may well
merit deference should the BIA reassert in this case (on remand) or
in others. But the BIA’s discussion of Section 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii)
gives us no reason to depart from its, and our own, precedents
regarding the more fundamental question of what is required of the
agency—in the interests of both fairness and efficiency—when an
alien’s removability hinges on the existence of a prior conviction,
however that conviction is defined….The BIA’s decision in this
case departs, with insufficient reason, from the legal framework
that we have long used to decide whether an alien charged with
removability under [U.S. Code] has been convicted of an
aggravated felony. And we are not confident of what result it
would reach under the proper framework” (Gertsenshteyn, 146149).
Even given all of these intra-opinion discussions about judicial activities and how the
Board does or does not meet the expectations of a court, the courts of appeals generally provide
the Board the benefit of the doubt regarding its ability to act court-like. In Chun Hua Chen, for
example, the Board does not explicitly state that they addressed the exhibits provided in the
affidavit, but the court nonetheless says:
“Furthermore, while the BIA did not address each of the exhibits
accompanying the Aird affidavit, was not required to do so, and
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there is no indication that it did not consider them in rendering its
decision” (Chun Hua Chen, 653).
This is direct evidence that, in this case at least, the court has a great deal of trust in the
Board and its ability to determine how best to provide a satisfactory decision and opinion. The
same discussion occurred later in Liadov:
“However, both the BIA and the Attorney General have steadfastly
maintained that the time limit is mandatory, and the BIA’s
reference to its self-certification authority in this case was a
reaction to the unwarranted judicial demand for an exception
imposed by Oh and Sun rather than a change of agency position.
Therefore, the refusal to self-certify may not be reviewed on the
ground that the agency itself treats the appeal time limit as nonmandatory….Thus, the failure of a courier to make a timely
delivery is not ‘an extraordinary circumstance that would justify
intervention by this court into the Board’s exercise of discretion’”
(Anssari Gharachedaghy v. INS; Liadov, 1011-1012).
This is suggestive of deference doctrine even though the court does not rely on Chevron
in this case: the court is allowing the Board to dictate how it functions in the day-to-day without
interference from the court telling the Board how, in fact, to function in the day-to-day.
But when the Board is not given the benefit of the doubt, it is typically because the court
accuses the Board of assuming too much when interpreting facts, statutes, or doctrine. This is
important: as powerful as suggestions on how to act like a court are for the Board, it is almost
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more powerful when the court, in suggesting that the Board is taking their court-ness too much
for granted, corrects the Board’s course of action and redirects it towards the correct judicial
path. Consider Maldonado-Cruz on this point:
“The BIA based its decision solely on the legal issues considered
above. The BIA’s refusal to consider credibility leads to the
presumption that it found the petitioner credible” (MaldonadoCruz, 792).
A similar sentiment is communicated in Canas-Segovia:
“Although the BIA considered the relevant Handbook provisions,
it dismissed them as ambiguous and not dispositive. We disagree.
The Handbook unambiguously supports the Canases’ claims”
(Canas-Segovia, 724).
In both cases, the court reminds the Board that there are steps that cannot regularly be
overlooked when acting judicially. As well as the Board acts like a court, there still needs to be
semi-regular reminders to stay abreast of the requirements of judicial actors.

Chevron and Deference in Action
It goes without saying that the question of deference, ubiquitous in discussions of
administrative law, flourishes in primary and secondary source discussions of immigration law
(“The history of immigration jurisprudence is a history of obsession with judicial deference”
(Cox 2007, 1671).). Throughout the one hundred and sixteen dyads that comprise this
dissertation’s data, the courts constantly discuss the ways that deference restricts their behavior
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and how particular circumstances arise that allow courts to transcend those restrictions, while
noting that “[the courts’] review[s] of the interpretation of the Board ‘is not a license for [the
courts] to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices’” (Rivas, 1330). The
reflections on deference in the case law appear throughout the entire time period under analysis,
but they find new purchase in the years after the Chevron decision. Further, these deference
conversations also take place in post-Chevron cases that do not cite the doctrine. Consider this
lengthy passage from Castillo v. INS, where the court discusses a claim of abuse of discretion by
the BIA.
“Petitioner recognizes that there can be no judicial interference
with the discretionary action of the Board except on a showing of
abuse of discretion or that discretion was, in fact, not exercised at
all….He contents, however, that the Board did abuse its discretion
when it relied upon the fact that he did not enter the United States
as a bona fide nonimmigrant as a ‘persuasive factor’ in denying his
application for status as a permanent resident under
[statute]….Petitioner contends that Congress, by elimination of
entry as a bona fide nonimmigrant as a statutory requirement of
status under section 245, also made entry as a bona fide
nonimmigrant without significance in the exercise of discretion
under the section. By relying on a factor which Congress could not
have intended to apply, the Board, petitioner contends, abused its
discretion in denying his application. We do not agree….Petitioner
further contends that, in fact, discretion has not been exercised at
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all in this case because his application was denied pursuant to an
arbitrary policy of the BIA to exclude from the benefits of Section
245 all aliens who did not enter as bona fide nonimmigrants, and
that his application was denied solely on that ground. We find no
merit in this contention” (Castillo, 4).
The opening statement of this passage recognizes the privileged position the Board occupies
wherein space is provided for the Board to adjudicate disputes without fear of retaliation unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion that warrants a sanction. That said, Castillo argues that the
Board did abuse its discretion and systematically documents each claim against the Board. But
on each point the court returns with a brief but clear defense of the Board and its latitude to
decide cases within their purview. This is a clear example of deference discussion independent of
the Chevron lens.
These discussions become more explicit and clearer when Chevron is cited and
interpreted. In Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, for example, the court quickly walks through Chevron’s
two steps (see Chapter 1).
“In so holding, we observed, first, that the INA is silent as to
whether IUD insertion constitutes sterilization. Second, we
determined that the BIA’s conclusion that involuntary IUD
insertion did not constitute involuntary sterilization was reasonable
and, therefore, entitled to deference” (Mei Fun Wong, 71).
A more robust example comes from Lettman v. Reno, where we observe the court fill in the
interpretive gaps while applying Chevron’s two steps.
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“We find nothing to compel the BIA to conclude that Congress
intended those convicted of firearm offenses to be treated
differently than those convicted of aggravated felonies. On the
contrary, giving the grounds parallel treatment is consistent with
Congress’ intent to ‘make the [INA] more rational and easier to
understand.’…We also find nothing in IMMACT to compel the
BIA to conclude that Congress meant to preserve and ‘merely
redesignate’ the old version of the aggravated felony ground.
Congress did not evince intent to make piecemeal changes, but
rather intended to ‘provide[] for a comprehensive revision of all
the existing grounds for exclusion and deportation.’ The BIA
reasonably included the aggravated felony ground among those
‘comprehensive revisions. Accordingly, we hold that, as with
firearms offenses under Lopez-Amaro, the BIA reasonably
concluded that an alien is deportable if convicted of an aggravated
felony at the time of entry” (Lettman, 1372).
Here the court claims that it could compel the Board to interpret firearms offenses in one way
under IMMACT, but it instead argued that the Board’s interpretation of IMMACT to include
firearms offenses under those “comprehensive revisions” was a perfectly sound interpretation
under Chevron and thus the Board’s interpretation stood against scrutiny. This is common in the
post-Chevron era, though it is not unique to the post-Chevron era. As we found in chapter 3,
deference was as common before the Chevron decision as it was after the Chevron decision. But
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after Chevron we are privier to explicit discussions of deference since the courts were given a
new language to discuss these issues.
Undergirding judicial discussions of deference are perspectives on Congress and
congressional statutory intent. King v. Katzenbach is an excellent introduction to this, for its
summary synthesizes debates over congressional intent and several other means through which a
court could be given interpretive latitude under Chevron.
“In summary, the rules of grammar, the administrative
interpretation, the legislative history, and the leading
commentators, all without exception, require the affirmance of the
finding that the petitioner is statutorily ineligible…” (King, 307).
Complementing the King excerpt, the Git Foo Wong v. INS decision explicitly refers to the
congressional language and the interpretation of that language that leads to an anti-Board
decision.
“We conclude, then, that it effectuates congressional purpose to
construe the intent exception to section 101(a)(13) as meaning an
intent to depart in a manner which can be regarded as meaningfully
interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence” (Git Foo Wong,
153).
The combined effect of the King and Wong Chevron discussions is to take Congress seriously in
the statutory process but not to over-rely on Congress’ decision making posture when
adjudicating a deference dispute; this is evidenced by the relatively short time spent by courts on
Chevron’s first step. But the Kofa decision urges caution in over-exerting interpretive muscle at
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the expense of Congress and its preferences. According to Kofa’s author, it is objectionable for
anyone but Congress to extoll the requirements of any given statute.
“Petitioners urge us to look at the legislative history surrounding,
and some written even after, the passage of the 1990 amendments
to Section 1253(h)(2). However, the first place where we must
look to see if Congress has spoken to the issue with which we are
concerned and whether Congressional intent in that regard is clear
is on the face of the statute. Statutory construction must begin with
the language of the statute….To do otherwise would assume that
Congress does not express its intent in the words of statutes, but
only by way of legislative history, an idea that hopefully all will
find unpalatable” (Kofa, 1088).
Kofa is an important reminder that statutory interpretation is hardly a judiciary-only
phenomenon, or, at the very least, that the other branches have similarly important roles to play
in the statutory interpretation process. Chevron’s strength lies in its status as a doctrine that
affects all branches of government. Thus, a discussion of Chevron is an opportunity for courts to
reflect on their status in an interbranch administrative state. Kofa’s assertive defense of Congress
is one variety of these discussions, but the more common interbranch discussion takes the form
of this paragraph in Shaar:
“Perhaps, as the Shaars suggest, the INS and the BIA could
manipulate the system so as to treat aliens unfairly for arbitrary or
downright improper reasons. Perhaps those entities could do that
by injecting unexpected delays into the setting of a hearing of a
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very timely petition to reopen, while denying extensions of time to
depart. We, however, have no reason to think that the agencies will
do so, nor is there the slightest hint that they did so here. If anyone
has attempted to manipulate the system, it is the Shaars, who
waited until the eve of their scheduled departure to ask for the
relief they now seek. We can detect no violation of the
Constitution” (Shaar, 958-959).
Here we observe a pointed defense of the immigration system against claims that the system is
biased against immigrants and their claims, and it is clear evidence of an alliance between courts
and agencies on immigration issues.
But just because Chevron could apply does not necessarily mean that Chevron will be
applied in the agency’s favor; given how ubiquitous and widely cited the doctrine is and given its
reputation as a doctrine that far more often than not benefits agencies, this is important to
recognize. As we observed in chapter 3, the presence of the Chevron doctrine does not mean that
the courts will defer to agencies every time. The dataset includes several cases where Chevron
analysis begins but does not complete to a satisfactory conclusion for the Board. Consider Blake,
where the court was ready to apply Chevron but was stymied by the government and its failure to
argue that an ambiguity exists:
“If the statutory language is clear, however, ‘that is the end of the
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ Chevron. The BIA,
through powers delegated by the Attorney General, enforces and
interprets the INA and thus the authority to fill statutory gaps with
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reasonable interpretations. The government would stand on firm
Chevron ground, then, if it could point to an ambiguity in Section
212(C). But the government has failed to suggest one” (Blake,
100).
The Ndayshimiye court at least gets to Step 1 before concluding the Board acted incorrectly.
“We conclude that the BIA’s interpretation of the ‘one central
reason’ standard is in error only to the extent that it would require
an asylum applicant to show that a protected ground for
persecution was not ‘subordinate’ to any unprotected motivation.
That particular term is inconsistent with the plain language of the
statute, cutting off our Chevron analysis at step one….Therefore,
we hold that once the term ‘subordinate’ is removed, the BIA’s
interpretation constitutes a reasonable, valid construction of
Section 208’s ‘one central reason’ standard” (Ndayshimiye, 129).
What is interesting about the Ndayshimiye opinion, however, comes after the court stops at
Chevron Step One. The court then provides a solution for the Board so that it can later surpass
Chevron scrutiny. Here the court asserts its interpretive power over the Board, but also gives the
Board the power to prevail in similar cases moving forward through identifying exactly what
needs to be changed.
Bautista, in contrast, makes it to Chevron Step Two but ultimately rules against the
interpretive prerogatives of agencies.
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“Here, we find that the BIA’s construction with respect to the
classification of state convictions as aggravated felonies under
section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) is inconsistent with Congress’ expressed
intent. ¶ …While we sympathize with this view, not every difficult
question of statutory construction amounts to a statutory gap for a
federal agency to fill….To conclude otherwise would be to find
that every time there is a disagreement about statutory
construction, we accord deference to agencies. This is not what
Chevron instructs us to do” (Bautista, 58).
According to the court here, just because an agency is entitled to deference under Chevron does
not mean that the agency will win in every case where the decision is borderline. This is a careful
reminder that Chevron is not a blunt-force tool for ceding interpretive power to agencies; instead,
it is a deliberate and measured means to calculate the balance of interpretive power across
institutions. Further, Chevron is not meant to legitimize the content of the agency’s
interpretations; instead, it is simply acknowledging correct interpretive procedure. We observe
this distinction in Mei Fun Wong:
“By deciding that the BIA reasonably resolved this statutory
ambiguity, we do not suggest that the agency could not have made
a different choice. We conclude only that the choice it made was
not unreasonable. One reason courts do not second-guess a
reasonable executive branch choice about the showing necessary to
demonstrate persecution under the INA is that the answer
necessarily implicates foreign relations, an area where, as the
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Supreme Court has cautioned, the "judiciary is not well positioned
to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and
importance of [potential] diplomatic repercussions." (INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425.) In such a context, we "must
take appropriate account of the greater immigration-related
expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative
needs and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive INS
efforts to enforce this complex statute, and the Nation's need to
speak with one voice in immigration matters." (Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 700, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001)). Of
course, if Congress takes a different view, it remains free to amend
the statute, as it did in 1996, to identify certain conduct as
categorically persecutive” (Mei Fun Wong, 75).
Chevron simply requires a reasonable interpretation by the agency, not necessarily the “correct”
decision, for only an expert in the subject area can speak conclusively as to the “correctness” of
the decision. According to the court in Mei Fun Wong, those experts are all actors besides the
court making the decision.
Before we conclude this section, let us take a closer look at the cases immediately
preceding and following the Chevron decision. Table 4b lists the cases whose circuit court
opinion was decided in the five years before and after Chevron.
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Table 4b: Pre- and Post-Chevron Cases
Pre-Chevron Case
Ruangswang
Lee
Von Pervieux
Wang
McMullen
Hill

Year Decided
1978
1978
1978
1979
1981
1983

Post-Chevron Case
Laipenieks
Kulle
(Name Redacted)
Maldonado-Cruz
Canas-Segovia

Year Decided
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990

Of the eleven cases, all but two (Wang and Hill) are active deference or active non-deference
cases. (Note that these two came prior to Chevron.) The six pre-Chevron cases are divided
evenly on deference and non-deference, and the five post-Chevron cases are coded as active nondeference except for Kulle (active deference). Three pre-Chevron cases (Ruangswang, Lee, and
McMullen) are “application of statute” cases; only one (McMullen) is an “application of facts”
case. In contrast, all six post-Chevron cases are “application of facts” cases. 82 This suggests that
in the immediate term following Chevron the courts were particularly careful to parse the factual
posture of the cases before them that could utilize Chevron deference. Two of the cases ((Name
Redacted) and Canas-Segovia) are also coded as “application of statute” cases, which is to be
expected after the development of a doctrine like Chevron whose goal is a standardized language
for considering statutory application and interpretation.
To conclude this discussion of Chevron and this chapter on explicit guidance from courts
to agencies on best judicial practice, let us dissect the final paragraph in the Blake et al v.
Carbone opinion. After a decision ruling in favor of the immigrant petitioner, the court clearly
discusses how the Board was deficient and what actions it can take moving forward to avoid
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See Appendix D for details.
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anti-Board cases like this one in the future. The court leaves no room for interpretation on the
BIA’s mistakes.
“The past thirty years have highlighted the difficulties that arise
when constitutionally problematic legislation is juxtaposed with
judicial stitchery and administrative attempts at coalescing the two.
Francis expanded the sweep of § 212(c); Congress's only response
was to limit and then repeal the statute; and the task of
reconciliation unfortunately fell on the BIA. While hindsight might
pin much of this confusion on Francis, we are bound to finish what
our predecessors started. The BIA is therefore directed to
determine whether petitioners' underlying aggravated felony
offenses could form the basis for exclusion under § 212(a) of the
INA as a crime of moral turpitude. In particular, the BIA must
consider whether Blake's first degree sexual abuse of a minor
conviction, Ho Yoon Chong's racketeering conviction, Foster's first
degree manslaughter conviction, and Singh's second degree murder
conviction, could each form the basis of exclusion as a crime
involving moral turpitude. If so, the merits of each petitioner's §
212(c) applications should be considered. The petitions for review
are GRANTED; and the cases are REMANDED to the BIA for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion” (Blake, 105).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This dissertation sought to understand deference in the administrative state through a
close quantitative and qualitative examination of interpretive behavior in administrative courts
and Article III courts’ responses to those interpretive actions. Further, the dissertation provided a
new methodological approach to understanding how disparate courts interact to (potentially)
affect lasting change on the institutions in the process.
The project proceeded in four steps. The introduction and Chapter 1 explained the
phenomenon under analysis and situated the project in both legal and political science literatures.
I discussed the features of courts and agencies that undergird the relationship that lends itself to
deferential behavior. I redefined deference, a term that has been topic of extensive discussion in
the last forty years but that was missing a key feature: the intent of the deferrers. I suggested
three reasons why judges may defer. First, an Article III court might defer to an administrative
court by the advice of Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council (1984). Chevron was an
explicit declaration in favor of deferring to agencies on the subject matters of which they are an
expert. To do so, it introduced a two-step test to determine whether deference should be applied.
The court must first determine whether the issue at hand has been preempted with congressional
instructions. If Congress has already spoken to the issue, their prescription is used. But if
Congress has not spoken to the issue, the court must determine whether the agency’s solution is
within the bounds of their governing statute. This is a low bar that agencies frequently surpass. A
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doctrinal explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference prior to the
Chevron decision and high levels after Chevron.
Second, an Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the courts are
staffed by co-partisans. The operating motivation here is not partisanship per se; instead, it is the
perception across institutions that decisions made by one institution will find common ground
with those comprising the companion institution. I reflect on the extensive literature on judicial
decision making and the ways that partisanship is measured by political scientists; I find that the
judicial decision making literature, though primarily focused on Supreme Court judicial
behavior, can offer insights on how to assert a partisan identity on non-Supreme Court judges. A
partisan explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference among judges in
different parties and high levels of deference among judges belonging to the same party.
Third, an Article III court might defer to an administrative court when the Article III
court would like to communicate instructions on good judicial practice to administrative law
judges. Drawing from interbranch institutionalism, this theory suggests that courts might
abdicate some of their interpretive power to another judicial body to promote the interpretive
acumen of the administrative state at large. Article III courts, according to the theory, provide
instructions to agencies in opinions that are directly related to the functions the agency serves. A
cooperative explanation would produce results that identify low levels of deference in opinions
that do not feature active language for or against an agency and its actions and high levels of
deference in opinions that do feature active language for or against an agency.
To test this novel theory, I utilize a new approach to identifying deference that is
introduced and explained in chapter 2. Using the universe of precedent decisions at the Board of
Immigration Appeals, I identified each decision where there was a companion case in the various
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courts of appeals. This created dyads of cases (n = 116) that provide the opportunity to trace a
dispute through two different judicial institutions. I coded each dyad on several variables
(described in detail in Appendices C and D) that provided analytical leverage on all three
theories.
Upon explicating the research design and case selection featured in this dissertation, I
introduce the four forms of deference. If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is evidence
in the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “active deference.” If a court rules in favor of an agency and there is no evidence in
the text of the opinion that the court is actively deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “passive deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is no evidence in the
text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “passive non-deference.” If a court rules against an agency and there is evidence in
the text of the opinion that the court is actively not deferring to the agency, then we can code this
instance as “active non-deference.” In this deference scheme, even non-deference has theoretical
significance. When a court provides rationales directly related to the actions of the agency, it is
the rationale rather than the outcome that matters. When we combine an agency’s outcome in
court with active language either for or against the agency’s actions, we can confidently make
conclusions about judicial intent regarding administrative behavior in a way that is impossible
when solely relying on win rates.
Chapters 3 and 4 use the coded data to test the three theories of judicial deference to
administrative agencies. Chapter 3 investigates the partisan and doctrinal explanations. Prior to
providing causal analyses, I introduce the dyadic data in tabular form. Of note: there are
approximately the same number of cases decided before and after the Chevron decision. This
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suggests that any differences between cases due to more deference cases after the Chevron
decision are unlikely to occur. Utilizing logistic regression, I tested partisan variables for the
entire time period under analysis (approximately 1940 to 2016). We observe no indications that
partisanship has a causal effect on win rates or deference type. But when we disaggregate the
data by pre- and post-Chevron status (read: cases before 1984 and cases after 1985), we observe
moderate partisan effects prior to Chevron that disappear among cases after Chevron. The key
observation of these doctrinal regressions is the strong causal relationship between win rates and
deference type and whether a case is decided per curiam. Drawing on the literature on per
curiam opinions, I argue that this suggests courts anonymize (or decide a case as an institutional
unit rather than as individuals) in situations where the court is ruling in favor of an agency but
not providing positive reinforcement for good judicial and administrative behavior by the BIA.
But when the court feels compelled to comment on the Board’s activity, the court will
infrequently decide as one body and instead indicate an author.
Here it is important to reconsider the potential effect immigration as a policy area could
have on deference behavior between the federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Since immigration policy is a cross-cutting political issue that does not always neatly fall along
partisan lines, partisan match could be less explanatory for the Board than for another
administrative court that litigates on an issue that is more distinct along partisan lines (such as
the National Labor Relations Board and labor policy). Further, and as a result of the relative
ambiguity of immigration policy, deference could serve political ends. Because of this, Chevron
might be explanatory not because of the doctrine itself, but because it can provide a cover for
more political reasons for deference. Another case study using an administrative court focused
on a more politically binary issue could help tease this out in future research.
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After considering the partisan and doctrinal explanations, chapter 4 investigates the
interbranch theory of deference by courts to agencies. The first section examines three activities
that are prototypical actions and prerogatives of courts: evidence and evidentiary procedure,
statutory and jurisprudential interpretation, and adherence to precedent. I identified examples in
the text of circuit court opinions that feature judicial instructions to the judges of the BIA. In
each instance, the court of appeals either actively approved of or disapproved of how the Board
engaged in these three judicial activities. The second section focuses on Chevron deference
specifically. Echoing the insights garnered from the regression data in Chapter 3, the qualitative
data suggest that Chevron did not automatically increase the number of cases where the Board
was successful or where the circuit court spoke explicitly on the Board’s actions. Examples of
explanations on deferential behavior provided by the courts of appeals are provided throughout.
The two empirical chapters together provide a comprehensive examination of how
deference occurs. Importantly, the two chapters suggest that no theory (of the three examined)
completely explain why courts defer to agencies; instead, deference can be explained in the
overlapping space between the three. We observe that partisan match does not explain agency
outcomes in court or the presence/absence of explicit language on deference to a statistically
significant degree, and we find that whether a circuit court decision is decided per curiam is
explanatory throughout the universe of cases, but especially in the post-Chevron era for both
dependent variables. When the qualitative insights from Chapter 4 are layered on top, we identify
the features of the active deference and active non-deference that we cannot observe simply with
the quantitative results. Together, then, the quantitative and qualitative chapters (1) consider why
(non-)deference might occur, and (2) what that (non-)deference could look like in action.
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Avenues for Future Inquiry
This dissertation provides significant theoretical and methodological insight on the
presence and strength of deference in the years before and after Chevron. It also introduces new
questions to investigate in subsequent studies.

How can we better measure agency/administrative court partisanship?
A methodological challenge arose when assigning partisanship to non-Supreme Court
actors, particularly at the administrative court level. The literature discussed above on assigning
partisanship to justices has been applied to other judges (Article III as well as state Supreme
Court justices (Brace et al 2000, Hall 1985, Kang and Shephard 2016)) but the effect of
partisanship (proxied by appointing president per Dahl) has been shown to be not nearly as
explanatory at the non-Supreme Court level. I utilized the appointment proxy for court of appeals
judges out of necessity and with great caution.
It was with even more reticence that I used the same method for assigning partisanship to
BIA judges. This relied on a large assumption: presidents will appoint attorneys general who
share their perspectives on Department of Justice prerogatives (notably immigration). A two-step
proxy is used in this case: the president’s partisan identity defines the attorney general’s partisan
identity which, in turn, defines the BIA member’s partisan identity. This is an admittedly tenuous
link, but it is the best approach given the data available. Future scholarship could probe this
question deeper to determine (1) a better way to identify administrative law judge partisanship,
and (2) whether administrative law judges exhibit partisan behavior in the first place. I suspect
that administrative courts vary in their propensity to make partisan-motivated decisions. (The
National Labor Relations Board is likely more “political” than the Bureau of Hearings and
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Appeals in the Railroad Retirement Board, for example.) Interviews with past and current
administrative law judges that discuss the political motivations of decision making in
administrative courts is the best preliminary approach to study this phenomenon.

Do circuit court decisions impact future administrative court behavior? How did Chevron
impact judicial behavior?
This study provides evidence that the courts of appeals provide guidance to
administrative courts on how to act best as judicial actors. But the study does not probe into
whether administrative court actors actually change as a result of circuit court opinions. It is not
possible to determine changes in administrative court behavior with the data I utilized for this
dissertation. Instead, future studies should interview administrative adjudicators to determine
whether the theories introduced here play a role in their day-to-day operations. Additionally, a
future study might appeal to agency archives for internal documentation indicating changes in
agency business-as-usual as a result of judicial opinions with instructions for future
administrative court activity. Access to these archives, if they exist, will be challenging to gain.

Can a court defer but rule against an agency?
This study asserts that deference by courts to agencies necessarily requires an agency
win. But a case could be made that an agency could be unsuccessful in court but still subject to
deference by courts. Consider, for example, levels of scrutiny. At the lowest level of scrutiny,
rational basis, courts require that a statute simply be rationally related to a government interest in
order to pass constitutional muster (United States v. Carolene Products, Co. (1938)). Under this
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relaxed standard, it is conceivable that an agency could be ruled against in court while the court
simultaneously supports the agency’s statute under rational basis review. A future analysis could
consider this possibility, identify instances of the phenomenon, and consider whether the
conception of deference in this dissertation should be amended. A study investigating deference
in losing cases could use the same basic method that was introduced in Chapter 2 by using the
coding scheme from Appendices C and D but would require minor framing edits.
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Appendix A: Administrative Courts
Below is a list of administrative courts present in the agencies of the executive branch
bureaucracy. Administrative courts were identified through a personal survey of administrative
agencies and complemented with a review of the database compiled pursuant to a joint study
performed by the Administrative Conference of the United States and Stanford Law.
Administrative courts were defined by the presence of two characteristics: (1) an adjudicative
body composed of one or several administrative law judges/commission members who (2) make
determinations on disputes between at least two parties. Boards that exclusively manage petitions
for benefits are not considered administrative courts for the purposes of this dissertation since
they do not resolve disputes. Administrative court websites that include a database of decisions
constitutes an unnecessary but sufficient condition for defining the office as an administrative
court; a narrative on the functions that the office provides and the process through which the
administrative court functions is both necessary and sufficient.

1. Administrative Appeals Office
a. Home agency: Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland
Security
b. Subject area: immigration
c. Mission statement: “Petitioners and applicants for certain categories of
immigration benefits may appeal an unfavorable decision to the Administrative
Appeals Office (AAO). We conduct administrative review of those appeals to
ensure consistency and accuracy in the interpretation of immigration law and
policy. We generally issue our appellate decisions as non-precedent decisions,
which apply existing law and policy to the facts of a given case. After review by
the Attorney General, we may also issue precedent decisions to provide guidance
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to adjudicators and the public on the proper interpretation and administration of
immigration law and policy (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services n.d.).”

2. Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: National Transportation Safety Board
b. Subject area: transportation
c. Mission statement: “The Administrative Law Judges conduct formal hearings and
issue initial decisions on appeals by airmen filed with the Safety Board. The
NTSB serves as the "court of appeals" for any airman, mechanic or mariner
whenever certificate action is taken by the Federal Aviation Administration or the
U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, or when civil penalties are assessed by the FAA
(National Transportation Safety Board n.d.).”

3. Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: United States Coast Guard, Department of Defense
b. Subject area: suspension and revocation of Coast Guard membership
c. Mission statement: “CG ALJs preside over 600-900 Suspension and Revocation
cases annually. In a fully-contested case, the ALJ presides over all aspects of the
hearing including admitting or rejecting evidence, regulating the course of the
hearing, ruling on motions, and issuing subpoenas for witnesses. The ALJ then
reviews the evidence and testimony, finds the facts, and prepares a decision that
applies the facts to the law and states the reasons for the ALJ’s findings. In a noncontested case (settlement, admission, or default), the ALJ reviews the docket
record, ensures that due process has been afforded the respondent, and then issues
an appropriate order (United States Coast Guard n.d.).”

4. Administrative Review Board
a. Home agency: Department of Labor
b. Subject area: employment disputes
c. Mission statement: “The Secretary of Labor has granted authority and assigned
responsibility to the Board to issue final agency decisions after review or on
appeal of matters arising under a wide range of employee protection laws. The
jurisdiction of the Board includes, but is not limited to, the following areas of law:
environmental, transportation, and securities whistleblower protection; temporary
immigration programs; child labor; employment discrimination; job training; and
federal construction and service contracts. The Board’s cases generally arise on
appeal from decisions by Department of Labor Administrative Law Judges or
136

determinations by the Administrator of the Department’s Wage and Hour
Division. Depending upon the statute at issue, parties may appeal the Board’s
decisions to federal district or appellate courts and ultimately to the United States
Supreme Court. The mission of the Board is to do justice under the law by
rendering legally correct and well-reasoned appellate decisions in a timely and
efficient manner, treating all those who come before the Board fairly and
impartially (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).”

5. Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records
a. Home agency: Department of the Air Force, Department of Defense
b. Subject area: correcting records of airmen
c. Mission statement: “The AFBCMR, established under Section 1552, Title 10,
United States Code, is the highest level of administrative review within the
Department of the Air Force. As such, applicants must first exhaust available
administrative avenues of relief before applying to the AFBCMR. Otherwise, the
Board will deny the case on that basis. The AFBCMR bases its decision on the
evidence contained in the case file. The case file consists of military records, an
advisory from the Office of Primary Responsibility and statements, arguments
and documents provided by the applicant. The burden of proof of either error or
injustice rests with the applicant. The AFBCMR’s decision is final and conclusive
(Air Force Personnel Center n.d.).”

6. Army Review Boards Agency
a. Home agency: Department of the Army, Department of Defense
b. Subject area: various Army personnel issues
c. Mission statement: “The Army Review Boards Agency, acting on behalf of the
Secretary of the Army, operating through Civilian and Military professionals,
adjudicates Soldiers' and Veterans' cases in an impartial manner, ensuring each
decision is fair, just and equitable, recognizing outcomes affect individual careers,
livelihood, and public safety. Provide oversight of the Army Corrections system
(U.S. Army n.d.).”

7. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
a. Home agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
b. Subject area: nuclear industry disputes
c. Mission statement: “The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) is
the independent trial-level adjudicatory body of the NRC. Acting on behalf of the
Commission, individual Licensing Boards conduct (1) public hearings concerning
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contested issues that arise in the course of licensing and enforcement proceedings
regarding nuclear reactors and the civilian use of materials in the United States;
and (2) uncontested hearings regarding matters such as the construction of
uranium enrichment facilities. As such, the ASLBP fulfills both the NRC's
obligation to afford the public and those subject to agency enforcement actions an
opportunity to challenge proposed licensing and enforcement activities as
required by Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and its responsibility
under AEA Sections 189(a) and 193 to conduct a public hearing regarding the
construction of certain types of facilities, even if there is not a challenge by any
affected person or entity. These hearings are conducted in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission's implementing regulations,
set forth at 10 CFR Part 2. A unique feature of the ASLBP that distinguishes it
from similar federal regulatory or administrative tribunals is that each Licensing
Board ordinarily is comprised of three administrative judges, usually consisting of
one attorney skilled in the conduct of administrative hearings and two experts in
scientific or technical areas relevant to the subject matter of the dispute. This
scientific enhancement of the adjudicatory function is statutorily mandated by
Section 191 of the AEA (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission n.d.).”

8. Benefit Review Board
a. Home agency: Department of Labor
b. Subject area: worker’s compensation
c. Mission statement: “The U.S. Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board was
created by Congress in 1972 to review appeals of administrative law judges’
decisions arising under the Black Lung Benefits Act, Title IV of the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq., and the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq., and its extensions, including
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331 et seq., the Defense Base
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1651 et seq., and the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities
Act, 5 U.S.C. §8171 et seq. The Board has authority to resolve appeals under
these statutes, filed by any party-in-interest, which raise a substantial question of
law or fact, and it reviews the decisions of administrative law judges in order to
determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and are in
accordance with law. The Board’s decisions may be appealed to the U.S. Courts
of Appeals in the circuit where the injury arose, and from there to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Board, by statute, consists of five Members appointed by the
Secretary of Labor, one of whom is designated as Chairman and Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).”
9. Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals
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a. Home agency: Department of Labor
b. Subject area: employment visa denial review
c. Mission statement: “The Secretary of Labor is responsible under the Immigration
and Nationality Act for administering labor certification and attestation programs
which are generally designed to ensure that the admission of foreign workers into
the United States on a permanent or temporary basis will not adversely affect the
job opportunities, wages, and working conditions of U.S. workers (U.S.
Department of Labor n.d.).”

10. Board of Contract Appeals
a. Home agency: United States Postal Service
b. Subject area: contract disputes with Post Offices
c. Mission statement: “The Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals has
jurisdiction to consider and decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting
officer of the United States Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory Commission
relative to a contract made by either (United States Postal Service n.d.).”

11. Board for Corrections of Military Records of the Coast Guard
a. Home agency: Department of the Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
b. Subject area: correcting records of Coast Guard members
c. Mission statement: “The Board for Correction of Military Records (BCMR) of the
Coast Guard is a board of civilians within the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, which has authority under Title 10, Section 1552, of the United States
Code (10 U.S.C. Â§ 1552) to review and correct the personnel records of current
and former members of the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve. Such records
include, but are not limited to, records regarding discharges, reenlistment codes,
disciplinary matters, performance evaluations, selection for promotion,
advancement, retirement, dates of service, disability ratings, medals, and various
bonuses and benefits (United States Coast Guard n.d.).”

12. Board for Correction of Naval Records
a. Home agency: Department of the Navy, Department of Defense
b. Subject area: correcting records of Naval officers
c. Mission statement: “The United States Navy's Board for Correction of Naval
Records (BCNR) is committed to providing current and former Navy and Marine
Corps members the highest level of administrative review within the Navy to
correct errors or injustices to their records (Department of the Navy n.d.).”
13. Board of Veterans Appeals
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a. Home agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
b. Subject area: veterans’ benefits
c. Mission statement: “The Board of Veterans’ Appeals is an agency within the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Its mission is to conduct hearings and issue
timely decisions for Veterans and other appellants in compliance with the law, 38
United States Code § 7101(a). The Board is responsible for making final
decisions on behalf of the Secretary regarding appeals for Veterans’ benefits and
services from all three administrations: Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA),
Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and National Cemetery Administration
(NCA), as well as the Office of General Counsel (OGC) that are presented to the
Board for appellate review. The Board’s jurisdiction extends to all questions in a
matter involving a decision by the Secretary under the law that affects a provision
of benefits by the Secretary to Veterans, their dependents, or their survivors. Final
decisions on appeals are made by the Board based on the entire record in the
proceeding and all applicable provisions of law and regulation (Department of
Veteran Affairs n.d.).”

14. Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
a. Home agency: Railroad Retirement Board
b. Subject area: appeals from retirement benefit determinations
c. Mission statement: “Persons claiming retirement, disability, survivor,
unemployment, or sickness benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB)
have the right to appeal unfavorable determinations on their claims (U.S. Railroad
Retirement Board n.d.).”

15. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals
a. Home agency: General Services Administration
b. Subject area: disputes between government contractors
c. Mission statement: “The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA) is an
independent tribunal housed within the General Services Administration. The
CBCA presides over various disputes involving Federal executive branch
agencies. Its primary responsibility is to resolve contract disputes between
government contractors and agencies under the Contract Disputes Act. For a full
discussion of the CBCA and its jurisdiction and history, please see About The
Board (General Services Administration n.d.).”

16. Departmental Appeals Board
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a. Home agency: Department of Health and Human Services
b. Subject area: benefits appeals
c. Mission statement: “The Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) provides impartial,
independent review of disputed decisions in a wide range of Department
programs under more than 60 statutory provisions. The DAB generally issues the
final decision for the Department, which may then be appealed to federal court.
The DAB may issue a recommended decision for action by another official. The
DAB has three broad areas of jurisdiction each with its own set of judges and
staff. The DAB also has a leadership role in implementing Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) across the Department since the DAB Chair is the designated
Dispute Resolution Specialist under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1996. DAB staff include trained mediators and facilitators. The DAB's ADR
responsibilities include providing ADR services and training and coordinating and
facilitating negotiated rulemaking committees. The DAB resolves disputes with
outside parties such as state agencies, Head Start grantees, universities, nursing
homes, doctors, and Medicare beneficiaries. In a single year, disputes heard by the
DAB may involve as much as $1 billion in federal grant funds (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services n.d.).”

17. Departmental Cases Hearings Division
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior
b. Subject area: resource management
c. Mission statement: “The Departmental Cases Hearings Division serves as the
Department's administrative trial court for cases involving lands and resources
under the Department's jurisdiction. Through formal hearings conducted by
administrative law judges under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Division
decides grazing appeals, surface coal mining cases, civil penalty assessments
under various wildlife and resource protection laws, certain cases involving the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), disputed issues
of material fact with respect to conditions and prescriptions in hydropower
licenses, and contests of mining claims, Alaska Native allotment applications, and
other asserted interests in Federal land. The Division also conducts hearings on
other matters upon request from a bureau or office, an OHA appeals board, or the
Director. Examples include adjudications pertaining to oil and gas leases, rightsof-way, and alleged trespasses on Federal lands (U.S. Department of the Interior
n.d.).”
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18. Division of Enforcement
a. Home agency: Securities and Exchange Commission
b. Subject area: investor protection
c. Mission statement: “The Division of Enforcement was created in August 1972 to
consolidate enforcement activities that previously had been handled by the
various operating divisions at the Commission's headquarters in Washington. The
Commission's enforcement staff conducts investigations into possible violations
of the federal securities laws, and litigates the Commission's civil enforcement
proceedings in the federal courts and in administrative proceedings (U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission n.d.).”

19. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
a. Home agency: Department of Labor
b. Subject area: worker’s compensation
c. Mission statement: “The Board's mission is to hear and decide cases on appeal
from decisions of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) in an
impartial and expeditious manner. The decisions of the Board are made in
accordance with its statutory mandate, based on a thorough review of the case
record as compiled by OWCP. Injured federal workers have the opportunity for a
full evidentiary hearing with OWCP's Branch of Hearings and Review prior to
review of the record by the Board (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).”

20. Environmental Appeals Board
a. Home agency: Environmental Protection Agency
b. Subject area: environmental sanction disputes
c. Mission statement: “The Appeals Board, which is located within the Office of
Administration and Resources Management, is the final Agency decision maker
on administrative appeals under all major environmental statutes that the Agency
administers. The EAB hears permit and civil penalty appeals in accordance with
regulations delegating this authority from the EPA Administrator. Appeals from
permit decisions made by EPA's Regional Administrators (and in some cases,
state permitting officials) may be filed either by permittees or other interested
persons. A substantial additional portion of the EAB's caseload consists of
petitions for reimbursement of costs incurred in complying with cleanup orders
issued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). The EAB decides these matters pursuant to a
delegation of authority from the Administrator. The EAB is also authorized to
hear appeals from various administrative decisions under the Clean Air Act's acid
rain program at 40 C.F.R. Part 78 and appeals of federal Clean Air Act Title V
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operating permits issued pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 71. More information about
the EAB (United States Environmental Protection Agency n.d.).”

21. Executive Office of Immigration Review (BIA)
a. Home agency: Department of Justice
b. Subject area: immigration
c. Mission statement: “The primary mission of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) is to adjudicate immigration cases by fairly, expeditiously, and
uniformly interpreting and administering the Nation's immigration laws. Under
delegated authority from the Attorney General, EOIR conducts immigration court
proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings (United States
Department of Justice n.d.).”

22. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
a. Home agency: Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
b. Subject area: mine and miner safety
c. Mission statement: “The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is
an independent adjudicative agency that provides administrative trial and
appellate review of legal disputes arising under the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act)....Most cases deal with civil penalties assessed
against mine operators and address whether the alleged safety and health
violations occurred as well as the appropriateness of proposed penalties. Other
types of cases include orders to close a mine, miners' charges of safety related
discrimination and miners' requests for compensation after the mine is idled by a
closure order (Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission n.d.).”

23. Federal Services Impasses Panel
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority
b. Subject area: labor disputes within federal government
c. Mission statement: “The Panel resolves impasses between federal agencies and
unions representing federal employees arising from negotiations arising under the
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute and the Federal Employees
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act. If bargaining between the parties,
followed by mediation assistance, does not result in a voluntary agreement, then
either party or the parties jointly may request the Panel's assistance (U.S. Federal
Labor Relations Authority n.d.).”
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24. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
a. Home agency: Department of Justice
b. Subject area: claims by American citizens against foreign governments
c. Mission statement: “The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United
States (FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of
Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments,
under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international claims
settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State. Funds for
payment of the Commission's awards are derived from congressional
appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in
the United States by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury (United States
Department of Justice n.d.).”

25. Foreign Service Grievance Board
a. Home agency: Department of State
b. Subject area: disputes arising from foreign service
c. Mission statement: “On March 26, 1976 Congress amended the Foreign Service
Act of 1946 to establish a permanent grievance system. Although it retained
many of the procedures of the earlier, interim system, the statutory system carried
additional functions and authority. In particular, the new Board could order the
suspension of agency actions pending the Board's decision in cases involving the
separation or disciplining of an employee if it considered such action warranted.
Further, the Board's recommendations to an agency head could be rejected only if
they "would be contrary to law, would adversely affect the foreign policy or
security of the United States, or would substantially impair the efficiency of the
service (Department of State n.d.)."

26. Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Agency
b. Subject area: collective bargaining for foreign service employees
c. Mission statement: “Created under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. §§
4101-4118, the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel assists in resolving
impasses arising in the course of collective bargaining under the Act over
conditions of employment affecting Foreign Service employees working for the
U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (formerly the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
U.S. Department of Commerce. The Act provides that the Chairperson of the
Foreign Service Labor Relations Board – who concurrently serves as the FLRA
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Chairman – appoints the five Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel members,
and requires that it be composed of two members of the Foreign Service (who are
not management officials, confidential employees, or labor organization officials);
one member of the Federal Service Impasses Panel; one individual employed by
the U.S. Department of Labor; and one public member who does not hold any
other office or position in the government (U.S. Federal Labor Relations
Authority n.d.).”

27. Foreign Service Labor Relations Board
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority
b. Subject area: labor management for foreign service employees
c. Mission statement: “Created under the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. §§
4101-4118, the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board (the FSLRB) administers
the labor-management relations program for Foreign Service employees working
for the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (formerly the
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the
U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S. Federal Labor Relations Authority n.d.).”

28. Interior Board of Indian Appeals
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior
b. Subject area: disputes arising out of Board of Indian Affairs regulations
c. Mission statement: “The Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) is an appellate
review body that exercises the delegated authority of the Secretary of the Interior
to issue final decisions for the Department of the Interior in appeals involving
Indian matters. Located within the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals,
IBIA is separate and independent from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the
Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs (U.S. Department of the Interior n.d.).”

29. Interior Board of Land Appeals
a. Home agency: Department of the Interior
b. Subject area: disputes arising out of various Interior regulations
c. Mission statement: “The Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) is an appellate
review body that exercises the delegated authority of the Secretary of the Interior
to issue final decisions for the Department of the Interior. Its administrative
judges decide appeals from bureau decisions relating to the use and disposition of
public lands and their resources, mineral resources on the Outer Continental
Shelf, and the conduct of surface coal mining operations under the Surface
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Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Located within the Department's Office of
Hearings and Appeals, IBLA is separate and independent from the Bureaus and
Offices whose decisions it reviews (U.S. Department of the Interior n.d.).”

30. International Trade Commision
a. Home agency: United States International Trade Commission
b. Subject area: trade
c. Mission statement: “The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC or
Commission) pursues its mission in three areas of U.S. international trade:
adjudication, research and analysis, and maintaining the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule. The Commission investigates and makes determinations in proceedings
involving imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S.
intellectual property rights; provides independent analysis and information on
tariffs, trade and competitiveness; and maintains the U.S. tariff schedule (United
States International Trade Commission n.d.).”

31. Investigations and Hearings Division
a. Home agency: Federal Communications Commission
b. Subject area: communications
c. Mission statement: “The Investigations & Hearings Division is responsible for
resolution of complaints against broadcast stations and other Title III licensees on
non-technical matters such as indecency, enhanced underwriting, unauthorized
transfer of control and misrepresentation. In addition, with regard to wireless
licensees, the Division is responsible for enforcement of rules regarding auction
collusion and misrepresentation. The Division also investigates industry
allegations of violations of Title II of the Communications Act, as amended, and
FCC rules and policies pertaining to common carriers. In addition, the Division
conducts, or assists in, various other investigations being conducted by the Bureau
and serves as trial staff in formal Commission hearings (Federal Communications
Commission n.d.).”

32. Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board
a. Home agency: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of
Health and Human Services
b. Subject area: rezoning Medicare providers
c. Mission statement: “The Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board
("MGCRB" or "Board") makes determinations on geographic reclassification
requests of hospitals who are receiving payment under the inpatient prospective
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payment system ("IPPS") but wish to reclassify to a higher wage area for
purposes of receiving a higher payment rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10) and
42 C.F.R. § 412.230 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services n.d.).”

33. Merit Systems Protection Board
a. Home agency: Merit Systems Protection Board
b. Subject area: government employee rights protection
c. Mission statement: “The mission of the MSPB is to "Protect the Merit System
Principles and promote an effective Federal workforce free of Prohibited
Personnel Practices." MSPB's vision is "A highly qualified, diverse Federal
workforce that is fairly and effectively managed, providing excellent service to
the American people." MSPB's organizational values are Excellence, Fairness,
Timeliness, and Transparency. MSPB carries out its statutory responsibilities and
authorities primarily by adjudicating individual employee appeals and by
conducting merit systems studies. In addition, MSPB reviews the significant
actions of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to assess the degree to
which those actions may affect merit (U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board n.d.).”

34. National Appeals Office
a. Home agency: National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce
b. Subject area: fisheries disputes
c. Mission statement: “NOAA Fisheries National Appeals Office provides
administrative appeals services, conducts administrative inquiries, and manages
Freedom of Information Act requests. NOAA Fisheries adjudicates appeals of
persons affected by initial administrative determinations, including those related
to the implementation of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration n.d.).”
35. National Labor Relations Board
a. Home agency: National Labor Relations Board
b. Subject area: labor disputes
c. Mission statement: “The NLRB is an independent federal agency enforcing the
National Labor Relations Act, which guarantees the right of most private sector
employees to organize, to engage in group efforts to improve their wages and
working conditions, to determine whether to have unions as their bargaining
representative, to engage in collective bargaining, and to refrain from any of these
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activities. It acts to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices committed by
private sector employers and unions (National Labor Relations Board n.d.).”

36. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
a. Home agency: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
b. Subject area: disputes over private-sector pensions
c. Mission statement: “The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protects
the retirement incomes of over 35 million American workers in private-sector
defined benefit pension plans. A defined benefit plan provides a specified
monthly benefit at retirement, often based on a combination of salary and years of
service. PBGC was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 to encourage the continuation and maintenance of private-sector defined
benefit pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
benefits, and keep pension insurance premiums at a minimum (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation n.d.).”

37. Postal Regulatory Commission
a. Home agency: Postal Regulatory Commission
b. Subject area: oversight of the U.S. Postal Service
c. Mission statement: “The Commission is an independent agency that has exercised
regulatory oversight over the Postal Service since its creation by the Postal
Reorganization Act of 1970, with expanded responsibilities under the Postal
Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (Postal Regulatory Commission
n.d.).”

38. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
a. Home agency: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (with oversight
provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission)
b. Subject area: public company audits
c. Mission statement: “The PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation established by
Congress to oversee the audits of public companies in order to protect investors
and the public interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports. The PCAOB also oversees the audits of brokers and dealers, including
compliance reports filed pursuant to federal securities laws, to promote investor
protection (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board n.d.).”
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39. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
a. Home agency: Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
b. Subject area: workplace safety
c. Mission statement: “The mission of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission is to provide fair and timely adjudication of workplace safety and
health disputes between the Department of Labor and employers. In doing this,
the Commission plays a vital role in encouraging safe and healthy workplaces for
American workers. The cases in which the Review Commission renders decisions
arise from inspections conducted by a Federal agency separate from the Review
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which
is a part of the Department of Labor. OSHRC, or the Review Commission, and
OSHA were created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, but the
Act mandated that the Review Commission be an independent agency (i.e., not
part of another Federal department) to ensure that parties to agency cases receive
impartial hearings (Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission n.d.).”

40. Office of Administrative Adjudication
a. Home agency: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
b. Subject area: consumer protection
c. Mission statement: “Administrative adjudication proceedings are formal
adversarial proceedings conducted by an administrative law judge, who issues a
recommended decision to the CFPB director. The director issues a final decision,
either adopting or modifying the administrative law judge’s recommended
decision. The Bureau initiates an administrative adjudication proceeding by filing
a Notice of Charges alleging a violation of a consumer protection statute
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau n.d.).”

41. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice
b. Subject area: drug enforcement regulation
c. Mission statement: “The Administrative Law Judges at the Office of
Administrative Law Judges (LJ) conduct formal hearings in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq) in connection with
enforcement and regulatory cases brought by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801, et
seq) and its attendant regulations (21 C.F.R. § 1300, et seq) (Drug Enforcement
Administration, n.d.).”
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42. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Department of Labor
b. Subject area: general labor concerns
c. Mission statement: “OALJ’s mission is to provide a neutral forum to resolve
labor-related administrative disputes before the Department of Labor in a fair,
transparent and accessible manner, and to promptly issue sound decisions correct
in law and fact. Department of Labor ALJs adjudicate complaints and claims in a
wide variety of cases. Cases where individuals seek benefits under the Black
Lung Benefits Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act and
the Defense Base Act constitute the largest part of the office’s workload. ALJs
also hear and decide cases arising from over 80 other labor-related statutes,
Executive Orders, and regulations, including such diverse subjects as:
whistleblower complaints involving corporate fraud and violations of
transportation, environmental and food safety statutes; alien labor certifications;
actions involving the working conditions of migrant farm laborers; grants
administration relating to preparation of workers and job seekers to attain needed
skills and training; prohibition of workplace discrimination by government
contractors; minimum wage disputes; child labor violations; mine safety
variances; OSHA formal rulemaking proceedings; federal contract disputes; civil
fraud in federal programs; certain recordkeeping required by ERISA; and
standards of conduct in union elections (U.S. Department of Labor n.d.).”

43. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Environmental Protection Agency
b. Subject area: environmental enforcement
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) is an
independent office in EPA's Office of Mission Support. The Administrative Law
Judges conduct hearings and render decisions in proceedings between the EPA
and persons, businesses, government entities, and other organizations that are, or
are alleged to be, regulated under environmental laws (United States
Environmental Protection Agency n.d.).”

44. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Federal Communication Commission
b. Subject area: communication
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) of the
Federal Communications Commission is responsible for conducting the hearings
ordered by the Commission. The hearing function includes acting on interlocutory
requests filed in the proceedings such as petitions to intervene, petitions to enlarge
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issues, and contested discovery requests (Federal Communications Commission
n.d.).”

45. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
b. Subject area: energy regulation
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Litigation litigates or otherwise
resolves cases set for hearing. The lawyers & technical staff in this Office
represent the public interest and seek to litigate or settle cases in a timely,
efficient and equitable manner while ensuring the outcomes are consistent with
Commission policy. Resolve disputes through settlement by: Developing and
serving on all parties objective settlement positions, or top sheets; Conducting or
participating in settlement processes with energy industry officials, state
commissions, customers and other intervening parties; and Assisting the
settlement judge and parties to ensure agreements are consistent with Commission
policy (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission n.d.).”

46. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Federal Labor Relations Authority
b. Subject area: general labor concerns
c. Mission statement: “FLRA Administrative Law Judges conduct hearings and
issue recommended decisions on cases involving alleged unfair labor practices.
Administrative Law Judges also render recommended decisions involving
applications for attorney fees filed under the Back Pay Act and the Equal Access
to Justice Act (U.S. Federal Labor Relations Authority n.d.).”

47. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Federal Maritime Commission
b. Subject area: shipping disputes
c. Mission statement: “If a person or company is unable to settle a dispute that
involves a possible violation of the Shipping Act, that person or company may file
a complaint. The complaint will be referred to the Office of Administrative Law
Judges (ALJ) (Federal Maritime Commission n.d.).”

48. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: Federal Trade Commission
b. Subject area: trade disputes
151

c. Mission statement: “The Office of Administrative Law Judges performs the initial
adjudicative fact-finding in Commission administrative complaint proceedings,
guided by the FTC Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, relevant case law
interpreting these statutes, and the FTC's Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. Part 3. The
administrative law judge assigned to handle each complaint issued by the
Commission holds pre-hearing conferences; resolves discovery disputes,
evidentiary disputes and procedural disputes; and conducts the full adversarial
evidentiary hearing on the record. The administrative law judge issues an initial
decision which sets out relevant and material findings of fact with record
citations, explains the correct legal standard, applies the law to the facts, and,
where appropriate, issues an order on remedy (Federal Trade Commission n.d.).”

49. Office of Administrative Law Judges
a. Home agency: United States Postal Service
b. Subject area: disputes arising under postal service legislation and Postmaster
General regulations
c. Mission statements: “The Judicial Officer and Office of Administrative Law
Judges perform quasi-judicial duties as designated by the Postmaster General,
applicable statutes and regulations. The Judicial Officer is the agency for the
purposes of chapter 5 of Title 5, to the extent those functions are delegated to him
by the Postmaster General (United States Postal Service n.d.).”

50. Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
a. Home agency: Department of Justice
b. Subject area: oversight of immigration judges
c. Mission statement: “The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer
(OCAHO) is headed by a Chief Administrative Hearing Officer who is
responsible for the general supervision and management of Administrative Law
Judges who preside at hearings which are mandated by provisions of law enacted
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA (PDF)) and the
Immigration Act of 1990 (PDF). These acts, among others, amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (U.S. Department of Justice
n.d.).”
51. Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
a. Home agency: Social Security Administration
b. Subject area: Social Security benefits hearings
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c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings Operations (OHO) and the Office of
Analytics, Review, and Oversight (OARO) are responsible for holding hearings,
issuing decisions, and reviewing post-hearing appeals for claims filed under Titles
II and XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended. Headquartered in Falls
Church, Virginia, and Baltimore, Maryland, these components make up one of the
largest administrative adjudication systems in the world (Social Security
Administration n.d.).”

52. Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition
a. Home agency: Federal Aviation Commission, Department of Transportation
b. Subject area: aviation acquisition
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA) is
the sole, statutorily designated tribunal for all contract disputes and bid protests
under the FAA's Acquisition Management System. The ODRA dispute resolution
process recognizes that it is in the best interests of the FAA and its private sector
business partners to work collaboratively to avoid and, where possible, voluntarily
resolve acquisition-related controversies in a timely and fair manner. To that end,
consistent with its statutory mandate, the ODRA uses a variety of dispute
avoidance and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques to the maximum
extent practicable. For those matters that cannot be avoided or resolved through
the use of ADR, the ODRA provides a flexible and efficient adjudication process
under the authority of the Administrative Procedure Act (United States
Department of Transportation n.d.).”

53. Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication
a. Home agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
b. Subject area: employment disputes in VA settings
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Employment Discrimination and Complaint
Adjudication (OEDCA) is an independent Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
adjudicatory authority created by Congress. Established in February 1998,
OEDCA’s mission is to objectively review the merits of employment
discrimination claims filed by present and former VA employees and non-agency
applicants for employment (U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs n.d.).”

54. Office of Financial Institution Adjudication
a. Home agency: The Federal Reserve System
b. Subject area: financial institution disputes
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c. Mission statement: “ The Office of Financial Institution Adjudication (OFIA) is
an inter-agency group of administrative law judges (ALJs), established pursuant
to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),
that presides over administrative enforcement proceedings brought by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB),
or the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and issues recommended
decisions to the relevant agency head (Office of Financial Institutional
Adjudication n.d.).”

55. Office of Hearings
a. Home agency: Department of Transportation
b. Subject area: various transportation disputes
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings (OH) is comprised of administrative
law judges (ALJs) and support staff. Its ALJs conduct official hearings under the
Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) within the US Department
of Transportation where formal APA hearings are required, including: air carrier
citizenship determinations; fairness of airport landing rates and charges. OH ALJs
also conduct hearings in civil penalty proceedings in cases including:
discrimination against passengers; violation of travel agent regulations; improper
shipment of hazardous materials; passenger misconduct on airlines; airlines' and
motor carriers' failure to comply with regulations concerning inspection,
maintenance, and hours of service (U.S. Department of Transportation n.d.).”

56. Office of Hearings and Appeals
a. Home agency: Department of Education
b. Subject area: educational institutions
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals hears cases arising
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA). These
cases include actions initiated by the U.S. Department of Education to terminate
the eligibility of institutions to participate in the Title IV, HEA programs; actions
to fine institutions; audit and program review actions to recover allegedly
misspent funds; emergency actions to immediately suspend funding of such
institutions; and actions to debar certain individuals from participating in various
programs government-wide (U.S. Department of Education n.d.).”
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57. Office of Hearings and Appeals
a. Home agency: Department of Energy
b. Subject area: all energy disputes except those arising under purview of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is the quasijudicial arm of the Department of Energy that conducts hearings and issues initial
Departmental decisions with respect to any adjudicative proceedings which the
Secretary may delegate, except those within the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). OHA jurisdiction principally includes
Personnel Security Hearing Officer functions (10 CFR Part 710) and
"whistleblower" complaints filed under the DOE Contractor Employee Protection
Program (10 CFR Part 708). The Office also analyzes and decides appeals
requesting review of determinations reached by officials within the Department
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, including initial determinations under the
Freedom of Information Act, 10 CFR 1004.1, the Privacy Act, 10 CFR 1008, the
payments-equal-to-taxes (PETT) provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, as amended, and the Alternative Fuels Transportation Program (10 CFR
Part 490). In addition, OHA is responsible for deciding Applications for
Exception from generally applicable requirements of a rule, regulation or order of
the Department, and analyzes Petitions for Special Redress seeking "extraordinary
relief" apart from or in addition to any other remedy provided in the Department’s
enabling statutes. Within OHA resides the Alternative Dispute Resolution Office
whose mission is to promote the use of conflict management and alternative
dispute resolution techniques at all levels of the DOE complex (Department of
Energy n.d.).”

58. Office of Hearings and Appeals
a. Home agency: Small Business Administration
b. Subject area: disputes arising from SBA programs
c. Mission statement: “The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) is an
independent office of the Small Business Administration (SBA) established in
1983 to provide an independent, quasi-judicial appeal of certain SBA program
decisions. OHA hears the following appeals: size determinations; contracting
officer designations of North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
codes on federal contracts; eligibility determinations for Service-Disabled
Veteran-Owned Small Business Concerns (SDVO SBC); eligibility of WomenOwned Small Businesses (WOSB); eligibility of Economically Disadvantaged
WOSB (EDWOSB); and 8(a)BD eligibility determinations, suspensions and
terminations (U.S. Small Business Administration n.d.).”
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59. Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals
a. Home agency: Department of Health and Human Services
b. Subject area: Medicare claims
c. Mission statement: “OMHA administers the nationwide Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) hearing program for appeals arising from individual claims for
Medicare coverage and payment for items and services furnished to beneficiaries
(or enrollees) under Medicare Parts A, B, C and D. OMHA also hears appeals
arising from claims for entitlement to Medicare benefits and disputes of Part B
and Part D premium surcharges. OMHA generally conducts the third level of a
five-level appeals process, and operates separately from the other agencies
involved in the Medicare claims appeal process (Department of Health and
Human Services n.d.).”

60. Provider Reimbursement Review Board
a. Home agency: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of
Health and Human Services
b. Subject area: Medicare provider reimbursements
c. Mission statement: “The Provider Reimbursement Review Board is an
independent panel to which a certified Medicare provider of services may appeal
if it is dissatisfied with a final determination by its Medicare contractor or by the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services n.d.).”

61. Reparations Program
a. Home agency: Commodity Futures Trading Commission
b. Subject area: trading complaints
c. Mission statement: “The Reparations Program is designed to provide an
inexpensive, expeditious, fair, and impartial forum to handle customer
complaints. The Program aims to resolve disputes between futures customers and
commodity futures trading professionals. The transactions involved can include
futures contracts, options on futures contracts or on physical commodities, and
leverage contracts (Commodity Futures Trading Commission n.d.).”

62. Surface Transportation Board
a. Home agency: Surface Transportation Board
b. Subject area: economic regulation of transportation
c. Mission statement: “The Surface Transportation Board is an independent federal
agency that is charged with the economic regulation of various modes of surface
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transportation, primarily freight rail. The STB exercises its statutory authority and
resolves disputes in support of an efficient, competitive, and economically viable
surface transportation network that meets the needs of its users (Surface
Transportation Board n.d.).”

63. Trademark Trial and Appeals Board
a. Home agency: Patent and Trademark Office
b. Subject area: trademark disputes
c. Mission statement: “The TTAB is an administrative board that hears and decides
adversary proceedings between two parties, namely, oppositions (party opposes a
mark after publication in the Official Gazette) and cancellations (party seeks to
cancel an existing registration). The TTAB also handles interference and
concurrent use proceedings, as well as appeals of final refusals issued by USPTO
Trademark Examining Attorneys within the course of the prosecution of
trademark applications (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office n.d.).”
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Appendix B: Meta-Analysis of Content Analysis of Legal Opinions
An analysis of the studies cited in Hall and Wright (2010) was conducted to craft the
coding instrument used to evaluate the dyads of administrative court/court of appeals cases. I
indicate whether the study is law-oriented (i.e. interpretive) or social science-oriented (i.e.
empirical), the topic, the size of the sample (n), and a summary of the coding scheme used.

1. Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and
Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia (Cornell Law Review, 1998)
a. Authors: Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, and Broffitt
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: death penalty and prosecutorial discretion
d. N: 425 cases
e. Coding details: used court documents (i.e. jury sheets, appellate record, etc.); used
a coding scheme that addressed all potential reasons why a trial is decided the
way it is (i.e. aggravating and mitigating factors)
2. An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement (California Law
Review, 2006)
a. Author: Beebe
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: multifactor tests re: consumer confusion
d. N: 331 cases
e. Coding details: district court cases between 2000-2004; codes for general case
details, topic within trademark law
3. Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions: Applying the Social Background Model to a
Celebrated Concern (Ohio State Law Journal, 1999)
a. Authors: Brudney, Schiaroni, and Merritt
b. Law/social science: both
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: unfair labor practices
d. N: 1224 cases
e. Coding details: codes each National Labor Relations Act cases between 1986 and
1993 for judicial background factors
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4. Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on Federal
Courts of Appeals (Yale Law Journal, 1998)
a. Authors: Cross and Tiller
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: partisanship and difference
d. N: approximately 170 cases
e. Coding details: all D.C. circuit cases citing Chevron between 1991 and 1995;
coded for deference, upholding agency policy, direction of outcome, partisanship
5.

“There is a Book Out…”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts
(Harvard Law Review, 1987)
a. Author: Davis
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: judicial use of facts
d. N: 193 cases
e. Coding details: used Lexis/Westlaw to search for cases where applicable theory
was cited; coded on nine case-level variables

6. Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions (Yale Law Journal, 1991)
a. Author: Eskridge
b. Law/social science: both
c. Topic: override statutes
d. N: 187 cases
e. Coding details: identified all override activity using search terms in USCCAN
between 1967 and 1990; codes case details
7. Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation (American Bar
Foundation Journal, 1980)
a. Author: Franklin
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: defamation law
d. N: 534 cases
e. Coding details: identified cases with “libel” and “slander” tag in West reporter;
coded for media parties
8. Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design
and Interpretation (Stanford Law Review, 2002)
a. Authors: Grundfest and Pritchard
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: statutory ambiguity
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d. N: 167 cases
e. Coding details: Lexis/Westlaw search; codes for different levels of adherence to
doctrine
9. But Do They Have to See It to Know It? The Supreme Court’s Obscenity and
Pornography Decisions (Western Political Quarterly, 1991)
a. Author: Hagle
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: obscenity and pornography cases in the
Supreme Court
d. N: 107 cases
e. Coding details: Supreme Court Database search for obscenity/pornography cases;
uses SCDB codes
10. Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts (Columbia Law Review, 2002)
a. Authors: Hammer and Sage
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: antitrust law and health care
d. N: 542 cases
e. Coding details: Lexis keyword search, winnowed out irrelevant cases; refer to
appendix for extensive and explicit coding scheme
11. Questioning the New Consensus on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical
Study (Columbia Law Review, 1998)
a. Author: Hillman
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: promissory estoppel
d. N: 362 cases
e. Coding details: codes for general case details
12. The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model
(University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1996)
a. Author: Johnston
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: fraud in business agreements
d. N: 25 cases
e. Coding details: codes for evidence of relationship between business partners,
complexity of case, detail in agreement, dispute-ending agreement
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13. The Evolution of State Supreme Courts (Michigan Law Review, 1978)
a. Authors: Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, and Wheeler
b. Law/social science: both
c. Topic: caseload details re: state high courts
d. N: 5904 cases
e. Coding details: stratified random sample of states; code categories: procedural
history, parties, area of law, outcome, style of decision
14. Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split (Virginia Law Review, 2002)
a. Author: Kamin
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: death penalty in California Supreme Court and harmless error doctrine
d. N: 281 cases
e. Coding details: coded for case details (outcome, jurisprudential details)
15. Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the
“Right to Counsel” Cases (American Political Science Review, 1957)
a. Author: Kort
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: right to counsel Supreme Court cases
d. N: 28 cases
e. Coding details: codes for pivotal factors in deciding rights to counsel cases (i.e.
gravity of crime, procedural irregularities, etc.)
16. Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories
(Virginia Law Review, 2005)
a. Authors: Krawiec and Zeiler
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: differential disclosures in common law relationships
d. N: 466 cases
e. Coding details: coded for type of transaction, undisclosed information to parties,
behavior of parties
17. The Influence of the Law in the Supreme Court’s Search and Seizure Jurisprudence
(American Politics Research, 2005)
a. Authors: Kritzer and Richards
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: judicial decision making re: search and seizure
d. N: 228 cases
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e. Coding details: uses Supreme Court Database codes and codes re: search and
seizure from Segal’s 1986 Journal of Politics essay
18. A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision Making: How Judges Use the Primary Caretaker
Standard to Make a Custody Determination (William and Mary Journal of Women and
the Law, 1998)
a. Author: Mercer
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: maternal preference in custody cases
d. N: 49 cases
e. Coding details: codes for differentiation/generality of legal norms, formality of
decision making, case details
19. Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent (Yale Law Journal, 1992)
a. Author: Merrill
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: deference doctrine
d. N: 135 cases
e. Coding details: all Supreme Court decisions from 1981-1990; superficial caselevel codes
20. Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt
Collection in Chapter 13 (American Bankruptcy Law Review, 1999)
a. Author: Norberg
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: Chapter 13 bankruptcy
d. N: 71 cases
e. Coding details: used final reports of each case, debtor’s plan for repayment; coded
for dollar amount, other details about decision
21. The Future of School Desegregation (Northwestern Law Review, 2000)
a. Author: Parker
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: contemporary school desegregation cases
d. N: 192 school districts
e. Coding details: codes each opinion for outcome, time in jurisprudential history
22. A Theory of Negligence (Journal of Legal Studies, 1972)
a. Author: Posner
b. Law/social science: law
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c. Topic: negligence in torts
d. N: 1528 cases
e. Coding details: one-thirtieth of all accident opinions during the defined period in
appellate courts; coded for doctrinal approaches, facts of the case
23. Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges
to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit (NYU Law Review, 2001)
a. Author: Revesz
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: agency cases in the D.C. Circuit
d. N: 2144 votes
e. Coding details: all cases decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals between
1970 and 1996 re: health and safety; codes for case details
24. Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit (Virginia Law Review, 1997)
a. Author: Revesz
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: role of ideology and judicial decision making in D.C. Circuit
d. N: approximately 250 cases with between 136 and 201 votes per period
e. Coding details: coded for panel details, partisanship, nature of objections, nature
of parties, outcome
25. The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for Legislative History Debate (Stanford Law Review, 1998)
a. Author: Schacter
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: use of legislative history in statutory interpretation cases
d. N: 45 cases
e. Coding details: all opinions re: statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court’s
1996 term; coded for use of legislative history, other resources judges use in
statutory interpretation cases
26. Jackson’s Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis (American Political
Science Review, 1965)
a. Author: Schubert
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: judicial decision making at the Supreme Court (values)
d. N: 306 cases
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e. Coding details: classified by type of decision, analyzed for value content; four
types of variables: content, opinion, voting, chronology
27. The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis (American Political
Science Review, 1962)
a. Author: Schubert
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: judicial decision making at the Supreme Court (psychology)
d. N: 99 cases
e. Coding details: vote matrix for each case for factor analysis
28. Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology and Report on New Empirical Research
(Administrative Law Review, 1990
a. Authors: Schuck and Elliott
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: descriptive statistics on administrative appeals
d. N: 1676 cases
e. Coding details: coded on descriptive details of the cases (introducing a larger
study)
29. Continuity and Change: Patterns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990
(Stanford Law Review, 1992)
a. Authors: Schuck and Wang
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: change in immigration litigation
d. N: 792 cases
e. Coding details: 9th Circuit Court of Appeals cases re: immigration in 1979, 1985,
1989, 1990; coded for types of relief sought, success rates, how courts responded
to appeal, Chevron
30. Telling Stories About Women at Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument (Harvard Law
Review, 1990)
a. Author: Schultz
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: employment discrimination opinions
d. N: 54 cases
e. Coding details: coded appellate cases on rhetorical and outcome (evidence
affecting outcome) data
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31. Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in
Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation (University of Chicago Law Review, 1992)
a. Authors: Schultz and Petterson
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: job discrimination cases
d. N: 117 cases in original dataset; 1247 from American Bar Foundation database
e. Coding details: codes for superficial case details
32. Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning
(NYU Law Review, 1998)
a. Authors: Sisk, Heise, and Morriss
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: judicial decision making
d. N: 293 judges
e. Coding details: codes for judge demographics, case details
33. The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law (Journal of Legal Studies,
2002)
a. Authors: Smith and Tiller
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: judicial instrument use in judicial decision making
d. N: 251 cases
e. Coding details: Westlaw search in Courts of Appeals from 1981 to 1993; coded
for case details, partisanship
34. The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in the United States Supreme Court (Journal of
Politics, 1960)
a. Author: Ulmer
b. Law/social science: social science
c. Topic: relationships between Supreme Court justices
d. N: 42 cases
e. Coding details: votes for each case for matrices of voting patterns
35. Is the Federal Court Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance
(University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2004)
a. Authors: Wagner and Petherbridge
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: patent cases in federal circuit
d. N: 413 cases
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e. Coding details: created a taxonomy of approaches to opinion writing
36. Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the
Federal Courts (Vanderbilt Law Review, 2006)
a. Author: Winkler
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: strict scrutiny
d. N: 459 cases
e. Coding details: coded to analyze strict scrutiny at both application and judgelevel; judge-level data includes demographic information
37. Counting Cases About Milk, Our “Most Nearly Perfect” Food, 1860-1940 (Law and
Society Review, 2002)
a. Authors: Wright and Huck
b. Law/social science: law
c. Topic: health regulation in Progressive era
d. N: 440 cases
e. Coding details: coded for case details, regulations, litigated, etc.
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Appendix C: Coding Instrument
For BIA cases:
1. Name of case
2. Citation
Section 1: General Information
1. Decision date
2. Petitioner name
3. Petitioner type
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States
b. Immigrant
c. Other
4. Respondent type
a. Immigrant
b. Other
5. Prior appellate activity (if applicable)
6. Future appellate activity
Section 2: Case Details
1. Disposition of case
a. Significant judgment/verdict for petitioner
b. Significant judgment/verdict for respondent
c. Remand with instructions
d. Dismissed without disposition
e. Other
2. Remedy prescribed
a. Change in party activity
b. Cease-and-desist order
c. Damages:
• Compensatory
• Punitive
d. Decision without punitive measures
e. Other
• Deportation
• Non-exclusion
3. Temporal relationship to Chevron
a. Pre-Chevron
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4.

5.
6.

7.

b. Post-Chevron
• If yes, does the case apply Chevron?
c. Is there any reference to another deference scheme? (see Eskridge and Raso for
details)
Reason for decision
a. Violation of statutory requirements
b. Non-violation of statutory requirements
c. Adequate factual support for petitioner
d. Adequate factual support for respondent
e. Inadequate factual support for petitioner
f. Inadequate factual support for respondent
Is the case per curiam?
Is there a concurring opinion(s)?
a. If yes, concurring Board member
b. If yes, concurring Board member party
Is there a dissenting opinion(s)?
a. If yes, dissenting Board member
b. If yes, concurring Board member party

Section 3: Partisanship
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Attorney General
President
Partisanship of Attorney General and President
Name of Board members
Name of Board members’ appointing president
Party of Board members’ appointing president
Direction of opinion
a. Pro-regulation of immigration
b. Anti-regulation of immigration
c. Other/mixed
8. Overall partisanship of Board (operationalized by appointing Attorney General)
9. Overall partisanship of contemporary Supreme Court (operationalized by appointing
President)
Section 4: Additional Case-Specific Codes
1. Nation of origin
2. Type of case
a. Removal proceedings
b. Bond redetermination hearings
c. Recission hearing
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d. Withholding-only hearing
e. Asylum-only hearing
f. Credible fear review
g. Claimed status review
h. In absentia hearing
i. Other
3. Any additional notes
For Court of Appeals cases
1. Name of case
2. Citation
Section 1: General Information
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Decision date
Circuit
Petitioner name
Respondent name
Petitioner type
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States
b. Immigrant
c. Other
6. Respondent type
a. BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States
b. Immigrant
c. Other
7. Prior appellate activity
8. Future appellate activity (if any)
Section 2: Case Details
1. Appellate facts
a. Appeal by petitioner
b. Appeal by respondent
c. Appeal by both parties
2. Disposition of case
a. Significant judgment/verdict for petitioner
b. Significant judgment/verdict for respondent
c. Remand with instructions
d. Dismissed without disposition
e. Other
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3. Remedy prescribed
a. Explicit application of Board’s remedy
b. Explicit non-application of Board’s remedy
c. Damages
• Compensatory
• Punitive
4. Temporal relationship to Chevron
a. Pre-Chevron
b. Post-Chevron
• If yes, does the case apply Chevron?
c. Is there any reference to another deference scheme? (see Eskridge and Raso for
details)
5. Reason for decision regarding the Board opinion
a. Adequate fact-finding
b. Inadequate fact-finding
c. Adequate application of facts
d. Inadequate application of facts
e. Adequate application of statute
f. Inadequate application of statute
g. Adequate statutory interpretation
h. Inadequate statutory interpretation
i. Adequate application of doctrine
j. Inadequate application of doctrine
6. Standard of review
a. De novo
b. Beyond a reasonable doubt
c. Clear and convincing evidence
d. Preponderance of the evidence
7. Is the decision per curiam?
8. Is there a concurring opinion(s)?
a. If yes, concurring judge(s)
b. If yes, concurring judge(s) party
9. Is there a dissenting opinion(s)?
a. If yes, dissenting judge(s)
b. If yes, concurring judge(s) party
Section 3: Partisanship
1. Attorney General
2. President
3. Partisanship of Attorney General and President
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4.
5.
6.
7.

Name of judges on panel
Name of judges’ appointing president
Party of judges’ appointing president
Direction of opinion
a. Pro-regulation of immigration
b. Anti-regulation of immigration
c. Other/mixed
8. Overall partisanship of circuit (operationalized by appointing president)
9. Overall partisanship of contemporary Supreme Court (operationalized by appointing
President)
Section 4: Additional Case-Specific Codes
1. Nation of origin
2. Type of case
a. Removal proceedings
b. Bond redetermination hearings
c. Rescission hearing
d. Withholding-only hearing
e. Asylum-only hearing
f. Credible fear review
g. Claimed status review
h. In absentia hearing
i. Other
3. Additional notes
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Appendix D: Details on and Examples of Codes
Petitioner and Respondent Type
I distinguish between different types of litigants for both BIA and courts of appeals cases.
This requires some assumptions, particularly regarding the BIA cases. Most BIA cases take the
form of In re Immigrant or Matter of Immigrant. Though the traditional Party v. Party form is
not followed, we can intuit that if the case name followed convention, it would look like Agency
v. Immigrant; this is because the BIA, in the vast majority of cases, is suing the immigrant for
some sort of activity that necessitates removal. The majority of BIA cases, then, have
“BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States” coded as the petitioner and
“Immigrant” coded as the respondent.
Court of Appeals cases are invariably more clear on petitioner and respondent. Since the
majority of cases coming out of the BIA are appeals of an anti-immigrant position, the petitioner
code is typically “Immigrant” and the corresponding respondent code is “BIA/INS/Attorney
General/Department of Justice/United States”. There are no cases in the dataset that do not have
either code.

Appellate Facts (for Courts of Appeals)
Here I indicate who appealed the BIA case to the geographically-appropriate court of
appeals. As aforementioned, the majority of dyads in this dataset include BIA cases where the
immigrant was unsuccessful in their attempt to receive aid from the BIA and who then appealed
their case to the federal judiciary. Therefore, the majority of cases are coded as “appeal by
immigrant.”
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There are no cases that are “appealed by both parties.” There are no instances where the
first appeal to the appropriate court of appeals is appealed by the BIA et al; however, there are a
handful of instances where the government appeals on the second appeal, almost always to the
Supreme Court. Since I limit the focus of this dissertation to the courts of appeals, there are no
cases coded as “appealed by BIA/INS/Attorney General/Department of Justice/United States.

Disposition
This code provides a simple indication as to who was most successful in the case. The
key here is most: I do not require that each case has one sole winner and one sole loser; instead I
compare the extent to which each party was successful and indicated which party was more
successful than the other. Fortunately most cases had one clear winner and one clear loser, but I
indicate where this was not the case in the coding. All cases, then, include a code for “significant
judgment/verdict for petitioner” or “significant judgment/verdict for respondent.”

Remedy Prescribed
This is perhaps the most important code for it indicates what the court orders regarding
what the BIA initially stated in the first case in the dyad. The two codes are “explicit application
of ALC’s remedy and “explicit non-application of ALC’s remedy.” There is also an “other”
category where non-explicit prescriptions can be coded. It is here that we are able to discern
whether the case is an instance of active deference, inactive deference, inactive non-deference,
and active non-deference. As I have argued elsewhere, relying on the “disposition of the case”
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code is inadequate for determining whether or not deference has occurred; instead the
“disposition of case” code and the “remedy prescribed” code must be taken in tandem to
determine deference.

Example of Explicit Application
In Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
appellant. Barragan-Sanchez, a Mexico native, was disallowed re-entry into the United States
after she returned to Mexico while on a non-resident visa. She left the United States on two
occasions and, during each exit, she was warned that her exit would lead to deportation pursuant
to the rules of her visa. The BIA affirmed that her exits constituted a deportable offense, and the
court begrudgingly agreed. (“Although we sympathize with petitioner's unfortunate position, we
are compelled to uphold the decision of the Special Inquiry Officer as affirmed by the Appeals
Board. Unfortunately for petitioner, we do not act as a court of equity (Barragan-Sanchez, 760.”)
The majority of the court’s opinion was dedicated to applying the Board’s interpretation of the
Fleuti doctrine.

Example of Explicit Non-Application
In Diallo v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Diallo, a
native of Mauritania, illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum out of fear of
racial persecution in his home country. His asylum application was denied and he was thus
referred to an immigration court to answer to a deportation order for his illegal entry. The Board
ruled against Diallo, finding that his testimony was not credible by interpreting that the situation
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Diallo cited in Mauritania was not dangerous enough to warrant asylum. The court, explicitly
applying Chevron, ruled the opposite: though the Board’s interpretation of the Mauritania facts
could be accurate, they do not explain why Diallo’s claims are insufficient. As a result, the court
explicitly does not accept the Board’s approach to the Diallo situation and rule in favor of Diallo
with a remand to the Board.

Temporal Relationship to Chevron and Reference to Other Doctrine Schemes
This code indicates whether or not a case’s opinion cites and/or applies Chevron doctrine.
At first glance this appears to be a doctrine that only applies for cases decided after 1984;
however Eskridge and Baer point to seven distinct deference doctrines that were implemented
both before and after Chevron. The “pre-Chevron” and ”post-Chevron” codes are selfexplanatory and need no explication here, but if the “post-Chevron” code is indicated then I also
determine whether or not the case applies Chevron, for just because a case occurs after Chevron
that does not necessarily mean that the doctrine was applied. To code this, I do a text search for
Chevron. If the text search elicits a Chevron reference, then I determine whether or not the case
actively applies the doctrine. Those cases coded “Chevron non-application” are cases that are
decided after 1984 that do not cite and/or apply Chevron.

Example of Chevron Application
In Nwozuzu v. Holder, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Nwozuzu,
originally from Nigeria though the parents of American citizens and present in the United States
before he turned eighteen, was denied citizenship as a result of (1) committing a crime, and (2)
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briefly leaving the United States to return to Nigeria and, thus, interrupting his presence in the
United States. The Board claimed that Congress did not speak explicitly to this particularly
circumstance. The Court disagreed wholeheartedly, citing Chevron and discussing their role
pursuant to it. They argued that Congress did, in fact, explicitly discuss this issue and, in so
doing, concluded that individuals like Nwozuzu were eligible for citizenship.

Further, I code for whether the case refers to another non-Chevron deference doctrine as
defined by Eskridge and Baer: Curtiss-Wright deference, Seminole Rock deference, Beth Israel
deference, Skidmore deference, consultative deference (Smith v. City of Jackson), or
antideference (PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin). This is also done through a text search of the opinion.
Almost every case does not reference another doctrine besides Chevron: only one case cites
another decision (Skidmore) but it is not applied.

Reason for Decision
This is by far the most complicated and subjective code and it required an extremely
close reading of the text of the opinion to discern. In short, I code for why the case was decided
as it was. This code varies across BIA and courts of appeals cases, and I will disaggregate all
types here. Almost all cases include at least two codes.

BIA: Violation of Statutory Requirements
In cases where this was indicated, I (1) determine whether the immigrant was successful
or unsuccessful at the BIA, and (2) determine if the reason for the decision was for a statutory
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reason. This generally means that the immigrant was in violation of the INA or IIRIRA,
oftentimes because of illegal entry or criminal activity that can lead to deportation. Since most
cases before the BIA have outcomes that rule against the immigrant, there are very few cases
coded as “non-violation of statutory requirements.”

Example of Violation
In In Re Gadda, the Board ruled against Gadda. Gadda, an attorney who litigates
immigration cases, was disbarred for “egregious and repeated acts of professional misconduct”
by the Supreme Court of California. Even so, he continued to represent clients before the Board,
arguing that since the Supreme Court of California is a state-level disbarment it has no
implications on his ability to litigate before administrative courts. The Board disagreed, arguing
that by Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations the Board has the authority to sanction
attorneys as a result of disbarment proceedings in state courts.

BIA: (In)adequate Factual Support for Petitioner or for Respondent
These codes, though imperfect, offer a means for understanding who was the party at
fault that led to the outcome of the decision. In short:

1. If the agency acted correctly leading to an anti-immigrant decision, then there was
adequate factual support for the petitioner.
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In In Re Blake, the Board ruled against Blake. Blake, a lawful permanent resident from an
unnamed country, was convicted of sexual assault of a minor in violation of the New York Penal
Code. He pleaded guilty and was called before an immigration court for removal to his home
country. He requested a waiver allowing him to stay in the United States and when his request
was unsuccessful he appealed to the BIA. In their decision, the Board affirmed the Immigration
Judge’s decision regarding the waiver, arguing that the waiver Blake requested is only available
in very narrow situations and that Blake’s context was not included.

2. If the agency acted incorrectly leading to a pro-immigrant decision, then there was
inadequate factual support for the petitioner.
In Marino v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellant.
Marino, an Italian national, was admitted to the United States as a non-resident visitor and later
applied for an adjustment of status to permanent resident. His petition was denied due to
conviction in Italy of “fraudulent destruction of his own property.” On appeal, he argued that his
crime was not one of moral turpitude and that the BIA ruled incorrectly due to a misapplication
of the facts of his Italian crime. The court agreed, stating that by not exhausting his appeals in
Italy the facts of the case have not been fully vetted and verified. Any conclusions drawn from
the facts by the BIA, then, are not conclusive.

3. If the immigrant acted correctly leading to a pro-immigrant decision, then there was
adequate factual support for the respondent.
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In Matter of Hill, the INS appealed a decision in favor of Hill, an English national, who
was ultimately unsuccessful before the Board. Hill voluntarily admitted to being a “practicing
homosexual” when he was examined upon arrival in San Francisco. Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, homosexuality was prohibited among immigrants out of concerns for public
health. The Board found that the Immigration Judge misapplied the facts of the case to allow
Hill’s entry and sustained the appeal. Though the immigrant was ultimately unsuccessful in this
case, the Board ruled against the immigration court which constitutes this code.

4. If the immigrant acted incorrectly leading to an anti-immigrant decision, then there was
inadequate factual support for the respondent.
In Matter of Gonzalez De Lara, the Board ruled against Gonzalez De Lara, a Mexican
national convicted of marijuana possession. Gonzalez De Lara argued that his status as a child of
a United States citizen even though she did not know the exact location of her birth and the fact
that she did not obtain her citizenship certification until she was in her thirties. The Board picked
up on some inconsistencies in Gonzalez De Lara’s argument (i.e. that his mother’s marriage
certificate stated her birth location) that indicated that the claims of his mother’s unknown
citizenship were facetious and that, as a result, he was an alien who was eligible for deportation
after his possession charge.

Rationales for Circuit Court Cases
The Courts of Appeals codes exclusively focus on the facts of the decision as they relate
to the actions of the BIA; the facts of the case are only relevant as necessary to understand how
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the administrative court made their decision in the first case of the dyad. As with the BIA codes,
most cases have at least two codes indicated.

Court of Appeals (CA): (In)adequate Application of Facts
The courts of appeals have de novo discretion to review the facts of a case on appeal.
This code captures whether the BIA correctly or incorrectly used the facts of the case correctly in
order to draw conclusions regarding the case at hand. When this code is used, two things
generally occur: the court state this very early in the decision, and the decisions are relatively
short.

Example of Adequate Application
In Von Pervieux v. INS, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellant.
The Von Pervieux family, originally from Argentina, sought to overstay their travel visa to
remain permanently in the United States. On appeal from an anti-Von Pervieux decision, the 3rd
Circuit actively affirmed, under Chevron, that the facts extolled in the Board decision clearly
indicated that the Von Pervieux family, no matter their claims to the contrary, intended to
circumvent the immigration process and were thus excludable under the governing immigration
laws.

180

Example of Inadequate Application
In McMullen v. INS, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellee.
McMullen, an Irish national and IRA defector, sought refuge in the United States to avoid
persecution and probable death at the hands of the IRA. When he relayed his story to the BIA, he
was met with skepticism that his situation was as dire as he suggested. The Board, in particular,
based their opinion on the fact that McMullen, under extant evidentiary rules, was responsible
for bearing the burden of proof and fell short of proving his case. The 9th Circuit disagreed with
this conclusion, stating that just because an immigrant may be tempted to lie to gain permanent
entry does not mean that an immigrant is necessarily untrustworthy.

CA: (In)adequate Application of Statute
If this code is indicated, then the decision hinges at least in part on the BIA (1) using the
correct statutory authority in a particular case, and (2) applying the statute correctly given the
facts of the case.

Example of Adequate Application
In Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals
found in favor of the appellant. Jolley was born in the United States but defected to Canada to
avoid compulsory military service. In so doing he renounced his U.S. citizenship. When he
attempted to marry a U.S. citizen to regain his American citizenship, he was denied entry and
citizenship as a result of his prior actions. The Board ruled against Jolley due to his violation of
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the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the 5th Circuit actively affirmed that application of the
statute.

Example of Inadequate Application
In Blake v. Carbone (the second half of the Blake dyad alluded to above), the 2nd Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellant. Blake, to refresh, pleaded guilty to statutory
rape and requested a waiver that would allow him to remain in the United States. As
aforementioned, the Board rejected his request on grounds that the waiver was only applicable in
a very narrow set of circumstances. The court did not accept this argument: the Board’s focus on
the grounds for deportation rather than the particular circumstances under which the waiver is
applicable was misplaced under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

CA: (In)adequate Statutory Interpretation
I borrow Black’s definition of statutory interpretation as “the interpretation of a statute by
the court, [and] principles developed for legislation interpretation by courts” and apply it using
the following codes. If one of these codes is indicated, then the BIA has interpreted the statute in
question correctly or incorrectly. In cases with this code decided after 1984, we often observe
that Chevron is cited and discussed.
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Example of Adequate Interpretation
In Leal v. Holder, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellant. Leal, a
native of Mexico who entered illegally but married a U.S. citizen and had four children with U.S.
citizenship, was ordered deportable due to his frequent and nearly lethal tendency to drive while
intoxicated. The Board found, and the court affirmed, that Leal’s actions constituted moral
turpitude and thus were deportable actions as defined by the Arizona criminal code and the
Immigration and Nationality Act. The entirety of the opinion is dedicated to explicating the
reasons why the Board’s conclusions regarding moral turpitude were appropriate.

Example of Inadequate Interpretation
In Goldeshtein v. INS, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the appellee.
Goldeshtein, an Israeli national, was convicted of doctoring financial documents in order to
avoid currency reports; he was sentenced to an extended period in prison and, upon the
conclusion of his sentence, he was ordered deportable. The Board argued that his crimes
necessarily constituted moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act since it
required malicious intent. The court, in contrast, disagreed: “fraud is not inherent in the nature of
the request....Accordingly, proof of intent was not required to convict Goldeshtein (Goldeshtein,
649-650).”
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CA: (In)adequate Application of Doctrine
I borrow Black’s definition of doctrine as “a rule, principle, theory, or tenet of the law”
and apply it using the following codes. This code is very similar to the “application of statute”
code but where the aforementioned code refers to statutory law, this code refers to law inscribed
in court doctrine. This is a very common code in conjunction with the statutory interpretation
codes.

Example of Adequate Application
In Diaz-Casteneda v. Holder, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
appellant. Diaz-Casteneda and her husband, both Mexican nationals, entered the United States
illegally, departed for Mexico, and subsequently attempted to re-enter the United States. Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, individuals who initially enter the United States illegally
are ineligible for permanent residence; when the pair attempted re-entry, they were necessarily
deportable. The court’s decision revolved around the Board’s interpretation of In Re Briones, a
2007 BIA precedent decision that declared that “recidivist immigration violators” are ineligible
for an adjustment of status (In re Briones, 24 I&N Dec. 355 (2007)). The court argued that the
Board’s application of Briones was both appropriate and adequate.

Example of Inadequate Application
In Lok v. INS, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the appellee. Lok, a
Chinese national from Hong Kong, initially overstayed a crewman’s visa but followed all
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channels required to become a legal resident of the United States upon marrying a U.S. citizen.
Shortly following his legal status, he was convicted and pled guilty to distribution of a narcotic
and was sentenced to five years in prison. He conceded deportability but requested a waiver
under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board did not grant the waiver based on its
long-standing reticence to rule against immigrants who have committed crimes that constitute
moral turpitude. But the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Lennon v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (which the Board also cited), stated that where an immigrant’s situation is
ambiguous the courts should rule in favor of the immigrant because “deportation is not, of
course, a penal sanction. But in severity it surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal
penalties (Lennon, 193).”

Per curiam and concurring/dissenting opinions
This dissertation does not use the text of concurring or dissenting opinions to interpret
deferential intent per se; however, the authorial partisanship of those opinions is used to
ascertain the partisan motivations of the case at hand. Conversely, indicating whether or not a
case is per curiam indicates that determining the partisanship of the judicial panel will need to be
calculated in a different way (i.e. through aggregate partisanship of the court in that year). By
indicating the nature of the case, we can know that the partisan indication of the case is less
exact.
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Judges’ names and partisanship of the panel
Coding decisions for partisanship presents a challenge. Since all measures are imperfect
at best, I employ several different means for ascertaining partisanship. The first approach codes
each judge’s partisanship and aggregates partisanship of the judicial panel. To proxy
partisanship, I identified each judge’s appointing president and assigned the partisanship of the
president to that judge. Where a judge was appointed by presidents of two parties, I code the
judge as having the partisanship of the initial appointing president (though this is only the case in
x% of cases).
I ascribe a +1 value for Democratic-appointed judges and a -1 value for Republicanappointed judges. I add the values for each panel and note the result. For the majority of cases
each each panel is composed of three judges, and as such the most common values are +3 (three
Democratic judges), +1 (two Democratic judges and one Republican judge), -1 (one Democratic
judge and two Republican judges), and -3 (three Republican judges).
By noting the names of the judges in concert with the aggregate partisanship, I can easily
indicate the partisanship of the author of the opinion. This provides the opportunity to more
closely examine cases where the author of the opinion is of a different party than his or her peers
on the panel.

Direction of Opinion
The second way I proxy partisanship is through determining whether the decision is “proimmigrant” or “anti-immigrant” as defined by Epstein, Landes, and Posner. Again, this is
imperfect and prone to overgeneralization. However, throughout the sixty years under
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examination the Republican party has generally been in favor of restricting immigration
bureaucratically while the Democratic party has generally been in favor of loosening regulatory
restrictions on immigration.

Example of Anti-Immigrant:
In Peignand v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the appellant. Peignand, a native of the Dominican Republic, was born out of
wedlock to Dominican parents. The mother formally recognized the child and shortly thereafter
became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Peignand was then convicted of possession of heroin and was
sentenced to a prison term and deportation to the Dominican Republic. He argued that due to his
mother’s citizenship he is precluded from being deported since he is a U.S. citizen by extension.
The court disagreed, stating that Peignand was never “legitimated” in the Dominican Republic
due to his birth out of wedlock and thus his mother’s citizenship could not be used as an
argument for non-deportation.

Example of Pro-Immigrant:
In Wong v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in favor of the appellee. Wong, a Chinese national who entered the United States illegally
by claiming he was the child of American citizens, successfully resided in the United States
continuously until a three-hour sight-seeing trip to Mexico. His military service ended one month
too early to be an avenue towards becoming a legal resident. The Board ruled that his trip to
Mexico was grounds for deportation since he was not continuously present in the United States;
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the 9th Circuit disagreed, stating that a three-hour trip to Mexico did not constitute a meaningful
absence in the United States.

Overall Partisanship of the Board/Court of Appeals/Supreme Court
I contextualize the aforementioned measures of partisanship through indicating the
overall partisanship of the instant court and the Supreme Court at the time the decision is made.
This aggregates the judge partisanship measure discussed above and takes into account the date a
decision is made – using these data I can indicate the partisanship of a court down to the day.

Nation of Origin
The nation of origin of the immigrant at the center of each case is indicated with this
code. For the vast majority of cases, this indicates the nationality of the immigrant. In a handful
of circumstances the nation of origin code refers to the country the immigrant most recently
came from but does not indicate the initial nationality of the immigrant. This is most common in
cases involving refugee and Convention Against Torture (CAT) cases where an immigrant has
left their country of origin out of safety concerns but is emigrating from a secondary country.
This was also the case in the Marks series of cases where an American emigrated to Cuba to join
revolutionary forces and was thus disallowed from re-entering the United States.
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Type of Case
Here I code for the seven kinds of cases that the BIA are tasked with hearing as
delineated by the IRIIRA (though they heard a similar set of cases prior to the passage of that
statute. These cases are removal proceedings, bond redetermination hearings, rescission hearings,
withholding-only hearing, asylum-only hearing, credible fear review, claimed status review, in
absentia hearing, and other. With the exception of one case coded as “other” (a disbarment
claim), all cases are coded as “removal”. Though there are cases that involve asylum claims and
credible fear concerns, they also involve removal considerations and are thus coded as removal
cases.
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Appendix E: Dyads Included in the Sample
To identify dyads, I examined each BIA precedent decision as catalogued in the Lexis
Nexis “Immigration Precedent Decisions: BIA, AAO/AAU” database. Most, but not all,
precedent decisions are available on the EOIR’s website; all precedent decisions are available on
Lexis Nexis. This made using the Lexis Nexis source the superior option. I then Shepardized
each BIA precedent decision. Any precedent decision that had future appellate activity in the
courts of appeals was identified as a dyad. Before beginning to read and code the decisions in
earnest, I did an initial review of the dyads to ensure that the Shepardize feature correctly
identified dyads. There were a handful of dyads (less than 5%) that were incorrectly identified as
dyads by the Shepardize feature. The remainder of dyads identified constitutes the dataset used
for this project.

The Circella Dyad
In re C----

United States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli

5 I&N Dec. 370 (1953)

216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954)
The Klapholz Dyad

In re K----

Klapholz v. Esperdy

9 I&N Dec. 143 (1959)

302 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1962)
The Title Dyad

In re T----

Title v. INS

9 I&N Dec. 127 (1960)

322 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1963)
The Scythes Dyad

In re S----

Scythes v. Webb

9 I&N Dec. 252 (1961)

307 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1962)
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The Marks Dyad
In re M----

United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy

9 I&N Dec. 452 (1961)

315 F.2d 673 (2nd Cir. 1963)

The Hernandez-Valensuela Dyad
In re H--- V----

Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg

9 I&N Dec. 428 (1961)

304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962)
The Sawkow Dyad

In re S----

Sawkow v. INS

9 I&N Dec. 613 (1962)

314 F.2d 34 (3rd Cir. 1963)
The Amarante Dyad

In re A----

Amarante v. Rosenberg

9 I&N Dec. 705 (1962)

326 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1964)
The Costello Dyad

In re C----

Costello v. INS

9 I&N Dec. 524 (1962)

311 F.2d 343 (2nd Cir. 1962)

The Garcia-Castillo Dyad
In re Garcia-Castillo

Castillo v. INS

10 I&N Dec. 516 (1964)

350 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965)
The Kinj/King Dyad

In re Kinj

King v. Katzenbach

11 I&N Dec. 42 (1965)

360 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1966)
The G. Wong Dyad

In re Wong

Git Foo Wong v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 106 (1965)

358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966)
The Lavoie Dyad

In re Lavoie

Lavoie v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 224 (1965)

418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969)

The Caudillo-Villalobos Dyad
In re Caudillo-Villalobos

Caudillo-Villalobos v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 259 (1965)

361 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1966)
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The Pang Dyad
In re Pang

Ah Chiu Pang v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 489 (1966)

368 F.2d 637 (3rd Cir. 1966)
The De Lucia Dyad

In re De Lucia

De Lucia v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 565 (1966)

370 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1967)
The Talanoa Dyad

In re Talanoa

Talanoa v. INS

11 I&N Dec. 630 (1966)

397 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1968)
The Ferrante Dyad

In re Ferrante

Ferrante v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 166 (1967)

399 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1968)
The Talanoa Dyad

In re Talanoa

Talanoa v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 187 (1967)

397 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1968)
The Nason Dyad

In re Nason

Nason v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 452 (1967)

394 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1968)

The Castillo-Godoy Dyad
In re Castillo-Godoy

Godoy v. Rosenberg

12 I&N Dec. 520 (1967)

415 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1969)
The Ho Dyad

In re Ho

Ho Yeh Sze v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 148 (1967)

389 F.2d 978 (1968)
The Riva Dyad

In re Riva

Riva v. Mitchell

12 I&N Dec. 646 (1968)

460 F.2d 1121 (3rd Cir. 1972)
The Yam Dyad

In re Yam

Yam Sang Kwai v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 676 (1968)

411 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
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The Gonzalez de Lara Dyad
In re Gonzalez de Lara

Gonzalez de Lara v. United States

12 I&N Dec. 806 (1968)

439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971)
The Becerra Dyad

In re Becerra

Becerra Monje v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 19 (1968)

418 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1969)

The Tsimbidy-Rochu Dyad
In re Tsimbidy-Rochu

Tsimbidy-Rochu v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 56 (1968)

414 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1969)
The Lee F.C. Dyad

In re Lee

Lee Fook Chuey v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 236 (1969)

439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1970)
The Laqui Dyad

In re Laqui

Laqui v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 232 (1969)

422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970)
The Au Dyad

In re Au

Au Yi Lau v. INS

12 I&N Dec. 294 (1969)

445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
The Yaldo Dyad

In re Yaldo

Yaldo v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 374 (1969)

424 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1970)
The Singh Dyad

In re Singh

Singh v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 439 (1969)

456 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1972)

The Martinez and Londono Dyad
In re Martinez

Londono v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 483 (1970)

433 F.2d 635 (2nd Cir. 1970)
The Marin Dyad

In re Marin

Marin v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 497 (1970)

438 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971)
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The Yanez-Jaquez Dyad
In re Yanez-Jaquez

Yanez-Jaquez v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 512

440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971)
The Jolley Dyad

In re Jolley

Jolley v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 543 (1970)

441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1971)
The Peignand Dyad

In re Peignand

Peignand v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 566 (1970)

440 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1971)
The Solis-Davila Dyad

In re Solis-Davila

Solis-Davila v. INS

13 I&N Dec. 694 (1971)

456 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1972)
The Barragan Dyad

In re Barragan

Barragan-Sanchez v. Rosenberg

13 I&N Dec. 759 (1971)

471 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1972)
The L. Wong Dyad

In re Wong

Lai Haw Wong v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 12 (1972)

474 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1973)
The Bark Dyad

In re Bark

Bark v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 237 (1972)

511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975)
The Khan Dyad

In re Khan

Santiago et al v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 397 (1973)

526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975)

The Maldonado-Sandoval Dyad
In re Maldonado-Sandoval

Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 475 (1973)

518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975)
The Anaya Dyad

In re Anaya

Anaya-Perchez v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 488 (1973)

500 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1974)
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The Castro Dyad
In re Castro

Castro-Guerrro v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 492 (1973)

515 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975)
The Merced Dyad

In re Merced

Merced v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 644 (1974)

514 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975)
The Quijencio Dyad

In re Quijencio

Quijencio v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 95 (1974)

535 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1976)
The Marino Dyad

In re Marino

Marino v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 284 (1975)

537 F.2d 686 (2nd Cir. 1976)

The Montemayor/Cacho Dyad
In re Montemayor

Cacho v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 353 (1975)

547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976)

The Von Pervieux Dyad
In re Von Pervieux

Von Pervieux v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 406 (1975)

572 F.2d 114 (3rd Cir. 1978)
The S.N. Lee Dyad

In re Shon Ning Lee

Shon Ning Lee v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 439 (1975)

576 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1978)
The Rehman Dyad

In re Rehman

Rehman v. INS

14 I&N Dec. 505 (1975)

544 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 1976)
The Lok Dyad

In re Lok

Lok v. INS

15 I&N Dec. 720 (1976)

548 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1977)
The Ruangswang Dyad

In re Ruangswang

Ruangswang v. INS

16 I&N Dec. 76 (1976)

591 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1978)
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The Wang Dyad
In re Wang

Wang v. INS

16 I&N Dec. 528 (1978)

602 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979)
The McMullen Dyad

In re McMullen

McMullen v. INS

17 I&N Dec. 542 (1980)

658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981)
The Hill Dyad

In re Hill

Hill v. INS

18 I&N Dec. 81 (1981)

714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)
The Gunaydin Dyad

In re Gunaydin

Gunaydin v. INS

18 I&N Dec. 326 (1982)

742 F.2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1984)
The Laipenieks Dyad

In re Laipenieks

Laipenieks v. INS

18 I&N Dec. 433 (1983)

750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)
The Kulle Dyad

In re Kulle

Kulle v. INS

19 I&N Dec. 318 (1985)

825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987)

The (Name Redacted) Dyad
In re A-G-

(Name Redacted) v. INS

19 I&N Dec. 502 (1987)

858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988)

The Maldonado-Cruz Dyad
Maldonado-Cruz v. Department of

In re Maldonado-Cruz

Immigration and Naturalization

19 I&N Dec. 509 (1988)

883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989)

The Canas-Segovia Dyad
In re Canas

Canas-Segovia v. INS

19 I&N Dec. 697 (1988)

902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990)
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The Goldeshtein Dyad
In re Goldeshtein

Goldeshtein v. INS

20 I&N Dec. 382 (1991)

8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993)
The Kofa Dyad

In re K-

Kofa v. INS

20 I&N Dec. 418 (1991)

60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995)
The Garawan Dyad

In re Garawan

Garawan v. INS

20 I&N Dec. 938 (1995)

91 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1996)
The Shaar Dyad

In re Shaar

Shaar v. INS

21 I&N Dec. 541 (1996)

141 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1998)
The Rivera Dyad

In re Rivera

Rivera v. INS

21 I&N Dec. 232 (1996)

122 F.3d 1062 (4th Cir. 1997)

The Lettman Dyad, pt. 1
In re Lettman

Lettman v. Reno

22 I&N Dec. 365 (1998)

168 F.3d 463 (11th Cir. 1999)

The Konstantinova Dyad
In re L-V-K-

Konstantinova v. INS

22 I&N Dec. 976 (1999)

195 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 1999)
The Diallo Dyad

In re M-D-

Diallo v. INS

21 I&N Dec. 1180 (1998)

232 F.3d 279 (2nd Cir. 2000)

The Lettman Dyad, pt. 2
In re Lettman

Lettman v. Reno

22 I&N Dec. 365 (1998)

207 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2000)
The Dillingham Dyad

In re Dillingham

Dillingham v. INS

21 I&N Dec. 1001 (1997)

267 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001)
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The Gadda Dyad
In re Gadda

Gadda v. Ashcroft

23 I&N Dec. 645 (2003)

377 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2004)
The Agyeman Dyad

In re Agyeman

Agyeman v. Gonzales

1999 BIA LEXIS 52 (1999)

155 Fed. Appx. 961 (9th Cir. 2005)
The Pickering Dyad

In re Pickering

Pickering v. Gonzales

23 I&N Dec. 621 (2003)

454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006)

The Vargas-Sarmiento Dyad
In re Vargas-Sarmiento

Vargas-Sarmiento v. Department of Justice

23 I&N Dec. 651 (2004)

448 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2006)
The Ahmed Dyad

In re Ahmed in Removal Proceedings

Ahmed v. Gonzales

2005 BIA LEXIS 25 (2005)

467 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2006)

The Maya-Cruz Dyad
In re Maya-Cruz

Maya-Cruz v. Keisler

2004 BIA LEXIS 20 (2004)

252 Fed. Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2007)
The Blake Dyad

In re Blake

Blake v. Carbone

23 I&N Dec. 722 (2005)

489 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2007)
The Smriko Dyad
Smriko v. Attorney General of the United

In re Smriko

States

23 I&N Dec. 836 (2005)

220 Fed. Appx. 103 (3rd Cir. 2007)
The Negusie Dyad

In re Negusie

Negusie v. Gonzales

2006 BIA LEXIS 37 (2006)

231 Fed. Appx. 325 (5th Cir. 2007)
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The Orozco-Solis Dyad
In re Orozco-Solis

Orozco-Solis v. Mukasey

2006 BIA LEXIS 34 (2006)

270 Fed. Appx. 689 (9th Cir. 2008)
The Liadov Dyad

In re Liadov

Liadov v. Mukasey

23 I&N Dec. 990 (2006)

518 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2008)

The Gertsenshteyn Dyad
In re Gertsenshteyn

Gertsenshteyn v. Department of Justice

24 I&N Dec. 111 (2007)

544 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 2008)
The Triumph Dyad

In re Triumph

Triumph v. Holder

2006 BIA LEXIS 28 (2006)

314 Fed. Appx. 725 (5th Cir. 2009)
The Tejwani Dyad
Tejwani v. Attorney General of the United

In re Tejwani

States

24 I&N Dec. 97 (2007)

349 Fed. Appx. 719 (3rd Cir. 2009)
The Escobar Dyad

In re Escobar

Escobar v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 231 (2007)

567 F.3d 466 (2009)
The Ndayshimiye Dyad
Ndayshimiye v. Attorney General of the

In re J-B-N-

United States

24 I&N Dec. 208 (2007)

557 F.3d 124 (3rd Cir. 2009)
The Lemus-Losa Dyad

In re Lemus-Losa

Lemus-Losa v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 373 (2007)

576 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2009)

The Carachuri-Rosendo Dyad
In re Carachuri-Rosendo

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 382 (2007)

570 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2009)
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The Chen Dyad
In re C-C-

Chun Hua Chen v. Holder

23 I&N Dec. 899 (2006)

343 Fed. Appx. 652 (2nd Cir. 2009)
The Abreu Dyad

In re Abreu

Cardenes Abreu v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 795 (2009)

378 Fed. Appx. 59 (2nd Cir. 2010)

The Soriano-Vino Dyad
In re Lourdes Soriano-Vino in Removal

Soriano-Vino v. Holder

Proceedings

653 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2011)

2003 BIA LEXIS 17 (2003)

The M.F. Wong Dyad
In re M-F-W-

Mei Fun Wong v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 633 (2008)

633 F.3d 64 (2nd Cir. 2011)
The Robles-Urrea Dyad

In re Robles

Robles-Urrea v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 22 (2006)

678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012)

The Monges-Garcia Dyad
In re Monges

Monges-Garcia v. Holder

25 I&N Dec. 246 (2010)

482 Fed. Appx. 272 (9th Cir. 2012)

The Almanza-Arenas Dyad, pt. 1
In re Almanza-Arenas

Almanza-Arenas v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 771 (2009)

771 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2014)

The Almanza-Arenas Dyad, pt. 2
In re Almanza-Arenas

Almanza-Arenas v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 771 (2009)

815 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 2016)

The Diaz-Castaneda Dyad
In re Diaz and Lopez

Diaz-Castaneda v. Holder

25 I&N Dec. 188 (2010)

540 Fed. Appx. 632 (9th Cir. 2013)
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The Moody Dyad
In re Moody

Moody v. Holder

2012 BIA LEXIS 40 (2012)

523 Fed. Appx. 88 (2nd Cir. 2013)

The Fernandez-Taveras Dyad
Taveras v. Attorney General of the United

In re Fernandez-Taveras

States

25 I&N Dec. 834 (2012)

731 F.3d 281 (3rd Cir. 2013)
The Akram Dyad

In re Akram

Akram v. Holder

25 I&N Dec. 874 (2012)

721 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2013)

The Silva-Trevino Dyad
In re Silva-Trevino

Silva-Trevino v. Holder

24 I&N Dec. 687 (2008)

742 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2014)
The Bautista Dyad
Bautista v. Attorney General of the United

In re Bautista

States

25 I&N Dec. 616 (2011)

744 F.3d 54 (3rd Cir. 2014)
The Leal Dyad

In re Leal

Leal v. Holder

26 I&N Dec. 20 (2012)

771 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2014)
The Rivas Dyad

In re Rivas

Rivas v. United States Attorney General

26 I&N Dec. 130 (2013)

765 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2014)

The Ortega-Lopez Dyad
In re Ortega-Lopez

Ortega-Lopez v. Lynch

26 I&N Dec. 99 (2013)

834 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2016)
The Enkui Li Dyad

In re [Name Redacted by the Court]

Enkui Li v. Lynch

2013 BIA LEXIS 25 (2013)

633 Fed. Appx. 560 (2nd Cir. 2016)
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The Hernandez Dyad
In re Hernandez

Hernandez v. Lynch

26 I&N Dec. 464 (2015)

823 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2016)

The Esquivel-Quintana Dyad
In re Esquivel-Quintana

Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch

26 I&N Dec. 469 (2015)

810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016)
The Garay-Reyes Dyad

In re W-G-R-

Garay-Reyes v. Lynch

26 I&N Dec. 208 (2014)

842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016)
The Obeya Dyad

In re Obeya

Obeya v. Sessions

26 I&N Dec. 856 (2016)

884 F.3d 442 (2nd Cir. 2018)
The Richmond Dyad

In re Richmond

Richmond v. Sessions

26 I&N Dec. 779 (2016)

697 Fed. Appx. 106 (2nd Cir. 2017)

The M. Hernandez Dyad
Matter of M-H-Z-

Hernandez v. Sessions

26 I&N Dec. 757 (2016)

884 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 2018)

The Gomez-Sanchez Dyad
In re G-G-S-

Gomez-Sanchez v. Sessions

26 I&N Dec. 339 (2014)

887 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018)
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Appendix F: Proportion of Law Review Citations on Chevron
To ascertain the ubiquity of discussions regarding the Chevron doctrine in the legal
literature, I identified the number of mentions of Chevron in the text of law review articles
between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2019. I used Washington and Lee University School
of Law’s 2018 ranked list of law reviews and examined the twenty-five highest ranked
publications. To determine the number of Chevron cites, I conducted a LexisNexis search for
“Chevron” by journal between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 2019. To determine the
number of total cites, I conducted a LexisNexis search for “law” by journal between January 1,
1985 and December 31, 2019.

Law Review by Rank

Total Cites since

Total Chevron Cites

1985

Proportion of
Chevron Cites

Yale Law Journal

2683

210

7.83%

Harvard Law Review

4493

356

7.92%

Stanford Law Review

1506

91

6.04%

1950

232

11.90%

1798

144

8.01%

1820

135

7.42%

1859

136

7.32%

2857

187

6.55%

Columbia Law
Review
Univ. of
Pennsylvania Law
Review
Texas Law Review
Georgetown Law
Journal
Fordham Law
Review

203

California Law

1771

98

5.53%

204

33

16.18%

Iowa Law Review

1515

110

7.26%

Cornell Law Review

1340

114

8.51%

1730

122

7.05%

1491

146

9.79%

1597

131

8.20%

Virginia Law Review

592

38

6.42%

UCLA Law Review

1386

92

6.64%

1851

169

9.13%

1562

107

6.85%

1184

99

8.36%

2620

164

6.26%

1706

154

9.03%

1333

187

14.03%

1365

67

4.91%

1390

125

8.99%

43603

3447

8.24%

Review
Supreme Court
Review

Vanderbilt Law
Review
New York Univ. Law
Review
Minnesota Law
Review

Univ. of Chicago
Law Review
Boston Univ. Law
Review
Boston College Law
Review
Michigan Law
Review
Notre Dame Law
Review
Duke Law Journal
Southern California
Law Review
William and Mary
Law Review
Total

204

Appendix G: χ2 Results
Along with logistic regressions, I ran a series of χ2 tests to ascertain the extent of the
relationship between agency win/loss and deference type with a series of independent variables.
The control variables used for each of the regressions were also used for the χ2 tests; details can
be found in footnotes in Chapter 3.

Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Universe
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Panel Match

2.497

4

0.645

Court Match

0.749

3

0.862

0.902

2

0.637

2.856

4

0.582

5.381

2

0.068

16.496

3

0.001

Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel
Partisanship
Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship
Board of Immigration
Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam
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Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Universe
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Panel Match

1.627

4

0.804

Court Match

1.058

3

0.787

0.267

2

0.875

8.774

4

0.067

7.901

2

0.019

5.650

3

0.130

Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel
Partisanship
Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship
Board of Immigration
Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Pre-Chevron
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Panel Match
Court Match

Significance

n/a
11.184

3

0.011

2.837

2

0.242

Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel
Partisanship

206

Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship

3.591

4

Board of Immigration

n/a

Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

0.464

12.576

3

0.006

Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Pre-Chevron
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Panel Match
Court Match
Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel Partisanship
Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship

n/a
0.201

3

0.977

0.823

2

0.663

6.824

4

0.146

Board of Immigration

n/a

Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

Significance

1.904

3

207

0.592

Effect of Numerous Variables on Agency Win or Loss: Post-Chevron
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Panel Match

2.457

4

0.652

Court Match

1.540

3

0.673

1.553

2

0.460

1.729

3

0.631

4.573

2

0.102

18.217

3

0.000

Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel Partisanship
Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship
Board of Immigration
Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

Effect of Numerous Variables on Deference Type: Post-Chevron
Independent Variable

χ2

Degrees of Freedom

Significance

Panel Match

2.994

4

0.559

Court Match

2.162

3

0.539

0.051

2

0.975

7.725

3

0.052

Board of Immigration
Appeals Panel Partisanship
Court of Appeals Panel
Partisanship
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Board of Immigration
Appeals Per Curiam
Court of Appeals Per
Curiam

2.360

2

0.307

6.398

3

0.094
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